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Unit-demand auctions have been well studied with applications in sev-
eral areas. In this dissertation, we discuss new variants of the unit-demand
auction that are motivated by practical applications. We design mechanisms
for these variants that have strong properties related to truthfulness, efficiency,
scalability, and privacy. The main contributions of this dissertation can be di-
vided into two parts.
In the first part, we introduce a new variant of the classic sealed-bid
unit-demand auction in which each item is associated with a put option; the
put option of an item gives the seller the right to sell the item at a speci-
fied strike price to a specified bidder, regardless of market conditions. We
motivate our unit-demand auction setting by discussing applications to the
reassignment of leases, and to the design of multi-round auctions. For the
classic sealed-bid unit-demand framework, the VCG mechanism provides a
vii
truthful auction with strong associated guarantees, including efficiency and
envy-freedom. For an item in our auction, the strike price of the associated
put imposes a lower bound on the auction price. Due to these lower bound
constraints on auction prices, we find that the VCG mechanism is not suitable
for our setting. Instead, our work draws on two fundamental techniques, one
from the realm of mechanism design for numerical preferences — the dynamic
unit-demand approximate auction of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor — and
one from the realm of mechanism design for ordinal preferences — the Top
Trading Cycles algorithm — to obtain a natural auction that satisfies the lower
bound constraints on auction prices. While we cannot, in general, achieve ei-
ther efficiency or envy-freedom in our setting, our auction achieves suitably
relaxed versions of these properties. For example, this auction is envy-free for
all bidders who do not acquire an item via the exercise of a put. We provide
a polynomial time implementation of this auction. By breaking ties in an
appropriate manner, we are able to prove that this auction is truthful.
In the second part, we specify rules for a dynamic unit-demand auction
that supports arbitrary bid revision. In each round, the dynamic auction
takes a tentative allocation and pricing as part of the input, and allows each
bidder — including a tentatively allocated bidder — to submit an arbitrary
unit-demand bid. Each round of our dynamic auction is implemented via a
single application of the sealed-bid unit-demand auction proposed in the first
part. We show that our dynamic auction satisfies strong properties related
to truthfulness and efficiency. Using a certain privacy preservation property
viii
of each round of the auction, we show that the overall dynamic auction is
highly resistant to shilling. We present a fast algorithm for implementing
the proposed auction. Using this algorithm, the amortized cost of processing
each bidding operation is upper bounded by the complexity of solving a single-
source shortest paths problem on a graph with nonnegative edge weights and a
node for each item in the auction. We also propose a dynamic price adjustment
scheme that discourages sniping by providing bidders with incentives to bid
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Online auctions have become increasingly popular over the last decade.
The overwhelming majority of online auctions are single-item auctions: mul-
tiple bidding agents bid to win a single item. In contrast, the field of combi-
natorial auction design, which enjoys a rich history in the academic literature,
is concerned with the sale of multiple items in a single auction. In such auc-
tions, agents are not limited to submitting single-item bids; for example, some
combinatorial auctions permit bids on bundles of items. Many different com-
binatorial auctions have been studied in the literature. However, auctions
involving multiple items, and especially auctions involving multiple distinct
items, are not widely encountered in practice. Significant deterrents to the
widespread adoption of combinatorial auctions include increased bid complex-
ity and the computational difficulty of determining a suitable allocation and
pricing of the items.
1.1 Overview
In this dissertation, we study unit-demand auctions. A unit-demand
auction is a restricted kind of combinatorial auction in which an agent is al-
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lowed to make a separate offer on each of a number of items, with the guarantee
that at most one of these offers will be accepted.
Consider the following concrete example of a real-world auction sce-
nario. The developer of a new high-rise condominium project wishes to sell
all of its units to the public. In this setting, each agent may assign a different
value to each unit, depending on factors such as floor plan, elevation, and view.
An agent in this auction is said to have unit-demand preference if the agent
is seeking to purchase at most one unit. In a unit-demand auction, the bid
of an agent takes the form of a unit-demand preference function: The agent
specifies an offer for each of a subset of items, with the understanding that the
bid can win at most one item. Typical online auction houses do not support
such unit-demand bids. Instead, if many items are to be sold, each is sold in
a separate auction. The resulting sequence of single-item auctions forces an
agent with unit-demand preferences to guess whether or not to bid on each
successive item, since the agent does not know the eventual selling prices of
the items. This guesswork degrades the efficiency of the allocation of items
to agents, where the efficiency of an allocation is defined as the sum, over all
items v, of the value assigned to v by the agent to which v is allocated. The
main reason to contemplate selling many items within a single unit-demand
auction, or within any form of combinatorial auction, is to reduce the need
for such guesswork, thereby enhancing efficiency. By improving efficiency, one
has the potential to improve the quality of the outcome for both buyers and
sellers alike.
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Most online auction sites are dynamic. A dynamic auction proceeds in
rounds. At the beginning of each round, new bid data (bid revision requests
and new bids) is received, and an update rule is applied to adjust the tentative
outcome (allocation and pricing). The tentative outcome is made public at the
end of each round. Dynamic auctions facilitate value discovery — agents use
their observations of the tentative outcomes published by the auction thus far
to guide their bidding behavior in the following rounds. By enhancing value
discovery, dynamic auctions make it easier to allocate items to the agents who
value them the most. Several important considerations are associated with
designing a dynamic auction. It is important that agents in a dynamic auction
are allowed to flexibly change their bids across rounds. If a dynamic auction is
overly restrictive with respect to bid revision, then there is a significant chance
that agents will limit their participation to the last round of the auction. It is
also desirable to provide agents in a dynamic auction with some strategy-proof
guarantees. As with restricted bid revision, strategic bid considerations can
have the potential to discourage agents from bidding early in the auction.
In the standard sealed-bid unit-demand context, one can apply the
well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [41, 7, 16] to obtain an
auction that is truthful, efficient, and envy-free [42]. In this dissertation,
we analyze variants of the unit-demand auction in both the sealed-bid and
dynamic settings. The first contribution of this dissertation is a variant of the
standard sealed-bid unit-demand auction in which each item is associated with
a “put” option; a put option of an item models an initial tentative allocation
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and pricing of the item. For the second contribution of this dissertation, we
use the results on the sealed-bid unit-demand auction from the first part to
design a dynamic unit-demand auction that supports arbitrary bid revision.
Below we provide an informal sketch of our proposed auctions. A for-
mal presentation of the auctions is provided in the following chapters of this
dissertation.
1.2 A Sealed-Bid Unit-Demand Auction with Put Op-
tions
In this section, we provide an overview of our proposed sealed-bid unit-
demand auction. A formal presentation of this auction is available starting
at Chapter 3 and continuing upto Chapter 8 wherein we describe the auction
and establish its properties.
A put option is a commitment between two parties — the “holder” of
the put and the “target” of the put. The holder of the put possesses the right
to sell a specified asset to the target of the put at a specified “strike price”,
regardless of the current market prices.
For the first contribution of this dissertation, we consider a new variant
of the classic sealed-bid unit-demand auction in which each item is associated
with a predetermined put option that expires when the auction terminates.
The holder of an item’s put is the seller of the item and the target is an agent
in the auction under the constraint that no agent is the target of more than
one put. We restrict attention to the case of no side-payments — the outcome
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of the auction consists of an allocation and pricing of the items, and each agent
who is allocated an item pays the item’s price to the seller of the item.
This auction setting finds motivation in several applications, some of
which are described below. As a first application, we introduce the following
“Lease Exchange” problem. Consider a number of leased apartments and a
number of agents who have unit demand preferences for renting the apart-
ments. The lessees of some apartments seek to break their current leases.
We would like to reallocate and reprice the apartments such that each lessor
receives at least the monthly rent being paid by the current lessee for the re-
mainder of the lease term. The lease exchange problem can be modeled as an
instance of a unit-demand auction with put options in the following way. Each
apartment is an item in our auction. The lessor of each apartment holds a
put of the apartment whose target is the current lessee and whose strike price
is equal to the current monthly rent of the apartment. In practice, a lease
involves many other important considerations including varying lease terms
and lessee specific adjustments that have been ignored in our simple example.
Such factors are easily handled by allowing lessors to specify additive amounts
for each option and incorporating these amounts into the bidding based on
the options chosen by each agent. We formulate a suitable solution concept
for this auction setting and we design a truthful auction that implements this
solution concept.
In combinatorial auction design, it is often useful to follow a two-phase
approach e.g. the clock-proxy auction proposed by Ausubel et al. [5]. A second
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application of our auction is in implementing the second phase of a two-phase
combinatorial auction. In general, our auction is a suitable candidate for
implementing the last round of any dynamic unit-demand auction.
A natural third application of our auction is in the design of a dy-
namic unit-demand auction in which each round is resolved using our proposed
sealed-bid unit-demand auction. In the first round of the dynamic auction, the
seller of each item holds a put whose target is a dummy agent and whose strike
price is equal to the reserve price of the item. In each subsequent round, each
item is associated with a put whose target is the agent who is tentatively allo-
cated to the item from the previous round, and whose strike price is the price
of the item determined by the auction in the previous round. Such a dynamic
auction generalizes the eBay auction to the unit-demand setting.
As previously discussed, in the standard sealed-bid unit-demand con-
text, the VCG mechanism provides an auction that is truthful, efficient, and
envy-free [42]. For an item in our setting, the strike price of the item imposes
a lower bound on the auction price of the item — by exercising the item’s put,
the seller of the item can ensure that the auction price is at least as high as
the strike price. Due to these lower bound constraints on auction prices, we
find that the VCG mechanism is not well-suited for our setting.
Moreover, in our setting, we cannot guarantee the strong properties
that are achieved by the VCG mechanism in the classic setting. For example,
consider an auction instance in which no agent bids on a particular item. The
auction would be forced to allocate the item to the target of its put at its
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associated strike price even if such an allocation violates the envy-freedom
property of the target. Accordingly, we formulate a new solution concept that
is appropriate for our setting (see Chapter 4).
1.2.1 A two-phase approach.
We construct a two-phase auction that draws on two fundamental tech-
niques, one from the realm of mechanism design for numerical preferences
— the dynamic unit-demand approximate auction of Demange et al. [10] —
and one from the realm of mechanism design for ordinal preferences — the
Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm [37]. In what follows, we will refer to
the dynamic unit-demand approximate auction of Demange et al. as DGS-
approximate. The DGS-approximate auction is an ascending-price auction
that proceeds in rounds. In each round, agents that are not tentatively allo-
cated are consulted in round-robin order and given the opportunity to either
select an item, or pass. If an unallocated agent u selects an item v, the tenta-
tive price of item v is increased by a parameter δ, and the tentative allocation
is updated to reflect that item v is allocated to agent u. The DGS-approximate
algorithm terminates when all of the unallocated agents pass.
Informally, the first phase of our auction corresponds to the following
proxy version of DGS-approximate. We fix an initial tentative allocation and
pricing of the items as follows: each item is allocated to the target of its put
and has a price equal to the strike price of its put. We associate with each agent
u, a proxy agent u′ who employs the following strategy to bid on behalf of u in
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each round of DGS-approximate: if the tentative price on every item exceeds
u’s offer on the item, then u′ passes; otherwise, u′ selects an item with the
highest utility for u (difference between u’s offer on the item and the tentative
price of the item). On termination of the auction, we identify as “unhappy”
each agent who is allocated to an item, but strictly prefers some other item
at the current prices. It is easy to see that the set of unhappy agents are a
subset of the agents in the initial tentative allocation. We note that in the
limit as δ approaches zero, the proxy based DGS-approximate auction achieves
a relaxed form of efficiency: the auction is efficient if the unit-demand bid of
each unhappy agent is replaced with a single offer on its allocated item equal
to the strike price of the item. The proxy based DGS-approximate auction
also achieves a relaxed form of envy-freedom — the auction is envy-free for all
agents other than the set of unhappy agents.
The second phase of our auction corresponds to a single application
of the TTC algorithm on a suitably defined instance of the house allocation
problem [37, 36]. The second phase of our auction affects only the allocation,
and keeps the item prices unchanged. The proposed two-phase auction com-
putes an outcome in the weak core and achieves the relaxed forms of efficiency
and envy-freedom that are described with respect to the first phase. Alterna-
tively, by employing the TC≺ algorithm of Jaramillo and Manjunath [19] in
the second phase, we achieve Pareto-efficiency of our two-phase auction. The
TC≺ algorithm runs in polynomial time and produces a strategy-proof and
Pareto-efficient outcome for the house allocation problem in the absence of
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strict preferences.
The two-phase approach proposed above has two shortcomings. Firstly,
the auction is not truthful for any positive value of δ. Secondly, the δ parameter
associated with the DGS-approximate auction leads to a trade-off between
speed and efficiency in the first phase. The running time of the first phase
increases as δ diminishes (it takes O(1/δ) time to increase the item prices by
a constant). Furthermore, for large values of δ, the auction is not efficient,
even in the relaxed form discussed above. We address these shortcomings in
our work. We provide a polynomial time implementation of the first phase
auction (see Section 8.7). By carefully breaking ties, we successfully obtain
a truthful first phase auction (see Lemma 8.4.9). The composition of two
truthful auctions is not necessarily truthful. We successfully show that the
two-phase auction obtained by composing the truthful first and second phases
is also truthful (see Lemma 8.4.10).
1.3 A Dynamic Unit-Demand Auction Supporting Ar-
bitrary Bid Revision
In this section, we provide an overview of our proposed dynamic unit-
demand auction. We use the results of the sealed-bid auction referred to
in Section 1.2 to provide a formal presentation of our dynamic auction in
Chapter 9.
We noted earlier, that in the standard sealed-bid framework, the VCG
mechanism yields a truthful auction with an efficient allocation and envy-free
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pricing [42]. However, the majority of auction sites, including the popular
site eBay, are dynamic. In a dynamic auction, bidding takes place in multiple
rounds. In each round, new bid data (bid revision requests and new bids)
is received, and an update rule is applied to adjust the tentative outcome
(allocation and pricing). The tentative outcome is made public at the end of
each round. This dynamic price feedback enables agents to concentrate their
value discovery efforts on the most relevant items.
Unit-demand bids are much more expressive than traditional single-
item bids, and bid formulation is correspondingly more complex. Accordingly,
in a dynamic auction, there is a significant chance that a tentatively allocated
agent may wish to revise one or more bid components. If a unit-demand
auction imposes undue constraints on bid revision, or if the semantics of bid
revision introduce additional strategic considerations, then agents may be re-
luctant to submit unit-demand bids or may only choose to submit bids in the
last round of the auction. Such an artificial reduction in the number of bids
directly undercuts the main value propositions of dynamic auctions, namely
value discovery and improved efficiency.
For the second contribution of this dissertation, we specify rules for a
dynamic unit-demand auction that supports arbitrary bid revision. We note
that each round of a dynamic auction is essentially a sealed-bid auction. A
guiding principle that we follow in the design of our auction is to use the
same sealed-bid auction to resolve each round of the dynamic auction. This
principle is natural and also rules out certain trivial solutions, e.g, an auction
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that postpones all of its processing to the last round. In order to motivate the
design of our auction, we analyze the special case of our auction setting for a
single item. In what follows, we discuss the design of a dynamic single-item
auction supporting arbitrary bid revision.
As a natural first approach, we consider using the well-known Vickrey
auction to resolve each round. However, it is easy to see that such a dynamic
auction discards information on the tentative outcome of each round and is
essentially equivalent to running the Vickrey auction exactly once in the last
round, after all of the bids have been received. Thus, this approach destroys
value discovery, a key feature of dynamic auctions.
Next we consider resolving each round of a dynamic single-item auction
in the style of the California auction [38] formulated by Steiglitz. The Cali-
fornia auction is a dynamic single-item auction that in each round, allocates
the item to the highest bidding agent and posts the second highest bid seen
up to that round as the tentative price of the item. The California auction
is efficient, satisfies envy-freedom, and retains straightforward bidding in an
ex-post Nash equilibrium. The eBay auction is an example of the California
auction. We note that each round of the California auction can be viewed as
an instance of the Vickrey auction with a reserve price, where in each round,
the reserve price of the item is set equal to the tentative price of the item
from the previous round. In order to support arbitrary bid revision, in each
round, we associate the item with the tentatively allocated agent of the previ-
ous round as a reserve agent: if every agent bids less than the tentative price
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of the item in a round, then the item remains allocated to the reserve agent
in that round.
It is straightforward to see that when arbitrary bid revision is allowed,
the California auction ceases to be efficient. Additionally, truthful bidding is
no longer an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the auction. For example, consider
an instance of the California auction with an item v and agents u0 and u1.
Agent u0 values item v at 20 units in round i and at 10 units in a later round
j. Agent u1 values item v at 19 units in round i and at 20 units in round j.
If agent u1 bids truthfully, then agent u1 wins item v for 19 units in round
j. However, by choosing not to bid in round i and by submitting a bid of 20
units in round j, agent u1 stands to win item v for a lower price of 10 units
in round j. Nonetheless, while the overall auction is not truthful, it can be
shown that each individual round of this auction is truthful.
Sealed-bid auctions exhibit strong properties related to truthfulness
and efficiency; yet, the overwhelming majority of online auctions continue to
be dynamic. The popularity of dynamic auctions suggests that value discov-
ery is one of the most important requirements of online auctions. As we dis-
cussed earlier, value discovery becomes increasingly important with increased
bid complexity. From our discussion of the dynamic single-item auction setting
above, it follows that there is an inherent tradeoff between flexibility of bid
revision and the attainability of desirable properties such as truthfulness and
efficiency. We find that the strong properties of truthfulness and efficiency are
lost when arbitrary bid revision is introduced, even in the restricted single-item
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case. We generalize this trade-off to the unit-demand setting in the design of
our proposed dynamic auction.
In keeping with our approach of using the same sealed-bid auction to
resolve each round of the dynamic auction, we seek to identify a suitable sealed-
bid unit-demand auction that generalizes the California auction to the unit-
demand setting. In our discussion of the California auction, we observed that
each round of the California auction with arbitrary bid revision is equivalent
to an instance of the Vickrey auction where each item is associated with a
reserve price and a reserve agent. Such a Vickrey auction with reserves can be
viewed as a Vickrey auction in which the item is associated with a put option
held by the item’s seller, with the reserve agent being the target of the put
and the reserve price being the strike price of the put. The put option of the
item gives the seller of the item the right to sell the item to the reserve agent
at the reserve price, regardless of market conditions.
Our proposed dynamic auction proceeds as follows. Each round of our
dynamic auction is resolved using an instance of the sealed-bid unit-demand
auction with put options proposed as a first contribution of this dissertation.
Each item is associated with a put option held by the item’s seller. In the first
round, the target of each item’s put is the seller of the item and the strike
price is the reserve price of the item. In each subsequent round, the target
and strike price of an item’s put are given by the tentatively allocated agent
and the tentative price of the item from the previous round.
Since each round of our dynamic auction is resolved using the sealed-
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bid unit-demand auction with put options, the outcome of each round satisfies
all of the equilibrium properties associated with the sealed-bid auction (see
Section 4.3). For example, like the sealed-bid auction, each round of our
dynamic auction is truthful (see Section 9.3.1). In Section 9.3 we establish
various properties of our dynamic auction that hold over multiple rounds of
the auction. In the description of our auction, we resolve each round using
the same sealed-bid auction. However, the technical claims of Section 9.3 hold
more generally for dynamic auctions in which each round is resolved using any
sealed-bid auction that satisfies certain subsets of the equilibrium properties
detailed in Section 4.3.
With regard to efficiency, recall that in the absence of bid revision,
the California auction produces an efficient allocation in each round. In the
absence of bid revision, our dynamic auction mimics the behavior of the Cali-
fornia auction, and hence achieves the same efficiency guarantee. When agents
are allowed to revise their bids in an arbitrary manner, such an efficiency guar-
antee cannot be achieved without sacrificing other key properties. Since we
do not wish to sacrifice these properties, we instead achieve the following re-
laxed form of efficiency achieved by the sealed-bid unit-demand auction with
put options — while the current allocation need not be efficient with respect
to the current revision of each bid, it is guaranteed to be efficient with re-
spect to a suitable combination of previous and current revisions. We derive
additional efficiency related properties pertaining to multiple rounds of our
auction in Section 9.3. We show that if an agent is envy-free in a round of
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the auction, then for any sequence of subsequent rounds in which the agent’s
preference does not change and the agent does not submit a bid revision, the
agent continues to remain envy-free (see Theorem 9.3.1). We also show that
for any sequence of rounds in which an agent is not envy-free, does not sub-
mit a bid revision, and does not change its preference, the auction can only
make progress towards achieving efficiency with respect to the most recent
bid revision of the agent (see Theorem 9.3.2). We believe that our efficiency-
related guarantees are essentially the strongest that can be achieved without
sacrificing other properties.
An important consideration in the design on a dynamic auction is its
vulnerability to “shill” bidding. If the seller of an item can deduce the maxi-
mum price that the agent who is tentatively allocated to the item is willing to
pay for the item, then the seller can extract this price without forfeiting sale
of the item by submitting a shill offer just below the agent’s offer. Dynamic
auctions are known to be particularly susceptible to shill bidding [38]. Thus,
a goal of our dynamic auction is to ensure bid privacy for tentatively allo-
cated agents. We establish bid privacy of an agent u in our dynamic auction
with respect to the grand coalition of all agents in the auction except agent u.
We assume that in each round of our auction, the grand coalition learns the
matching and allocation published in the round, the bid of every agent in the
round except the bid of agent u, and whether agent u submitted a bid in the
round. We show that our dynamic auction is resistant to shilling by such a
grand coalition of agents. Specifically, we show that for any sequence of rounds
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in which agent u does not submit a bid revision, the grand coalition of agents
cannot shill agent u by more than one unit without risking forfeiture of sale in
one of the rounds (see Theorem 9.3.3). Since the running time of our auction
is independent of the monetary units used, each unit can be considered to be
as low as one cent, thus making our auction highly resistant to shilling.
With respect to scalability, our fast implementation of the proposed dy-
namic auction (see Section 9.4) processes each bidding operation (i.e., new bid
or bid revision) using an amortized constant number of Hungarian [24] aug-
mentations, thereby matching the asymptotic complexity associated with the
sealed-bid auction, which uses a single augmentation to process each new bid.
The worst-case time complexity of such an augmentation is upper bounded
by the cost of running a single-source shortest paths computation on a graph
where the number of nodes is proportional to the number of items, and where
the number of edges is proportional to the total number of “active” bid com-
ponents of the tentatively allocated agents. (A component of a unit-demand
bid is considered active if the associated offer is at least the current price of
the associated item.)
In supporting arbitrary bid revision in the unit-demand setting, our dy-
namic auction successfully achieves the properties that the California auction
achieves with arbitrary revision. For any bid revision operation, our dynamic
auction immediately admits a closest approximation to the revised bid, and
as prices change over rounds, our auction continually admits closer and closer
approximations to the revised bid. An important feature of our auction is
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that in the special case where bid revisions are “consistent” – such revisions
involve raising all components of the unit-demand bid by the same amount –
the outcome of our auction is equivalent to the celebrated VCG outcome. For
the above mentioned reasons, we believe that our proposed dynamic auction
is an appropriate generalization of the California auction to the unit-demand
setting.
An issue of practical concern in dynamic auctions is “sniping”. Snip-
ing refers to agents holding off on submitting bids until close to the end of
the auction. Such late bidding impedes the value discovery process, thereby
degrading efficiency. We propose a dynamic price adjustment scheme that
encourages agents to bid early in the auction, thus discouraging sniping (see
Chapter 10). With this proposed price adjustment scheme, our auction contin-
ues to satisfy all of the strong theoretical properties established for the basic
version of our auction.
1.4 Related Work
The theory of two-sided matchings has a rich history. In recent work,
Fujishige and Tamura [13] show the existence of a stable matching in a general-
ized many to many matching model with upper and lower bounds on payments.
The model proposed by Fujishige and Tamura generalizes various previous
two-sided matching models; see [13] for a discussion of the relevant literature.
Like much of the prior work in this line of research, the work of Fujishige
and Tamura does not address issues related to incentive compatibility. In
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applying the theory of two-sided matchings to the design of auctions, a funda-
mental challenge is to identify two-sided matching models where truthfulness
is achievable. Aggarwal et al. [1] address this challenge for a special case of
Fujishige and Tamura’s model with applications to sponsored search auctions.
Specifically, for the unit-demand auction setting with agent and item specific
minimum and maximum prices, Aggarwal et al. provide a truthful auction that
computes an agent optimal stable matching. Similarly, for the setting consid-
ered in the present work, our central focus is to obtain a truthful auction.
In the auction of Aggarwal et al., each agent submits a value and a
maximum price that the agent is willing to pay for each item. We observe
that the algorithm of Aggarwal et al. can be used to implement the first phase
of our auction in the special case where each agent that is the target of a put
values the associated item strictly below than the strike price of the put. This
special case of our auction can be modeled in the framework of Aggarwal et
al. as follows: For each item and agent pair where the agent is the target of
the item’s put, we submit a value of infinity and a maximum price equal to
the strike price of the put; for every other agent and item pair, we submit the
agent’s offer for the item as the value and maximum price; we set the reserve
price of each item to the strike price of its put.
Recall the lease exchange problem that was discussed in Section 1.2. A
lessee may sometimes value his leased apartment below its current rent. In such
cases, the first phase of our auction can be implemented using the algorithm of
Aggarwal et al. [1] as described above. However, it is not difficult to see that
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a lessee’s value for his leased apartment may in certain cases be higher than
the current rent. Note that the decision to put the apartment in the auction
may not rest with the lessee; in such situations, the lessee may be willing to
pay a higher rent to retain his current apartment. Even in situations where
the lessee decides to put the apartment in the auction, it is not uncommon to
have lessees who are willing to risk winning their current apartments at higher
monthly rates.
Demange et al. [10] present two dynamic unit-demand auctions: an
“exact” auction, which we refer to as DGS-exact, and an “approximate” auc-
tion, which we refer to as DGS-approximate. In each round, the DGS-exact
auction elicits the demand (i.e., set of preferred items at the current prices) of
each agent. If there is an overdemanded set of items, a minimal overdemanded
set is found, and the prices of all items in the set are incremented by one. If no
overdemanded set can be found, the DGS-exact auction terminates and each
item is allocated to an agent who demands it. Observe that the DGS-exact
auction implicitly supports a limited form of bid revision: An agent is free to
revise its unit-demand bid as long as the demands specified in all preceding
rounds remain consistent with the revision.
Recognizing the highly restrictive nature of the form of bid revision per-
mitted by the DGS-exact auction, Demange et al. propose the DGS-approximate
auction. Like DGS-exact, DGS-approximate is an ascending-price auction.
(We remark that Mishra and Parkes [29] describe exact and approximate de-
scending price auctions corresponding to DGS-exact and DGS-approximate.)
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Agents that are not tentatively allocated are consulted in round-robin order
and given the opportunity to either select an item, or pass. If an unallocated
agent u selects an item v, the tentative price of item v is increased by a pa-
rameter δ, and the tentative allocation is updated to reflect that item v is
allocated to agent u. The DGS-approximate algorithm terminates when all of
the unallocated agents pass. The DGS-approximate auction has several short-
comings in comparison with our dynamic unit-demand auction: the auctioneer
is required to specify a value for the parameter δ; the outcome is guaranteed to
be approximately efficient/truthful, even in the absence of bid revision; there
is a tradeoff between the quality of the approximation and the running time
of the algorithm; and the bid revision framework is restrictive, since it does
not allow for trading of items between tentatively allocated agents.
Gul and Stacchetti [18] present a dynamic auction that generalizes the
DGS-exact auction for the setting in which agents demand bundles of items.
Gul and Stacchetti show that their auction converges to the smallest Walrasian
prices, and that their auction is strategy-proof if the smallest Walrasian prices
correspond to the VCG payments. Gul and Stacchetti’s auction, like the DGS-
exact auction, supports a limited form of bid revision: An agent is free to
revise its bid on a bundle as long as the demands on the bundle specified in
all preceding rounds remain consistent with the revision.
General combinatorial auctions support more complex preferences than
unit-demand preferences, such as preferences for bundles of items. Unfortu-
nately, for many combinatorial auctions, the problem of finding an efficient al-
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location is NP-hard. The computational intractability of general combinatorial
auctions motivates the study of specialized combinatorial auctions. Rothkopf
et al. discuss special cases (including unit-demand) of combinatorial auctions
where the problem of finding an efficient allocation can be solved in polyno-
mial time [35]. Various generalizations of unit-demand have been considered
in the literature, including work on dynamic auctions for homogeneous [3, 6]
and heterogeneous [4, 9, 28, 34] commodities.
1.5 Organization
We present and analyze our auctions in layers. In the following chap-
ters, we present five unit-demand auctions — the bottom-level auction, the
mid-level auction, the top-level auction, our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand
auction with put options, and our proposed dynamic unit-demand auction.
Each round of the dynamic auction is resolved as an instance of our pro-
posed sealed-bid unit-demand auction. As discussed above, the sealed-bid
unit-demand auction consists of two phases. The first phase, which affects
both the allocation and pricing, is defined in terms of the mid-level auction.
The second phase affects only the tentative allocation, and involves resolving
a single instance of a suitably designed house allocation problem to exchange
items within a certain subset of the tentatively allocated agents.
The design of the first phase of our sealed-bid unit-demand auction
constitutes a key technical component of this dissertation and the associated
analysis is quite involved. For example, it is a major challenge to prove that
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the first phase of our sealed-bid auction is truthful. A second major challenge
is to justify the correctness of our fast implementation. In order to overcome
these challenges, we carry out a layered analysis of our sealed-bid auction.
We first present and analyze the top-level auction, which is a basic, slow
variant of our sealed-bid auction. The top-level auction, like our sealed-bid
auction, is defined in terms of the mid-level auction. The mid-level auction is
a determinized, proxy version of the bottom-level auction. The bottom-level
auction is dynamic with each round of the auction corresponding to an agent
raising all of its offers by exactly one unit.
Our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction and our proposed dy-
namic unit-demand auction are presented in [23] and [22] respectively.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2,
we discuss some background material. In Chapter 3, we provide a foundation
for the technical presentation to follow. In Chapter 4, we propose a novel solu-
tion concept for our sealed-bid unit-demand auction. In Chapters 5, 6, and 7,
we present the bottom-level, mid-level, and top-level auctions respectively. In
Chapter 8, we present our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction with put
options, establish various properties related to truthfulness, efficiency, and bid
privacy, and discuss a polynomial-time implementation. In Chapter 9, we
present our proposed dynamic auction, establish various properties of the auc-
tion related to truthfulness, efficiency, and shill-resistance, and discuss a fast
implementation. In Chapter 10 we present a scheme that discourages sniping
by encouraging early bidding. In Chapter 11 we offer some concluding remarks
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Game theory [12, 33] is the branch of economics that deals with the
study of agents and their interactions in strategic settings. Game theory has
numerous applications in a wide variety of fields including finance, computer
science, and politics. For instance, in computer science, game theoretic mod-
els are used to solve problems in network congestion, routing, and resource
sharing.
Mechanism design [26, 40] is that branch of game theory that is con-
cerned with implementing a system-wide common goal in the presence of self-
interested agents. In mechanism design, the rules of a game are designed such
that agents are incentivized to not strategize but to play in accordance with
their true preferences. In general, a mechanisms may not be computationally
feasible. For instance, in a combinatorial auction with multiple items being
sold concurrently, the range of possible outcomes is huge, and finding a welfare
maximizing outcome can be NP-hard.
Algorithmic mechanism design is concerned with the tractability of
mechanisms and the design of computationally feasible mechanisms. Algo-
rithmic mechanism design techniques are routinely used in the design of com-
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binatorial auctions [27, 44]. An auction for a set of items can be viewed as
a game in which bidding agents strategize to win their favorite items at the
lowest prices. Each bidding agent in the auction has some private value for the
items which may not be equal to the public bid that the agent submits to the
auction. A common goal of auction design is to compute a value maximizing
outcome; such an outcome corresponds to an allocation of items to agents who
value them the most.
Below we discuss some common mechanism design terms and definitions
that are used in this dissertation.
2.1 Basic Definitions
Let U = ∪0≤i≤Nui be the set of agents in a game, and let O be the
set of outcomes associated with the game. For any agent ui in U and any
outcome o in O, agent ui’s preference for outcome o is given by a utility function
utility(o, ui). For any pair of outcomes o and o
′ in O, agent ui prefers outcome
o over outcome o′ if utility(o, ui) > utility(o
′, ui).
A strategy of an agent ui in U is a complete specification of the action
taken by agent ui at every point in the game. For any agent ui in U , the set
Σi represents the set of all strategies that are available to agent ui. A strategy
profile s of the agents in U is a joint strategy (s0, . . . , sN) where si is a strategy
in the set Σi. For any strategy profile s = (s0, . . . , sN), we define s−i as the
strategy profile (s0, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN) representing the joint strategy of all
agents except the agent ui.
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A mechanism defines a mapping from the set of strategy profiles Σ0 ×
. . . × ΣN to the set of outcomes O. Recall that we defined the utility of an
agent in a game as a function of the outcome of the game. Alternately, we can
define the utility of an agent in a game as a function of the strategy profile
that determines the outcome. Thus, for any agent ui in U , and any strategy
profile s of the game, we define utility(s, ui) to be equal to utility(o, ui), where
o is the outcome of the mechanism with strategy profile s.
2.2 Solution Concept
A solution concept of a game is a formal prediction of the strategies
that will be played by each agent in the game. Thus, a solution concept pre-
dicts the final outcome of a game. Equilibrium solution concepts are the most
commonly studied solution concepts in mechanism design. An equilibrium
solution concept predicts the strategies that will be adopted by agents in equi-
librium. Some well known equilibrium solution concepts are discussed below.
For the auctions described in this dissertation, our goal is to find dominant
strategy equilibria (see Section 2.2.3 below).
2.2.1 Nash equilibrium
One of the most popular solution concepts is that of a Nash equilib-
rium [32]. A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium of a game if
each agent maximizes his utility by playing his equilibrium strategy, given
that every other agent in the game is also playing his equilibrium strategy.
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Let U represent the set of agents in a game. A strategy profile s =
(s0, . . . , si, . . . , s|U |) ∈
∏
0≤i≤|U |Σi is a Nash equilibrium of the game if for any
agent ui in U , and any strategy profile s
′ = (s0, . . . , s
′
i, . . . , s|U |) we have
utility(s, ui) ≥ utility(s′, ui).
Finding a Nash equilibrium is associated with making strong assump-
tions on the common knowledge shared amongst agents in the game — each
agent is assumed to know the Nash equilibrium strategies of every other agent
in the game. It was shown by Nash that every finite game is associated with
at least one Nash equilibrium. A game that is associated with more than one
Nash equilibrium runs the risk of agents choosing different equilibria. In a
game with multple Nash equilibria, agents must co-ordinate in order to choose
the same Nash equilibrium.
2.2.2 Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an agent is assumed to know the dis-
tribution of preferences for all other agents. With these assumptions on agent
preferences, in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, an agent maximizes his expected
utility by playing his equilibrium strategy. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium makes
fewer assumptions than a Nash equilibrium on the common knowledge shared
amongst agents, but is less robust than the dominant strategy equilibrium
described in the following section.
27
2.2.3 Dominant strategy equilibrium
In a dominant strategy equilibrium, each agent maximizes his utility
by playing his dominant equilibrium strategy, irrespective of the strategies of
the other agents.
Let U be the set of agents in a game and let s = (s0, . . . , si, . . . , s|U |) be
a strategy profile in
∏
0≤i≤|U |Σi. We say si is a dominant strategy for agent
ui if for any strategy profile s




0≤i≤|U |Σi, we have
utility(s, ui) ≥ utility(s′, ui)
Unlike a Nash equilibrium, a dominant strategy equilibrium makes no
assumptions regarding an agent’s knowledge of the strategies of the other
agents in a game. Thus, a dominant strategy equilibrium is a stronger solution
concept and is more desirable in practice than a Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Quasi-Linear Mechanism
An agent is said to have quasi-linear preferences if its utility can be
expressed as v(o, ui) − p(o, ui), where v(o, ui) represents agent ui’s valuation
for outcome o, and p(o, ui) represents the payment made by the agent to the
mechanism. Thus, a quasi-linear mechanism defines an outcome rule and a
payment rule. A mechanism where agents have quasi-linear preferences is a
quasi-linear mechanism.
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2.4 Social Choice Function
As discussed earlier, mechanism design seeks to compute a common
social choice in the presence of self-interested agents. By definition, a mecha-
nism maps a strategy profile to an outcome. A social choice function maps the
private preferences of agents to an outcome. We say that a mechanism imple-
ments a social choice if, in equilibrium (Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy
equilibrium, etc), the mechanism computes the outcome corresponding to the
social choice function. In general, designing a mechanism that computes a de-
sired social choice is difficult because agents can choose to misrepresent their
preferences. Thus, the goal of mechanism design is to design strategies and an
outcome rule such that, despite agents being self-interested, the mechanism
is successful in computing the desired social choice. Below we discuss some
important properties of social choice functions.
2.4.1 Allocative efficiency
A social choice function is allocatively efficient if it produces a value










A social choice function is Pareto efficient if its outcome is such that no
other outcome is strictly preferred (in terms of utility) by at least one agent
and weakly preferred by all other agents. Formally, a social choice function is
Pareto efficient if there does not exists an agent ui and an outcome o in the
set of outcomes O such that utility(o, ui) > utility(o
∗, ui) and
utility(o, uj) ≥ utility(o∗, uj) ∀uj ∈ U \ ui
where o∗ is the outcome associated with the social choice function. A mech-
anism is said to be Pareto efficient if it implements a Pareto efficient social
choice function.
2.4.2.1 Weak Pareto efficiency
A social choice function is weakly Pareto efficient if there does not exists
an agent ui and an outcome o in the set of outcomes O such that
utility(o, ui) > utility(o
∗, ui) ∀ui ∈ U
where o∗ is the outcome associated with the social choice function. A mech-
anism is said to be weakly Pareto efficient if it implements a weakly Pareto
efficient social choice function. In other words, a mechanism is weakly Pareto
efficient its outcome is such that no other outcome is strictly preferred by all
agents.
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2.4.2.2 The core and the weak core
The core of a game is the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. Consider
a game with a set of agents U and a set of outcomes O.
The weak core is the set of all outcomes o∗ in O such that for any subset
of agents U0 of U , there does not exists an outcome o in O for which
utility(o, ui) > utility(o
∗, ui)∀ui ∈ U0
In other words, an outcome is in the weak core if no other outcome is strictly
preferred by all members of any coalition.
2.4.3 Budget balance
A social choice function is budget balanced if there are no net trans-
fers either out of or into the system; that is, if the social choice function
computes an outcome o, then
∑
ui∈U p(o, ui) = 0. A social choice function
is weakly budget balanced if there are no net transfers out of the system, i.e∑
ui∈U p(o, ui) ≥ 0. A mechanism is (weakly) budget balanced if it implements
a (weakly) budget balanced social choice function.
We do not discuss the budget balance property in the following chapters
of this dissertation. However, we note that all of the auctions presented in this
dissertation are weakly budget balanced.
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2.5 Direct-Revelation Mechanism
In a direct-revelation mechanism, agent strategies are limited to di-
rectly reporting their preferences to the mechanism. A single-item auction in
which agents submit bids to win the item is an example of a direct-revelation
mechanism. Note however, that in a direct-revelation mechanism, agents can
choose to strategically misreport their preferences.
2.6 Incentive-Compatibility
A direct-revelation mechanism is incentive-compatible if the equilib-
rium strategy (Nash, Bayesian-Nash, dominant etc.) of each agent is to report
their true preferences. A strategy proof or truthful mechanism is a mechanism
that is incentive-compatible in dominant strategy equilibrium.
2.7 Revelation Principle
According to the revelation principle [14, 15, 30, 31], any mechanism
that implements a particular social choice function under equilibrium has an
equivalent incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism that implements
the same social choice function.
The revelation principle has powerful implications in mechanism de-




A mechanism satisfies voluntary participation or individual-rationality
if the expected utility of an agent from participating in the mechanism is at
least as high as the agent’s utility from not participating in the mechanism.
2.9 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, also referred to as the VCG
mechanisms, are a general class of direct-revelation mechanisms proposed by
Vickrey [41], Clarke [7], and Groves [16] for agents with quasi-linear prefer-
ences. The VCG mechanisms are the only direct-revelation mechanisms that
are strategy-proof and efficient [15], and the only efficient, Bayesian Nash
mechanisms [21, 43].
Consider a direct-revelation mechanism with a set of agents U . Let
s denote the strategy profile reported by the agents in U , and let o be the
outcome of the mechanism in response to strategy profile s. We know that
the agents in U have quasi-linear preferences; it follows that the utility of any
agent ui in U is of the following form
utility(o, ui) = v(o, ui)− p(o, ui)
where v(o, ui) is the valuation of agent ui for outcome o, and p(o, ui) is the
payment made by agent ui to the mechanism.
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The VCG price paid by an agent ui is given by




where o∗ is the VCG outcome, and hi is a function of the reported strategies
of all agents except the agent ui. The family of VCG mechanisms arise from
the different choices of function hi.
2.9.1 The Clarke pivot pricing rule
The Clarke pivot pricing rule is a specific VCG pricing rule that achieves
individual rationality and weak budget-balance under quite general conditions.
A VCG mechanism with the Clarke pivot pricing rule is referred to as the
pivotal mechanism.
In a pivotal mechanism, the term hi(s−i) in the VCG pricing for an





where o∗−i is the VCG outcome when agent ui is removed from the mechanism.
Informally, each agent in the Pivotal mechanism is charged the opportunity
cost introduced by the agent to the remaining agents in the mechanism. exce
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2.10 The Vickrey auction
The Vickrey auction [41] is a well-known sealed-bid single-item auction.
The Vickrey auction is the special case of the pivotal mechanism for a single
item. If ui and uj are agents with the highest and second highest bids of bi
and bj respectively, then in the Pivotal mechanism, the item is sold to agent
ui for a price equal to bj. Since the price of the item is equal to the second





In this chapter, we present definitions and notation that will be useful
through the remainder of this dissertation. We introduce a number of basic
types and their auxiliary functions, and present a number of associated pre-
liminary lemmas. The results of Sections 3.5 and 3.6 follow from standard
results in the literature [17, 42]; the purpose of including these sections is to
provide a self-contained presentation.
3.1 Agents and Items
We refer to the bidders in our auction as agents. In order to break
ties among agents, we identify each agent with a binary string. We define the
maximum over an empty set of agents as the empty agent ε.
An item v in our auction is a pair where the first component is a binary
string identifier, denoted id(v), and the second component is an integer lower
bound on the price of v, denoted min(v). We allow the price of an item in our
auction to be negative in order to support procurement-type auctions.
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3.2 Bid-Graphs
A bid-graph encapsulates a set of items and a set of agents having
unit-demand bids on the items.
Formally, a bid-graph is an edge-weighted complete bipartite graph
G = (U, V, w), where U is a set of agents, V is a set of items, w is a function
from the set U × V to the set of integers, and the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. the cardinality of U is at least the cardinality of V
2. for any agent u in U , agent u is nonempty
3. for any pair of distinct items v and v′ in V , we have id(v) 6= id(v′).
For any bid-graph (U, V, w), the function w encodes the unit-demand
bids of the agents in U . In general, an agent’s unit-demand bid may not include
an offer for every item in the bid-graph. In this dissertation, we assume that
an agent’s unit-demand bid includes an integer offer for every item in the big-
graph, and we choose to represent the absence of an offer by a negative integer
that is sufficiently large in magnitude.
For any set of items V , we define a (unit-demand) bid on V as a function
that maps each item in V to an integer. In the definitions that follow, let
G = (U, V, w) be a bid-graph. We define bids(G) as the set of all possible bids
on the set V . For any agent u in U , we define bid(G, u) as the bid β in bids(G)
such that β(v) = w(u, v) for any item v in V .
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For any nonempty agent u not in U , and any bid β in bids(G), we define
add(G, u, β) as the bid-graph G′ = (U + u, V, w′) where bid(G′, u) = β and
bid(G′, u′) = bid(G, u′) for any agent u′ in U . For any nonempty agent u not in
U , any item v in V , and any integer z, we define add(G, u, v, z) as add(G, u, β),
where β is the bid in bids(G) such that β(v) = z and β(v′) = min(v′)− 1 for
any item v′ in V − v.
For any any agent u in U , and any integer z, we define shift(G, u, z) as
the bid-graph (U, V, w′) where w′(u, v) = w(u, v) + z for any item v in V , and
w′(u′, v) = w(u′, v) for any agent u′ in U − u and any item v in V .
For any any agent u in U , and any bid β in bids(G), we define subst(G, u, β)
as the bid-graph G′ = (U, V, w′) where bid(G′, u) = β, and bid(G′, u′) =
bid(G, u′) for any agent u′ in U − u.
3.3 Configurations
A configuration encapsulates a bid-graph along with an associated out-
come (allocation and pricing of the items).
A configuration χ is a triple (G,M,Φ), where G = (U, V, w) is a bid-
graph, M is a maximum cardinality matching (MCM) ofG, and Φ is a potential
function that maps each item v in V to an integer Φ(v) such that Φ(v) ≥
min(v). In the definitions that follow, let χ = (G,M,Φ) be a configuration
where G = (U, V, w).
The function agents(χ) is the set U and the function items(χ) is the
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set V . We say χ is efficient if M is a maximum weight MCM (MWMCM) of
G.
We define matched(χ) as the subset of agents in U that are matched
in M , and we define unmatched(χ) as the set of agents in U \ matched(χ).
For any item v in V , we define match(χ, v) as the agent u in U such that
the edge (u, v) belongs to M . For any agent u in U , we define gap(χ, u) as
w(u, v)− Φ(v) if match(χ, v) = u, and as zero otherwise.
We say that an agent u in U satisfies voluntary participation if gap(χ, u)
is nonnegative, and that u satisfies envy-freedom if gap(χ, u) ≥ w(u, v)−Φ(v)
for all items v in V . We say χ is Walrasian if every agent u in U satisfies
voluntary participation and envy-freedom.
For any item v in V , we define amount(χ, v) as w(match(χ, v), v),
and we define amount(χ) as the function that maps each item v in V to
amount(χ, v). We define positive(χ) as the set of agents u in U such that
gap(χ, u) > 0 and we define the set nonpositive(χ) as U \ positive(χ).
For any bid β in bids(G), we define max-gap(χ, β) as the maximum
over all items v in V , of β(v) − Φ(v). For any bid β in bids(G), we define
pseudo-demand(χ, β) as the set of all items v in V such that β(v) − Φ(v) =
max-gap(χ, β).
For any bid β in bids(G), we define demand(χ, β) as pseudo-demand(χ, β)
if max-gap(χ, β) ≥ 0, and as the empty set ∅ otherwise. For any item v in V ,
we define bids(χ, v) as the set of all bids β in bids(G) such that v belongs to
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demand(χ, β).
For any agent u in U , we define max-gap(χ, u) as max-gap(χ, bid(G, u)),
we define pseudo-demand(χ, u) as pseudo-demand(χ, bid(G, u)), and we define
demand(χ, u) as demand(χ, bid(G, u)).
For any nonempty agent u not in U , and any bid β in bids(G), we
define add(χ, u, β) as the configuration (add(G, u, β),M,Φ). Similarly, for
any nonempty agent u not in U , any item v in V , and any integer z, we define
add(χ, u, v, z) as the configuration (add(G, u, v, z),M,Φ).
For any agent u in U and any bid β in bids(G), we denote the con-
figuration (subst(G, u, β),M,Φ) by subst(χ, u, β). For any agent u in U and
any nonempty agent u′ not in U , we define subst(χ, u, u′) as the configuration
obtained from χ by replacing all occurrences of agent u with agent u′.
For any agent u in U and any integer z, we define shift(χ, u, z) as the
configuration subst(χ, u, β) where β is the bid in bids(G) such that β(v) =
w(u, v) + 1 for any item v in V .
We now characterize a suitable directed graph on χ and formulate a
reachability condition on this directed graph. We define digraph(χ) as the
directed graph (U ∪ V,A), where A is the set of arcs that includes for each
edge (u, v) in U × V such that w(u, v) ≥ w(u, v′) for every item v′ in V − v:
1. an arc (v, u) if edge (u, v) is in M
2. an arc (u, v) if edge (u, v) is not in M .
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For any agent u in unmatched(χ), we define items(χ, u) as the set of
items v in V such that there exists a directed path from agent u to item v in
digraph(χ). In the terminology of the Hungarian algorithm, the set items(χ, u)
is the set of items reachable from agent u in the Hungarian tree rooted at u.
3.4 Agent Colors
We identify special classes of configurations (e.g. Walrasian configura-
tions) by adopting a suitable coloring scheme of the agents. Every agent in a
configuration is colored white, gray, or black according to certain rules. Infor-
mally, a non-black agent satisfies voluntary participation and envy-freedom,
and a white agent satisfies a certain tie-breaking convention described below.
For any configuration χ, the color of any agent u in agents(χ) is de-
termined as follows. We first consider the case where agent u belongs to
matched(χ). In this case, let v be the item such that match(χ, v) = u. If v
does not belong to pseudo-demand(χ, u), then agent u is black. If v belongs
to demand(χ, u), then agent u is white. Otherwise, agent u is gray. Next,
we consider the case where agent u belongs to unmatched(χ). In this case,
if max-gap(χ, u) > 0, then agent u is black. If max-gap(χ, u) = 0, and there
exists some item v in items(χ, u) such that either match(χ, v) is non-white, or
match(χ, v) < u and gap(χ,match(χ, v)) = 0, then agent u is gray. Otherwise,
agent u is white.
We define white(χ) as the set of white agents in χ. The sets gray(χ),
black(χ), nonblack(χ), and nonwhite(χ) are defined similarly.
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1. u belongs to white(χ), or
2. u belongs to nonwhite(χ) and for all items v in items(χ), we have β(v) <
Φ(v)− 1, where β = bid(G, u).
3.5 Walrasian Configurations
One of the most common notions of equilibrium in auctions is the
Walrasian equilibrium. In Section 3.3, we defined a Walrasian configurations
as a configuration in which every agent satisfies voluntary participation and
envy-freedom. In this section, we formalize the notion of Walrasian configu-
rations in terms of agent colors.
A configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) is Walrasian if matched(χ) ⊆ white(χ)
and unmatched(χ) ⊆ nonblack(χ). A bid-graph G is Walrasian if it admits a
Walrasian configuration of the form (G,M,Φ).
The following is a list of definitions and lemmas related to Walrasian
configurations.
Lemma 3.5.1. For any bid-graph G′ of the form add(G, u, β), if bid-graph G
is Walrasian then the bid-graph G′ is Walrasian.
Proof. Since G is Walrasian, there exists some Walrasian configuration of the
form (G,M,Φ). It follows that M is an MWMCM of G, and thus there exists
some MWMCM M ′ of G′. Koopmans and Beckmann [20] and Leonard [25]
show the existence of prices satisfying the Walrasian properties in the unit-
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demand setting; thus, there exists some Walrasian configuration of the form
(G′,M ′,Φ′).
Lemma 3.5.2. If χ = (G,M,Φ) is a Walrasian configuration, then M is an
MWMCM of G.
Proof. By definition, every agent in matched(χ) is white; thus for every item
v in items(χ), we have w(match(χ, v), v) ≥ Φ(v). Similarly, for every agent u
in unmatched(χ) and every item v in items(χ), we have w((u, v)) ≤ Φ(v). It
follows that any MCM of G with higher weight than M must match the set
of agents in matched(χ).
Suppose there exists an MCMM ′ ofG that matches agents in matched(χ)
and has higher weight than M . Since every agent in matched(χ) is white, it
follows that w((u, v))−Φ(v) ≥ w((u, v′))−Φ(v′), where v and v′ are the items
matched to u in M and M ′ respectively. Thus,
∑
(u,v)∈M
w((u, v)) − Φ(v) ≥∑
(u′,v)∈M ′
w((u′, v))− Φ(v). Thus, M ′ cannot be of higher weight than M .
[Definition] For any Walrasian bid-graph G, we define potentials(G) as
the set of all potential functions Φ such that there exists a Walrasian config-
uration of the form (G,M,Φ).
Lemma 3.5.3. Let (G,M,Φ) be a Walrasian configuration where bid-graph
G = (U, V, w), and let M∗ be an MWMCM of G. Let P be a path in the
undirected graph (U ∪ V,M ⊕M∗). Let A denote the set of edges of P that
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are in M and let B denote the set of edges of P that are in M∗. Then the
configuration (G,M − A+B,Φ) is Walrasian.
Proof. Let path P be defined by the sequence of vertices u0, v0, u1, v1, ···vk−1, uk.
We use the fact that (G,M,Φ) is Walrasian to derive the following equations.
w((uk, vk−1)) ≥ Φ(vk−1), (3.1)
w((u0, v0)) ≤ Φ(v0), (3.2)
w((ui, vi−1))− Φ(vi−1) ≥ w((ui, vi))− Φ(vi) (3.3)
for all i such that 0 < i < k. Rewriting inequalities 3.1 and 3.2 as w((uk, vk−1))−
Φ(vk−1) ≥ 0 and 0 ≥ w((u0, v0)) − Φ(v0), respectively, and then adding the
latter inequalities to those obtained from 3.3, we find that the potential terms
all cancel out, and we are left with the inequality
∑
0<i≤k w((ui, vi−1)) ≥∑
0≤i<k w((ui, vi)). Since M and M
∗ are both MWMCMs, the above inequality
is tight. It follows that all of the inequalities we summed in order to obtain
the above inequality are also tight. In other words, we have
w((uk, vk−1)) = Φ(vk−1), (3.4)
w((u0, v0)) = Φ(v0), (3.5)
and
w((ui, vi−1))− Φ(vi−1) = w((ui, vi))− Φ(vi) (3.6)
for all i such that 0 < i < k. Armed with the above equations, we are now
ready to establish that (G,M ′,Φ) is Walrasian.
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First we show that for all edges e = (u, v) in M ′ \M , w(e) ≥ Φ(v). The
latter claim follows immediately from Equations 3.5 and 3.6. Next we show
that for all nodes v such that (uk, v) belongs to M ⊕M∗, w((uk, v)) ≤ Φ(v).
(Notice that uk is the only node that is matched under M and unmatched
under M ′.) For v = vk−1, the desired inequality holds tightly by Equa-
tion 3.4. For v 6= vk−1, Walrasian property of (G,M,Φ) implies w((uk, vk−1))−
Φ(vk−1) ≥ w((uk, v)) − Φ(v), so the desired inequality follows from Equa-
tion 3.4.
Finally, we show that for any edges e = (u, v) and e′ = (u, v′) such
that (u, v) belongs to M ′, w(e) − Φ(v) ≥ w(e′) − Φ(v′). We consider three
subcases. In the first subcase, assume that u is not equal to one of the ui’s,
0 ≤ i ≤ k. In this subcase, the claim follows from the Walrasian property of
(G,M,Φ). In the second subcase, assume that u = u0, which is unmatched
in M and matched via edge e = (u0, v0) in M
′. Let edge e′ = (u0, v
′) belong
to E, where v′ 6= v0. Then Equation 3.5 implies that w(e) − Φ(v0) = 0,
and the Walrasian property of (G,M,Φ) implies that w(e′) ≤ Φ(v′); hence
w(e) − Φ(v0) ≥ w(e′) − Φ(v′), as required. In the third subcase, assume that
u = ui for some i such that 0 < i < k. (We do not need to consider u = uk
because uk is unmatched in M
′.) Notice that ui is matched in M
′ via edge
e = (ui, vi). Let edge e
′ = (ui, v
′) belong to E, where v′ 6= vi. If v′ = vi−1, the
required inequality w(e)−Φ(vi) ≥ w(e′)−Φ(v′) holds tightly by Equation 3.6.
Otherwise, Equation 3.6 implies that w(e) − Φ(vi) = w((ui, vi−1)) − Φ(vi−1),
the Walrasian property of (G,M,Φ) implies that w((ui, vi−1)) − Φ(vi−1) ≥
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w(e′)−Φ(v′), and hence the required inequality w(e)−Φ(vi) ≥ w(e′)−Φ(v′)
holds.
Lemma 3.5.4. Let (G,M,Φ) be a Walrasian configuration where bid-graph
G = (U, V, w), and let M∗ be an MWMCM of G. Let C be a cycle in the
undirected graph (U ∪ V,M ⊕M∗). Let A denote the set of edges of C that
are in M and let B denote the set of edges of C that are in M∗. Then the
configuration (G,M − A+B,Φ) is Walrasian.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.5.3.
Lemma 3.5.5. For any Walrasian bid-graph G, any MWMCM M of G, and
any potential function Φ in potentials(G), the configuration (G,M,Φ) is Wal-
rasian.
Proof. Let M denote the set of all MWMCMs M ′ of G such that (G,M ′,Φ)
is Walrasian. Since Φ is in potentials(G), the set M is guaranteed to be
nonempty. Fix an MWMCM M∗ in M such that |M \M∗| is minimized. It
is sufficient to prove that M = M∗. We prove this by contradiction. Assume
that |M \M∗| is equal to some positive integer k. Consider the undirected
graph G′ = (U ∪V,M ⊕M∗). Since no vertex in G′ has degree greater than 2,
it can be partitioned into isolated vertices, simple paths of positive length, and
simple cycles of positive length. Since k > 0, we are assured that G′ contains
either a simple path of positive length or a simple cycle of positive length. We
consider these two cases separately.
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• Graph G′ contains a simple path P of positive length
Let A and B denote the sets of edges of P that are in M∗ and M
respectively. By Lemma3.5.3, the configuration (G,M ′,Φ) is Walrasian,
where M ′ = M∗ − A + B. Furthermore, |M \ M ′| = k − |A| < k,
contradicting the definition of M∗.
• Graph G′ contains a simple cycle C of positive length
Let A and B denote the sets of edges of P that are in M∗ and M
respectively. By Lemma 3.5.4, the configuration (G,M ′,Φ) is Walrasian,
where M ′ = M∗ − A + B. Furthermore, |M \ M ′| = k − |A| < k,
contradicting the definition of M∗.
Lemma 3.5.6. For any Walrasian bid-graph G, the functions in potentials(G)
form a lattice with meet and join operations given by pointwise minimum and
maximum, respectively.
Proof. LetG = (U, V, w) and let Φ0 and Φ1 be potential functions in potentials(G).
Let Φ and Φ′ be potential functions such that for any item v in V , Φ(v) =
min(Φ0(v),Φ1(v)) and Φ
′(v) = max(Φ0(v),Φ1(v)). We are required to show
that configurations (G,M,Φ) and (G,M,Φ′) are Walrasian. In what follows,
we will show that (G,M,Φ) is Walrasian. By a similar argument, it follows
that (G,M,Φ′) is also Walrasian.
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Observe that (G,M,Φ0) and (G,M,Φ1) are Walrasian; thus, for any
edge (u, v) in M , we have w((u, v)) ≥ Φ0(v) and w((u, v)) ≥ Φ1(v); thus
w((u, v)) ≥ Φ(v). Similarly, for any agent u unmatched in M and any item v
in V , we have w((u, v)) ≤ Φ0(v) and w((u, v)) ≤ Φ1(v); thus w((u, v)) ≤ Φ(v).
It now remains to be shown the following condition: for any edge (u, v) in M
and any item v′ in V − v, we have w((u, v)) − Φ(v) ≥ w((u, v′)) − Φ(v′). We
accomplish this by showing that the condition holds when Φ(v) = Φ0(v). It
follows by symmetry that the condition also holds when Φ(v) = Φ1(v). Fix an
arbitrary item v′ in V , and consider the following two cases.
• Φ(v′) = Φ0(v′).
Since (G,M,Φ0) is Walrasian, we have w((u, v))− Φ0(v) ≥ w((u, v′))−
Φ0(v
′); using Φ(v) = Φ0(v) and Φ(v
′) = Φ0(v
′), we obtain the desired
inequality w((u, v))− Φ(v) ≥ w((u, v′))− Φ(v′).
• Φ(v′) = Φ1(v′)
By the Walrasian property of configuration (G,M,Φ1), we have w((u, v))−
Φ1(v) ≥ w((u, v′))−Φ1(v′). Since Φ(v) = Φ0(v), we have Φ0(v) ≤ Φ1(v).
Thus w((u, v)) − Φ0(v) ≥ w((u, v′)) − Φ1(v′); using Φ(v) = Φ0(v) and
Φ(v′) = Φ1(v
′), we obtain the desired inequality w((u, v)) − Φ(v) ≥
w((u, v′))− Φ(v′).
[Definition] For any Walrasian bid-graph G, we define max-potential(G)
as the maximum function in potentials(G), and we define min-potential(G) as
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the maximum function in potentials(G); the existence of these functions is
guaranteed by Lemma 3.5.6.
Lemma 3.5.7. For any bid-graph G′ of the form add(G, u, v, z) where bid-
graph G is Walrasian, there exists a unique integer z0 such that the following
conditions hold:
• If z > z0 and configuration χ = (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian, then agent u
belongs to matched(χ).
• If z < z0 and configuration χ = (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian, then agent u
belongs to unmatched(χ).
• If z = z0, then there exist Walrasian configurations χ = (G′,M,Φ) and
χ′ = (G′,M ′,Φ) such that agent u belongs to matched(χ)∩unmatched(χ′).
Proof. Let Φ = max-potential(G) and let M be some MWMCM of G. Since
G is Walrasian, (G,M,Φ) is Walrasian. Thus the weight of any MWMCM of
G is at least equal to
∑
v∈G Φ(v). By Lemma 3.5.1, G
′ is Walrasian and by
Lemma 3.5.5, any configuration of the form (G′,M ′,Φ′) is Walrasian, where
M ′ is an MWMCM of G′ and Φ′ is in potentials(G′). It is easy to see that when
z < Φ(v), (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian and thus u is unmatched in every Walrasian
configuration of G′. We now consider the case when z = Φ(v). There exists
some item v′ in items(χ, u) such that gap(χ,match(χ, v′)) = 0 as otherwise
Φ(v′′) can be incremented for each item v′′ in items(χ, u). In this case, by
Lemma 3.5.3, u is matched in some Walrasian configuration of G′. Further,
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it is easy to see that if u is matched in some Walrasian configuration χ of
G′, then u is matched in every Walrasian configuration of shift(χ, u, 1). Thus,
there exists a unique z0 = max-potential(v) with the desired property.
[Definition] For any Walrasian bid-graph G = (U, V, w) and any item
v in V , we define threshold(G, v) as the unique integer z0 of Lemma 3.5.7,
and we define threshold(G) as the function that maps each item v in V to
threshold(G, v).
Lemma 3.5.8. For any Walrasian bid-graph G, we have threshold(G) =
max-potential(G).
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 3.5.7, we showed that for any item v in G,
threshold(G, v) = max-potential(v).
For any Walrasian bid-graph G = (U, V, w), we define price(G) as
min-potential(G), and for any item v in V , we define price(G, v) as Φ(v),
where Φ is equal to min-potential(G).
Lemma 3.5.9. For any bid-graph G′ of the form add(G, u, β) where bid-graph
G = (U, V, w) is Walrasian, if β(v) ≤ price(G, v) for every item v in V , then
price(G′) = price(G).
Proof. Let M be an MWMCM of G. By Lemma 3.5.5, χ = (G,M, price(G))
is Walrasian and thus the weight of M is at least
∑
v∈G price(G, v). Since
β(v) ≤ price(G, v) for every item v in V , M is an MWMCM of G′. It follows
that (G′,M, price(G)) is a Walrasian configuration. Further, if there exists a
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potential function Φ in potentials(G′) such that Φ < price(G), then (G,M,Φ)
is Walrasian; this contradicts the definition of price(G). Thus, price(G′) =
price(G).
Lemma 3.5.10. For any Walrasian configuration χ = (G,M,Φ), we have
price(G) ≤ threshold(G) ≤ amount(χ).
Proof. By definition, price(G) = min-potential(G), and by Lemma 3.5.8,
we have threshold(G) = max-potential(G); thus price(G) ≤ threshold(G).
Since threshold(G) = max-potential(G), it follows from Lemma 3.5.5 that
(G,M, threshold(G)) is Walrasian. By the definition of Walrasian configura-
tions, it follows that amount(χ) ≥ threshold(G).
Lemma 3.5.11. Let G′ be a bid-graph of the form add(G, u, β) where bid-
graph G = (U, V, w) is Walrasian. Let ∆ denote the maximum over all items
v in V , of β(v) − threshold(G, v), and let V ′ denote the set of all items v in
V such that β(v)− threshold(G, v) = ∆. Then the following conditions hold:
• If ∆ > 0 and configuration χ = (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian, then match(χ, v) =
u for some item v in V ′, and price(G′, v) = threshold(G, v) for for every
item v in V ′.
• If ∆ < 0 and configuration χ = (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian, then agent u is
unmatched in M .
• If ∆ = 0, then there exist Walrasian configurations χ = (G′,M,Φ) and
χ′ = (G′,M ′,Φ) such that agent u belongs to matched(χ)∩unmatched(χ′).
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• If ∆ ≤ 0, then threshold(G′) = threshold(G).
Proof. Let M be an MWMCM of G and let Φ = max-potential(G). By
Lemma 3.5.5, χ0 = (G,M,Φ) is Walrasian; thus, by definition, the weight
of M is at least
∑
v∈G Φ(v). We consider the following cases:
• ∆ < 0
In this case, β(v) < Φ(v) for each item v in G, and thus, M is an
MWMCM of G′. Thus, (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian, and it follows by the
definition of Walrasian configurations that u is unmatched in M .
• ∆ ≤ 0
By the same argument as in the previous case, (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian.
Further, if there exists a potential function Φ′ in potentials(G′) such
that Φ′ > max-potential(G), then (G,M,Φ′) is Walrasian; this con-
tradicts the definition of max-potential(G). Thus, max-potential(G′) =
max-potential(G). By Lemma 3.5.8, max-potential(G) = threshold(G)
and max-potential(G′) = threshold(G′); thus threshold(G) = threshold(G′).
• ∆ ≥ 0
It is easy to see that there exists at least one item v in the set items(χ0, u)
for which gap(χ0,match(χ0, v)) = 0 as otherwise the potential asso-
ciated with each item in items(χ0, u) can be incremented while χ re-
mains Walrasian, violating the definition of max-potential(G). When
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∆ ≥ 0, v belongs to items(χ0, u); thus there exists an augmenting path
in digraph(χ0). It follows that u belongs to some MWMCM of G
′.
When ∆ = 0, it is easy to see that (G′,M,Φ) is Walrasian; thus, Φ is in
potentials(G′). By Lemma 3.5.5, (G′,M, price(G′)) is Walrasian. How-
ever, we know that u is not matched in M . It follows that price(G′, v) ≥
Φ(v) for each item v in V ′ in order to satisfy the Walrasian property of
(G′,M, price(G′)). Thus price(G′, v) = Φ(v) = threshold(G, v) for each
item v in V ′. Above we showed that when ∆ = 0, u is matched in some
MWMCM M ′ of G′; thus (G′,M ′, price(G′)) is Walrasian. It is easy to
see that when ∆ > 0, (G′,M ′, price(G′)) remains Walrasian and thus,
price(G′, v) = threshold(G, v) for each item v in V ′.
3.6 White Configurations
In designing our auction, we are interested in configurations, and partic-
ularly Walrasian configurations, that adhere to a specific tie-breaking scheme
that ensures that a unique set of agents is allocated in the event of ties. We
characterize as white configurations, all Walrasian configurations whose out-
comes adhere to this tie-breaking scheme.
A configuration χ is white if agents(χ) = white(χ).
The following is a set of definitions and lemmas related to white config-
urations. The proofs of these lemmas are similar to those for the corresponding
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results established in Section 3.5 for Walrasian configurations.
Lemma 3.6.1. For any Walrasian bid-graph G, there exists a white config-
uration of the form (G,M,Φ), and for any white configuration of the form
(G,M,Φ), the bid-graph G is Walrasian.
Proof. By definition, every white configuration is Walrasian. Thus, for any
white configuration of the form (G,M,Φ), the bid-graph G is Walrasian. Con-
sider any Walrasian configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) that is not white. Then
there exists at least one agent u in unmatched(χ) such that for some item
v in items(χ, u), gap(χ,match(χ, v)) = 0 and match(χ, v) < u. By repeated
application of Lemma 3.5.3, χ can be transformed to a white configuration.
Lemma 3.6.2. For any Walrasian bid-graph G and any potential function Φ
in potentials(G), there exists a white configuration of the form (G,M,Φ).
Proof. By Lemma 3.5.5, any configuration χ = (G,M ′,Φ) is Walrasian where
M ′ is an MWMCM ofG. Then there exists at least one agent u in unmatched(χ)
such that gap(χ,match(χ, v)) = 0 and match(χ, v) < u for some item v in
items(χ, u). By repeated application of Lemma 3.5.3, χ can be transformed
to a white configuration. Thus, there exists some MWMCM M of G such that
(G,M,Φ) is white.
Lemma 3.6.3. For any Walrasian bid-graph G and any pair of white con-
figurations χ = (G,M,Φ) and χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ′), we have matched(χ) =
matched(χ′).
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Proof. Let χ0 = (G,M,max-potential(G)) and let χ1 = (G,M
′,max-potential(G)).
By Lemma 3.5.5, χ0 and χ1 are Walrasian. Further, since max-potential(G) ≥
Φ and max-potential(G) ≥ Φ′, it follows that white(χ) ∩ unmatched(χ) =
white(χ0) ∩ unmatched(χ0) and white(χ′) ∩ unmatched(χ′) = white(χ1) ∩
unmatched(χ1); thus χ0 and χ1 are white configurations. If M⊕M ′ consists of
only cycles and no paths, then it follows that matched(χ) = matched(χ′). Sup-
pose there exists some path P in M ⊕M ′ with endpoints u in matched(χ0) ∩
unmatched(χ1) and u
′ in matched(χ1) ∩ unmatched(χ0). By Lemma 3.5.3, u
belongs to agents(χ0, u
′) and u′ belongs to agents(χ1, u). Since u < u
′ or
u′ < u, this violates the assumption that χ0 and χ1 are both white. Thus,
there is no such path P and matched(χ) = matched(χ′).
[Definition] By Lemmas 3.6.1 and 3.6.3, we can conclude that for
any Walrasian bid-graph G, there exists a unique set of matched agents in
any white configuration of the form (G,M,Φ). We denote this unique set of
matched agents by matched(G).
Lemma 3.6.4. For any white configuration (G,M,Φ), and for any potential
function Φ′ in potentials(G), the configuration (G,M,Φ′) is white.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6.2, there exists an MWMCM M ′ of G such that the
configuration χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ′) is white. Let χ = (G,M,Φ) and let χ′′ =
(G,M,Φ′). By Lemma 3.5.5, χ′′ is Walrasian and by Lemma 3.6.3, matched(χ) =
matched(χ′). Thus, matched(χ) = matched(χ′′) and matched(χ′′) ⊆ white(χ′′).
Since χ′′ and χ are Walrasian, for any agent u in unmatched(χ′′), we have
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agents(χ′′, u) = agents(χ, u); since u is white in χ, it follows that u is white
in χ′′.
In what follows, we sometimes compare amount-agent pairs. Such com-
parisons are resolved lexicographically.
Lemma 3.6.5. For any Walrasian bid-graph G = (U, V, w), any item v in
V , and any white configurations χ = (G,M,Φ) and χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ), we have
agents(χ, v) = agents(χ′, v).
Proof. By Lemma 3.6.3, we have matched(χ) = matched(χ′); thus unmatched(χ) =
unmatched(χ′). Since χ and χ′ are Walrasian, for any item v, gap(χ,match(χ, v)) =
maxv∈V w(match(χ, v), v)−Φ(v). Further, by the definition of digraph(χ), arc
(match(χ, v), v′) belongs to digraph(χ) for every item v′ in demand(χ,match(χ, v)).
By a similar argument, arc (match(χ′, v), v′) belongs to digraph(χ′) for ev-
ery item v′ in demand(χ′,match(χ′, v)). Thus it follows that agents(χ, v) =
agents(χ′, v).
[Definition] For any Walrasian bid-graph G = (U, V, w), any potential
function Φ in potentials(G), and any item v in V , we define agents(G,Φ, v)
as the unique set agents(χ, v) of Lemma 3.6.5, where χ = (G,M,Φ) is a
white configuration whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 3.6.2. For any
Walrasian bid-graphG = (U, V, w), and any item v in V , we define agents(G, v)
as agents(G, price(G), v).
[Definition] For any Walrasian bid-graph G = (U, V, w), and any item v
in V , we define price∗(G, v) as (price(G), u0), where u0 is the maximum agent
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in agents(G, v). Recall that the maximum agent over an empty set is defined
as ε. In addition, we define price∗(G) as the function that maps each item v
in V to price∗(G, v).
For the following lemmas, we view bids and prices as pairs — if u has
an offer of z on item v, we view the offer as the pair (z, u).
Lemma 3.6.6. For any bid-graph G′ of the form add(G, u, v, z) where bid-
graph G = (U, V, w) is Walrasian, there exists a unique agent u0 in U such that
agent u belongs to matched(G′) if and only if (z, u) > (threshold(G, v), u0).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.5.9 when bids and prices are
viewed as pairs.
For any Walrasian bid-graph G = (U, V, w) and any item v in V , we
define threshold∗(G, v) as the unique pair (threshold(G, v), u0) of Lemma 3.6.6.
Lemma 3.6.7. For any bid-graph G′ of the form add(G, u, β) where bid-graph
G is Walrasian, if the pair (β(v), u) < price∗(G, v) for all items v in V , then
price∗(G′) = price∗(G).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.5.9 when bids and prices are
viewed as pairs.
For any configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) where G = (U, V, w), and any
item v in V , we define amount∗(χ, v) as the pair (amount(χ, v),match(χ, v)),
and we define amount∗(χ) as the function that maps each item v in V to
amount∗(χ, v).
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Lemma 3.6.8. For any white configuration χ = (G,M,Φ), we have price∗(G) ≤
threshold∗(G) ≤ amount∗(χ).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.5.10 when bids and prices are
viewed as pairs.
Lemma 3.6.9. Let G′ be a bid-graph of the form add(G, u, β) where bid-graph
G = (U, V, w) is Walrasian. Let ∆ denote the maximum, over all items v in
V , of β(v) − threshold(G, v), and let V ′ denote the set of all items v in V
such that β(v) − threshold(G, v) = ∆. Let u0 denote the minimum, over all
items v in V ′, of the second component of the pair threshold∗(G, v). Then the
following conditions hold:
• If the pair (∆, u) > (0, u0) and configuration χ = (G′,M,Φ) is white,
then match(χ, v) = u for some item v in V ′, and price(G′, v) = threshold(G, v)
for every item v in V ′.
• If the pair (∆, u) < (0, u0) and configuration χ = (G′,M,Φ) is white,
then agent u is unmatched in M and threshold∗(G′) = threshold∗(G).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.5.11 when bids and prices are
viewed as pairs.
3.7 Quiescent configurations
The inputs and outputs of the bottom-level auction of Section 5 are qui-
escent configurations. A configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) is quiescent if unmatched(χ)
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is a subset of white(χ), and for any agent u in black(χ) where β = bid(G, u),
we have β(v) < Φ(v) for all items v in items(χ).
For any configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) where G = (U, V, w), and any
agent u in U , we say χ is u-quiescent if either
1. u belongs to unmatched(χ)∩ gray(χ) and (G′,M,Φ) is quiescent, where
G′ = (U − u, V, w), or
2. u belongs to matched(χ) and shift(χ, u, 1) is quiescent.
3.8 ECCs
We use tie-breaking to handle degeneracy in the bottom-level auction
of Section 5; in each round, we break ties such that the set of allocated agents
is uniquely determined. Below we identify equivalence classes of configurations
(ECCs) that adhere to this tie breaking scheme.
For any pair of configurations χ = (G,M,Φ) and χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ),
we write χ ∼ χ′ if matched(χ) = matched(χ′), nonwhite(χ) = nonwhite(χ′),
and for any item v in items(χ) such that match(χ, v) is non-white, we have
match(χ, v) = match(χ′, v). Observe that ∼ is an equivalence relation and
thus partitions the set of all configurations into equivalence classes. We refer
to an equivalence class of configurations as an ECC , and we use the notation
[χ] to refer to the ECC of a given configuration χ.
By definition, for any ECC X, there exists a unique bid-graph G0 and
a unique potential function Φ0 such that every configuration in X is of the
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form (G0,M,Φ0). We define bid-graph(X) and potential(X) as G0 and Φ0
respectively. We define potential(X, v) as Φ0(v), for any item v in V , where
G0 = (U, V, w). An ECC X is quiescent if every configuration χ in X is
quiescent. We define u-quiescent ECCs similarly.
It follows by definition that for any ECC X, every configuration χ in X
is associated with the same set of agents; we define agents(X) to be this unique
set of agents. We define the following similarly: items(X), matched(X), and
unmatched(X). For any ECC X and any agent u in unmatched(X), we define
items(X, u) to be the unique set of items given by Lemma 3.8.1. We define
the following functions similarly: gray(X), white(X), black(X), nonwhite(X),
nonblack(X), enabled(X), positive(X), nonpositive(X), gap(X, u), bids(X, v),
max-gap(X, u), demand(X, u), pseudo-demand(X, u), items(X, u), agents(X, u),
and agents(X, v).
For any ECC X, any agent u in agents(X) and any integer z such
that either u belongs to unmatched(X) or z ≥ 0, we define shift(X, u, z)
as [shift(χ, z, u)] where χ is any configuration in X. For any ECC X and
any agent u in agents(X) and any agent u′ not in agents(X), we define
subst(X, u, u′) as the ECC ∪χ∈X [subst(χ, u, u′)] given by Lemma 3.8.3. We
define the following similarly: add(X, u, β), and add(X, u, v, z). Below we
establish some basic properties of ECCs.
Lemma 3.8.1. For any ECC X, any agent u in unmatched(X), and any pair
of configurations χ and χ′ in X, we have items(χ, u) = items(χ′, u).
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Proof. Configurations χ and χ′ are associated with the same potential func-
tion. By definition, matched(χ) = matched(χ′), nonwhite(χ) = nonwhite(χ′),
and for any agent u′′ in matched(χ) ∩ nonwhite(χ), agent u is matched to
the same item in χ and χ′. Thus, for any item v, gap(χ,match(χ, v)) =
maxv∈V w(match(χ, v), v)−Φ(v). Further, by the definition of digraph(χ), arc
(match(χ, v), v′) belongs to digraph(χ) for every item v′ in demand(χ,match(χ, v)).
By a similar argument, arc (match(χ′, v), v′) belongs to digraph(χ′) for every
item v′ in demand(χ′,match(χ′, v)). It follows that items(χ, u) = items(χ′, u).
Lemma 3.8.2. For any quiescent configuration χ, the ECC [χ] is quiescent.
Proof. Let χ = (G,M,Φ) and let χ′ be any configuration in [χ]. By definition,
potential([χ′]) = Φ, unmatched(χ′) = unmatched(χ), and for every agent u
in matched(χ) ∩ nonwhite(χ), there exists an item v in items(χ) such that
match(χ, v) = match(χ′, v) = u. It follows that since χ is quiescent, χ′ is
quiescent.
Lemma 3.8.3. For any ECC X, any agent u in agents(X), and any agent u′
not in agents(X), the set of configurations given by ∪χ∈X [subst(χ, u, u′)] is an
ECC.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of ECCs and the definition of




In this chapter, we present a novel solution concept for our proposed
sealed-bid unit-demand auction. Our sealed-bid unit-demand auction is used
to implement each round of our proposed dynamic unit-demand auction; it fol-
lows that each round of our dynamic auction implements the solution concept
described in this chapter.
Recall from Section 1.2 that for an item in our proposed sealed-bid
unit-demand auction, the strike price of the item imposes a lower bound on
the auction price of the item — by exercising the item’s put, the seller of
the item can ensure that the auction price is at least as high as the strike
price. Due to these lower bound constraints on prices, we find that the VCG
mechanism is not well-suited for our auction.
Additionally, in our proposed sealed-bid setting, we cannot guarantee
the strong properties that are achieved by VCG in the classic setting. For
example, consider an auction instance in which no agent bids on a particular
item. The auction would be forced to allocate the item to the target of its
put at its associated strike price even if such an allocation violates the envy-
freedom property of the target. Consequently, we formulate a solution concept
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that is appropriate for our work.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we
present an informal discussion of the proposed solution concept for our sealed-
bid unit-demand auction. In Section 4.2, we provide a formal definition of
semi-Walrasian configurations. In Section 4.3, we formalize the equilibrium
conditions associated with the proposed solution concept.
4.1 Informal Description
We say that an agent u is “satisfied” in an outcome if u satisfies the stan-
dard properties of voluntary participation and envy-freedom (see Section 3.3
for the formal definitions). For the classic sealed-bid unit-demand auction, a
solution is said to be Walrasian if all of the agents are satisfied. Moreover, the
VCG mechanism returns a Walrasian solution where the pricing is given by
the unique minimum price vector over all Walrasian solutions.
For the present problem, we relax the Walrasian conditions by requiring
only a certain subset of the agents in an outcome to be satisfied. For example,
we enforce the natural requirement that if an agent u is not allocated, then u is
satisfied; equivalently, each component of the unit-demand bid of u is required
to be less than or equal to the price of the corresponding item. Additionally,
we require that if a non-allocated agent u is indifferent to being allocated to
an item v that is allocated to some agent u′, then u′ is satisfied. Continuing in
this manner, we require that if a non-allocated agent u is indifferent to being
allocated to an item v that is allocated to agent u′, and u′ is indifferent to
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being allocated to an item v′ (not equal to v) that is allocated to agent u′′,
then u′′ is satisfied, and so on.
In the terminology of the well-known Hungarian algorithm [24] for
weighted bipartite matching, the aforementioned sequence of requirements
may be stated more concisely as follows: If an agent u belongs to the Hungarian
tree rooted at some non-allocated agent, then u is satisfied. (In Section 3.3, we
formalize this requirement as a reachability condition in a suitably defined di-
graph.) The class of solutions meeting the latter requirement — which clearly
includes all Walrasian solutions — plays a central role in our work. We refer
to such solutions as “semi-Walrasian” (see Condition 1 in Section 4.3).
A key observation underlying the design of our solution concept is that
a semi-Walrasian solution implicitly partitions the items into two sets: the set
of all items v such that any positive decrease in the price of v (while leaving
the prices of all other items unchanged) yields a solution that is no longer
semi-Walrasian, and the remaining items. In Section 4.3, the former items
are defined to be “priced at market”, and the latter items are defined to be
“priced above market”. For an item that is priced at market, the associated
put need not be exercised in order to justify the price. For such an item v, the
price is required to be at least the strike price (see Condition 2 in Section 4.3);
otherwise, the seller of item v would prefer to exercise the put associated with
v. For an item that is priced above market, the price can only be justified
via exercise of the associated put; for such an item we require the price to be
equal to the strike price (see Condition 3 in Section 4.3).
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We require that the set of items V ′ priced above market be purchased by
the set of agents U ′ who are targets of the associated puts (see Condition 4(a)
in Section 4.3); the motivation for this requirement is that the items in V ′ are
too expensive to be of interest to any of the remaining agents. The problem
of determining a suitable allocation of V ′ to U ′ may be viewed as an instance
of the house allocation problem [37]; accordingly, we enforce standard desider-
ata related to voluntary participation (see Condition 4(b) in Section 4.3) and
Pareto-efficiency (see Condition 5 in Section 4.3).
4.2 Semi-Walrasian Configurations
We now formally introduce semi-Walrasian configurations that we re-
ferred to during the discussion of the solution concept in Section 4.1. A con-
figuration χ is semi-Walrasian if for every agent u in unmatched(χ) and every
item v in items(χ, u), the agent match(χ, v) satisfies voluntary participation
and envy-freedom.
A semi-Walrasian configuration χ induces a partition of the items into
two sets: the set of items that belong to items(χ, u) for some agent u in
unmatched(χ), and the remaining items. We say that the items in the former
set are priced at market, and that the remaining items are priced above market.
For the standard sealed-bid unit-demand auction, the VCG mechanism yields
a Walrasian configuration in which every item is priced at market.
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4.3 Equilibrium Conditions
Given a configuration χ0 = (G,M0,Φ0) as input where G = (U, V, w),
we seek to devise a truthful mechanism that computes a configuration χ =
(G,M,Φ) satisfying the equilibrium conditions listed below.
1. The configuration χ is semi-Walrasian.
2. For any item v in V that is priced at market, we have Φ(v) ≥ Φ0(v).
3. For any item v in V that is priced above market, we have Φ(v) = Φ0(v).
4. Let V ′ denote the set of all items in V that are priced above market.
Then there is a permutation π of V ′ such that the following conditions
hold.
(a) For any item v in V ′, match(χ, π(v)) = match(χ0, v).
(b) For any item v in V ′ having match(χ0, v) = u, gap(χ, u) ≥ gap(χ0, u).
5. For any configuration χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ), if there exists an agent u in U
such that gap(χ, u) < gap(χ′, u), then there exists an agent u′ in U
such that: (strong version) gap(χ′, u′) < gap(χ, u′); (weak version) u′ is
matched differently in M and M ′, and gap(χ′, u′) ≤ gap(χ, u′).
The reader will note that above conditions are stated in terms of an
agent’s gap rather than the utility. For a unit-demand auction where agents
bid truthfully, the gap of an agent is equal to its utility, and (the weak version
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of) Condition 5 corresponds to a solution in the (weak) core. Our reference
to the (weak) core is in the sense defined by Jaramillo and Manjunath [19].
Consequently, for a truthful auction, a solution in the core satisfies Pareto-
efficiency, and a solution in the weak core satisfies the following property: no
subset of agents can exchange their allocated items amongst themselves such




In this chapter, we present the bottom-level auction. The bottom-level
auction is a dynamic unit-demand auction, and is a building block of the
mid-level auction described in Chapter 6.
The input to the bottom-level auction is a quiescent ECC (see Sec-
tions 3.7 and 3.8 for definition). It is easy to see that quiescent ECCs satisfy
equilibrium conditions 1, 2, and 3 of Section 4.3. In each round of the bottom-
level auction, a single agent increments its offers on all items by one unit, and
the round is resolved by incorporating the bid increment while continuing to
satisfy equilibrium conditions 1, 2, and 3.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we
introduce some preliminary definitions. In Section 5.2, we describe the bottom-
level auction. In Section 5.3, we develop formalism leading to the definition
of the raise operation. In Section 5.4, we establish some basic properties of




For any configuration χ, we define enabled(χ) as the set of agents u in
agents(χ) such that either
1. u belongs to white(χ), or
2. u belongs to nonwhite(χ) and for all items v in items(χ), we have β(v) <
Φ(v)− 1, where β = bid(G, u).
We define enabled(X) similarly.
5.2 Description
The bottom-level auction is dynamic. The auction takes a quiescent
ECC as input and updates the ECC over a sequence of rounds. In a general
round of the bottom-level auction, a single enabled agent in the ECC invokes
the function raise defined in Section 5.3 below. Informally, an invocation of
raise by an agent corresponds to the agent incrementing all components of
its bid by one unit. If two or more enabled agents wish to invoke raise in a
round, then the auction chooses from amongst them arbitrarily. The auction
terminates when no agent invokes raise in a round.
5.3 The Raise Operation
In this section, we develop formalism leading to the definition of the
function raise.
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For any ECC X and any agent u in unmatched(X), we define the
predicate P0(X, u) to hold if X is either quiescent or u-quiescent.
We now define victim(X, u, z) for any ECC X, any integer z in {0, 1},
and any agent u in unmatched(X) such that the predicate P0(X, u) holds. Let
set U0 denote white(X) and let set U1 denote agents(X, u)∪{u}∩nonpositive(X).
Note that set U1 is nonempty as it contains agent u. If U1 \ U0 6= ∅, we define
victim(X, u, z) as the minimum agent in U1 \ U0. If U1 \ U0 = ∅, z = 1, and
U1 − u 6= ∅, then we define victim(X, u, z) as the minimum agent in U1 − u.
Otherwise, we define victim(X, u, z) as the minimum agent in U1.
For any ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X), we define the predicate
P1(X, u) to hold if either
1. agent u belongs to matched(X) and X is quiescent, or
2. agent u belongs to unmatched(X) and the predicate P0(X, u) holds.
We now define augment(X, u, z) for any ECC X, any integer z in {0, 1},
and any agent u in enabled(X) such that the predicate P1(X, u) holds. If agent
u belongs to matched(X), then augment(X, u, z) is the ECC X. Otherwise,
augment(X, u, z) is the ECC [χ′], where χ′ is constructed as follows: Let χ
be an arbitrary configuration in X and let P be an arbitrary simple directed
path from u to victim(X, u, z) in digraph(χ); for every item v′ such that there
exists an arc of the form (u′, v′) on path P , we set match(χ′, v′) = u′, and for
every item v′ that is not on path P , we set match(χ′, v′) = match(χ, v′). By
Lemma 5.3.1, it follows that augment(X, u, z) is well defined.
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For any ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X) such that either
1. X is quiescent and agents(X, u) ∩ nonpositive(X) = ∅, or
2. X is u-quiescent and u belongs to matched(X)
we define inc(X, u) as
∪(G,M,Φ)∈X [(G′,M,Φ′)]
where G′ = shift(bid-graph(X), u, 1), and Φ′ is defined as follows: if agent u
belongs to matched(χ), then Φ′ = Φ; otherwise Φ′(v) = Φ(v) + 1 for any item
v in items(χ, u) and Φ′(v) = Φ(v) for any item v in items(χ) \ items(χ, u).
The existence of such an ECC is established by Lemma 5.3.2.
For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X), we de-
fine raise ′(X, u) as augment(X, u, 1). For any ECC X and any agent u in
enabled(X) such that either X is quiescent, or X is u-quiescent and u be-
longs to matched(X), we define raise ′′(X, u) as augment(inc(X, u), u, 0) For
any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X), the function raise(X, u)
is defined as raise ′′(raise ′(X, u), u).
For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in unmatched(X), we define
victim(X, u) as follows: if matched(X)∩ unmatched(raise(X, u)) = {u′}, then
victim(X, u) = u′; otherwise, victim(X, u) = ∅. Recall that by Fact 5.3.4,
matched(X) ∩ unmatched(X) has a cardinality of at most 1.
The facts below follow from the definition of the function raise.
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Fact 5.3.1. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X) ∩
matched(X), we have raise(X, u) = shift(X, u, 1).
Fact 5.3.2. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X), we
have potential(raise(X, u)) ≥ potential(X).
Fact 5.3.3. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X) such
that bid(bid-graph(X), u) < potential(X), we have potential(raise(X, u)) =
potential(X).
Fact 5.3.4. For any ECC X ′ of the form raise(X, u), we have |S| ≤ 1, where
S = matched(X) \matched(X ′).
The following lemmas establish that the output of the bottom-level
auction is a quiescent ECC.
Lemma 5.3.1. For any ECC X, any integer z in {0, 1}, and any agent u in
enabled(X) such that the predicate P1(X, u) holds, there is a unique ECC of
the form augment(X, u, z). augment(X, u, z).
Proof. If u belongs to matched(X), then by definition augment(X, u, z) = X.
We now consider the case where u belongs to unmatched(X). Let χ be any
configuration in X. By definition, irrespective of the choice of χ and the path
P used, the agent victim(χ, u, z) is unmatched in augment(X, u, z) and each
agent in matched(χ) ∩ nonwhite(χ) \ victim(χ, u, z) is matched to the same
item in χ and augment(X, u, z). Thus it follows that augment(X, u, z) is an
ECC.
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Lemma 5.3.2. Any set of configurations of the form inc(X, u) is an ECC.
Proof. If u belongs to matched(X), then by definition inc(X, u) = shift(X, u, 1).
We now consider the case where u belongs to unmatched(X). By the precon-
ditions on X required by inc(X, u), it follows that X is quiescent and there
exists no agent u′ in agents(X, u) such that gap(X, u′) ≤ 0. Let (G,M,Φ)
be any configuration in X. By definition, inc(X, u) includes the configura-
tion (G′,M,Φ′) where G′ = shift(bid-graph(X), u, 1) and Φ′(v) = Φ(v) + 1 for
each item v in items(χ, u). Thus, every agent in nonwhite(χ) is matched to
the same item in χ and χ′. It follows that the set of configurations given by
inc(X, u) is an ECC.
Lemma 5.3.3. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X),
the predicate P1(X, u) holds.
Proof. Since X is quiescent, by definition, P1(X, u) holds if u belongs to
matched(X). Suppose u belongs to unmatched(X). Then, P1(X, u) holds
if P0(X, u) holds. By definition, P0(X, u) holds when X is quiescent.
Lemma 5.3.4. For any ECC X ′ of the form inc(X, u), the predicate P1(X
′, u)
holds.
Proof. By the preconditions of inc(X, u), we know that either agents(X, u) ∩
nonpositive(X) = ∅ and X is quiescent, or u belongs to matched(X) and
shift(X, u, 1) is quiescent. We first consider the case when u belongs to
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matched(X). In this case, inc(X, u) = shift(X, u, 1). Thus inc(X, u) is quies-
cent and P1(X
′, u) holds.
Next we consider the case when u belongs to unmatched(X). In this
case, agents(X, u) ∩ nonpositive(X) = ∅ and X is quiescent. By definition,
inc(X, u) is an ECC X ′ whose bid-graph G = shift(bid-graph(X), u, 1) and
whose potential function has incremented potential(X, v) by one for each item
v in items(X, u). It is easy to see that u is either white or gray in inc(X, u);
thus inc(X, u) is either quiescent or u-quiescent. It follows that P1(inc(X, u), u)
holds
Lemma 5.3.5. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X),
either raise′(X, u) is quiescent, or raise′(X, u) is u-quiescent and u belongs to
matched(raise′(X, u)).
Proof. We first consider the case where u belongs to matched(X). In this case
raise ′(X, u) = X and thus raise ′(X, u) is quiescent.
Next, we consider the case where u belongs to unmatched(X). Since X
is quiescent, u belongs to white(X). In this case, raise ′(X, u) = augment(X, u, 1).
Thus, either u is unmatched and u is white in raise ′(X, u), or u belongs to
matched(raise ′(X, u)) and u is gray in raise ′(X, u). Thus, raise ′(X, u) is either
quiescent or u-quiescent.
Lemma 5.3.6. Any ECC of the form raise(X, u) is quiescent.
Proof. By definition raise(X, u) = raise ′′(raise ′(X, u), u). By Lemma 5.3.5,
raise ′(X, u) satisfies the preconditions of raise ′′. We consider the following two
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cases. First, we consider the case where u belongs to matched(raise ′(X, u)), In
this case, by Lemma 5.3.5, raise ′(X, u) is u-quiescent. Further, by definition,
raise ′′ for a matched agent results in incrementing the bid of the agent by
one unit; thus, raise(X, u) = shift(raise ′(X, u), u, 1) which is quiescent by
definition.
Next we consider the case where u belongs to unmatched(raise ′(X, u)).
In this case, by Lemma 5.3.5, raise ′(X, u) is quiescent and thus raise ′(X, u)
satisfies the precondition for invoking inc. By Lemma 5.3.4, the predicate
P1(inc(raise
′(X, u), u), u) holds; it follows that agent u belongs to the set
matched(inc(raise ′(X, u), u)), or the ECC inc(raise ′(X, u), u) is either quies-
cent of u-quiescent. In the case where inc(raise ′(X, u), u) is u-quiescent, it is
easy to see from the definition of augment that raise(X, u) is quiescent. For
the remaining two cases, augment is a no-op.
5.4 Properties
In this section, we discuss some basic properties of the bottom-level
auction that are useful in both proving lemmas of Section 5.5 and in estab-
lishing results in Chapter 6.
Lemma 5.4.1. For any ECC X ′ of the form raise(X, u′) and any agent u in
nonwhite(X), either
1. u belongs to unmatched(X ′), or
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2. u belongs to nonwhite(X ′), and there exists an item v in items(X) such
that potential(X, v) is equal to potential(X ′, v) and match(χ, v) = u for
any configuration χ in X ∪X ′.
Proof. Since u belongs to nonwhite(X), there exists an item v in items(X) such
that for any configuration χ in X, we have match(χ, v) = u. By definition, u
does not belong to digraph(X) and v is a leaf of digraph(X). Since v is a leaf
of digraph(X), by the definition of the function raise ′ either implies that u =
victim(X, u′, 1) or match(χ, v) = u for any configuration χ in X∪raise ′(X, u′).
If u = victim(X, u′, 1), then u belongs to unmatched(X ′) and the proof is
complete.
We now consider the case where u 6= victim(X, u′, 1); thus v does not
belong to items(X, u′). By the definition of the function raise ′′, we have
potential(X ′, v′) = potential(X, v′) + 1 for any item v′ in items(X, u′) and
potential(X ′, v′) = potential(X, v′) for any item v′ not in items(X, u′); thus
potential(X ′, v) = potential(X, v). Let X ′′ = inc(raise ′(X, u′), u′). It is easy
to see that v is a leaf of digraph(X ′′). Thus, either u = victim(X ′′, u′, 0) or
match(χ, v) = u for any configuration χ in X ∪X ′.
Lemma 5.4.2. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X), if
X ′ = raise(X, u), then
gray(X) ⊆ nonblack(X ′) ∧ white(X) ⊆ white(X ′).
Proof. By the definition of the function raise, if u belongs to gray(X), then u
belongs to gray(X ′), and if u belongs to white(X), then u belongs to white(X ′).
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Consider any agent u0 in agents(X) − u. By Lemma 5.3.6, X ′ is quiescent,
and by the definition of a quiescent ECC, unmatched(X ′) ⊆ white(X ′). Thus,
if u0 belongs to unmatched(X
′), then u0 belongs to white(X
′) and hence u0
belongs to enabled(X ′). Now suppose that u0 belongs to matched(X
′). We
consider the following two cases.
First we consider the case where u0 belongs to gray(X)∩matched(X ′).
By Fact 5.3.2, we have potential(X ′) ≥ potential(X) and by Lemma 5.4.1,
it follows that there exists an item v0 in items(X) having potential(X, v0) =
potential(X ′, v0) and for any configuration χ in X∪X ′, we have match(χ, v0) =
u0. It follows that u0 belongs to gray(X
′).
Next we consider the case where u0 belongs to white(X)∩matched(X ′).
By our assumption, u0 belongs to matched(X). By the definition of raise, it
follows that gap(X ′, u0) ≥ 0. Thus, u0 belongs to white(X ′).
Lemma 5.4.3. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X),
we have enabled(X)− u ⊆ enabled(raise(X, u)).
Proof. Let X ′ = raise(X, u). By Lemma 5.3.6, X ′ is quiescent. Consider
any agent u0 in enabled(X) − u. Suppose u0 belongs to white(X); then by
Lemma 5.4.2, u0 belongs to white(X
′), and hence u0 belongs to enabled(X
′).
Suppose u0 belongs to nonwhite(X). Since u0 belongs to enabled(X),
we have β(v) < potential(X, v) for every item v in items(X), where β =
bid(X, u0). By Fact 5.3.2, potential(X
′) ≥ potential(X) and by Lemma 5.4.1,
either u0 belongs to unmatched(X
′) or there exists an item v0 in items(X)
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such that for any configuration χ in X∪X ′, we have match(χ, v0) = u0. Thus,
u0 belongs to enabled(X
′).
Lemma 5.4.4. For any quiescent ECC X and any agent u in enabled(X),
if there exists an item v in items(X) such that potential(X, v) is equal to
potential(raise(X, u), v), then bids(X, v) ⊆ bids(raise(X, u), v).
Proof. Let β be any bid in in bids(X, v). By definition, for any item v′ in
items(X) − v, we have β(v) − potential(X, v) ≥ β(v′) − potential(X, v′). By
Lemma 5.3.2, we have potential(raise(X, u)) ≥ potential(X). Thus, for any
item v′ in items(X)− v, we have
β(v)− potential(X, v) ≥ β(v′)− potential(raise(X, u), v′)
Thus, β belongs to bids(raise(X, u), v).
Lemma 5.4.5. For any quiescent ECC X0 and any quiescent ECC X1 of the
form subst(X0, u0, u1) where u0 belongs to unmatched(X0) and u1 < u0, we
have gap(raise(X0, u0), u0) = gap(raise(X1, u1), u1) = 0. Furthermore, either
1. raise(X1, u1) = subst(raise(X0, u0), u0, u1), or
2. raise(raise(X1, u1), u1) = subst(raise(raise(X0, u0), u0), u0, u1)
Proof. Let β = bid(bid-graph(X0), u0). Let X
′
0 = raise
′(X0, u0) and let X
′′
0 =
raise ′′(X ′0, u0). Let X
′
1 = raise
′(X1, u1) and let X
′′
1 = raise
′′(X ′1, u1). Note
that items(X0, u0) = items(X1, u1). Thus, by the definition of the function
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raise ′ it follows that X ′1 = subst(X
′
0, u0, u1). If u0 belongs to matched(X
′
0),
then it is easy to see that X ′′1 = subst(X
′′
0 , u0, u1) and the proof is complete.
We now consider the case where u0 belongs to unmatched(X
′
0). Note that
items(X ′0, u0) = items(X
′
1, u1). Since u1 < u0, it follows from the defini-
tion of the function raise ′′ that if u1 belongs to matched(X
′′
1 ), then u0 be-
longs to matched(X ′′0 ). Similarly, if u0 belongs to unmatched(X
′′
0 ), then u1




0 , u0, u1), or u0 be-
longs to matched(X ′′0 ) and u1 belongs to unmatched(X
′′
1 ). Thus, there exists
an item v in items(inc(X ′1, u1), u1) such that match(inc(X
′
1, u1), v) belongs
to zero(inc(X ′1, u1)) and u1 < u
′ < u0. It is easy to see from the defi-
nition of the function raise ′ that raise ′(X ′′0 , u0) = X
′′
0 and raise
′(X ′′1 , u1) =
subst(X ′′0 , u0, u1). Thus, raise(X
′′
1 , u0) = subst(raise(X
′′
0 , u0), u0, u1).
5.5 Commutativity of Raise Operations
A key property of the bottom-level auction is the commutativity of
raise invocations. This property is formalized in Lemma 5.5.9 and is used
extensively in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
Lemma 5.5.1. For any quiescent ECC X, any agents u0 and u1 in unmatched(X)
such that agents(X, u0)∩nonpositive(X) = ∅, and any item v in items(X, u0),
we have v belongs to items(raise(X, u1), u0) if and only if
potential(raise(X, u1), v) = potential(X, v)
Proof. Since agents(X, u0)∩nonpositive(X) = ∅, it follows that victim(X, u1, 1)
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does not belong to agents(X, u0), thus agents(X, u0) = agents(raise
′(X, u1), u0)
and items(X, u0) = items(raise
′(X, u1), u0). Let χ = (G,M,Φ) be any con-
figuration in X and let χ′ = (G′,M ′,Φ′) be any configuration in raise(X, u1).
By Lemma 3.8.1, we have items(χ, u0) = items(X, u0) and items(χ
′, u0) =
items(raise(X, u1), u0). By definition, v belongs to items(χ, u0) if and only if
there exists a directed path from u0 to v in digraph(χ), where every edge (u
′, v′)
in digraph(χ) is such that v′ belongs to demand(χ, bid(bid-graph(X), u′)).
It is easy to see that if potential(raise(X, u1), v) > potential(X, v), then
there is no directed path from u0 to v in digraph(χ). We now consider the
case where potential(raise(X, u1), v) = potential(X, v). It follows from the
definition of the raise function that if Φ′(v′) > Φ(v′) for some item v′ on a
directed path from u0 to v, then Φ
′(v) > Φ(v), and this would contradict
our assumption that potential(raise(X, u1), v) = potential(X, v). Thus every
item v′ on every directed path from u0 to v has Φ
′(v′) = Φ(v′); it follows that
all such directed paths are preserved in digraph(χ′), and thus, v belongs to
items(raise(X, u1), u0).
Lemma 5.5.2. For any quiescent ECC X and any agents u0 in unmatched(X)
and u1 in enabled(X), if agents(X, u0) ∩ nonpositive(X) = ∅, then
agents(X1, u0) ⊆ agents(X, u0) ∧ agents(X1, u0) ∩ nonpositive(X1) = ∅
where X1 = raise(X, u1).
Proof. If agent u1 belongs to matched(X), then by Fact 5.3.1, we have X1 =
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shift(X, u1, 1); in this case it is easy to see that agents(X1, u0) ⊆ agents(X, u0)
and agents(X1, u0) ∩ nonpositive(X1) = ∅.
We now consider the case where u1 belongs to unmatched(X). By
Lemma 5.5.1, we have items(X1, u0) ⊆ items(X, u0) and potential(X1, v) =
potential(X, v) for any item v in items(X1, u0). Thus, we have agents(X1, u0) ⊆
agents(X, u0) and agents(X1, u0) ∩ nonpositive(X1) = ∅.
Lemma 5.5.3. Let X0 and X1 be quiescent ECCs such that the following
conditions hold
1. bid-graph(X0) = bid-graph(X1)
2. potential(X0) = potential(X1)
3. for any agent u in nonwhite(X) ∩ matched(X), there exists an item v
such that match(χ, v) = u for any configuration χ in X0 ∪X1
For any agents u0 and u1 such that matched(X0) \matched(X1) = {u1} and
matched(X1) \ matched(X0) = {u0}, if u1 belongs to agents(X0, u0) and u0
belongs to agents(X1, u1), then either victim(X0, u0, 1) = victim(X1, u1, 1) or
victim(X0, u0, 0) = victim(X1, u1, 0).
Proof. Let U = matched(X0)−u1 = matched(X1)−u0. We have potential(X0) =
potential(X1) and for any agent u in nonwhite(X)∩matched(X), there exists
an item v such that match(χ, v) = u for any configuration χ in X0 ∪X1; thus
we have nonpositive(X0) = nonpositive(X1) and for any agent u in U , we have
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agents(X0, u) = agents(X1, u) and items(X0, u) = items(X1, u). Additionally,
since u1 belongs to agents(X0, u0) and u0 belongs to agents(X1, u1), we have
nonpositive(X0) ∩ agents(X0, u0) = nonpositive(X1) ∩ agents(X1, u1). By the
definition of the function victim, it is easy to see that either victim(X0, u0, 1) =
victim(X1, u1, 1) or victim(X0, u0, 0) = victim(X1, u1, 0).
Lemma 5.5.4. For any quiescent ECC X and any agents u0 and u1 in
unmatched(X), if victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1, 1), then agent u0 belongs to
agents(raise(X, u0), u1).
Proof. Let X0 = raise(X, u0) and let victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1, 1) = u.
Since u = victim(X, u1, 1), we have u1 belongs to nonpositive(X) and V ⊆
items(X, u1) where V = demand(X, u).
Suppose V ∩ items(X0, u1) = ∅. Then, by Lemma 5.5.1, we have
potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for every item in V and V ⊆ items(X, u0);
thus u belongs to agents(X, u0) and by the definition of the function raise
′,
potential(X0) = potential(X), which is a contradiction. Thus, we have V ∩
items(X0, u1) 6= ∅. Additionally, since u = victim(X, u0), we have u0 belongs
to agents(X0, u
′) for any agent u′ having V ∩ items(X0, u′) = ∅. Thus, u0
belongs to agents(raise(X, u0), u1).
Lemma 5.5.5. For any quiescent ECC X and any agents u0 and u1 in
unmatched(X) such that u1 = victim(X, u1, 1), if victim(X, u0) is equal to
victim(X ′1, u1, 0) where X
′
1 = inc(raise
′(X, u1), u1), then agent u0 belongs to
agents(X ′01, u1) where X
′
01 = inc(raise
′(raise(X, u0), u1), u1).
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Proof. Let X0 = raise(X, u0) and let victim(X, u0) = victim(X
′
1, u1, 0) = u.
Note that the case where victim(X, u0, 1) = u is symmetric to the case handled
by Lemma 5.5.4; thus the proof of this case follows from Lemma 5.5.4.
We now focus on the case where victim(X, u0, 1) = u0. By the definition
of the function raise ′′, we have potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v) + 1 for any
item v in items(X, u0) and potential(X, v) = potential(X, v) for any item v
in items(X) \ items(X, u0). Since victim(X, u0) = u, we have u0 belongs to
agents(X0, u
′) for any agent u′ such that demand(X0, u) ∩ items(X0, u′) 6= ∅.
Since victim(X, u1, 1) = u1, we have nonpositive(X)∩ agents(X, u1) = ∅; thus
by Lemmas 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, we have potential(X ′01, v) = potential(X, v) + 1
for any item v in items(X, u0) ∪ items(X, u1). Since victim(X ′1, u1, 0) = u, we
have V ∩ items(X ′01, u1) 6= ∅. It follows that u0 belongs to agents(X ′01, u1).
Lemma 5.5.6. Let X be a quiescent ECC and let u0 and u1 be agents in
unmatched(X). Let X0 = raise(X, u0) and let X1 = raise(X, u1). If victim(X, u0)
is not equal to victim(X, u1), then we have victim(X0, u1) = victim(X, u1) and
potential(raise(X0, u1), v) = potential(X1, v) for any item v in items(X) such
that potential(X1, v) = potential(X, v) + 1.
Proof. First we consider the case where victim(X, u1, 1) 6= u1. In this case, we
have victim(X, u1) = victim(X, u1, 1) and potential(X1) = potential(X); thus
victim(X, u1) belongs to nonpositive(X). The statement of the lemma assumes
that victim(X, u0) 6= victim(X, u1); thus, by the definition of the function
raise, we find that victim(X, u1) belongs to agents(X0, u1)∩ nonpositive(X0).
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If victim(X0, u1) = victim(X, u1), then the proof is complete. Suppose that
victim(X0, u1) 6= victim(X, u1). Then there is an agent u′ in agents(X, u1)
such that u′ = victim(X, u0), and hence u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1). Since
u′ = victim(X0, u0), u
′ belongs to agents(X, u1), and u
′ 6= victim(X, u1, 1), the
definition of the function victim implies that victim(X0, u1, 1) = victim(X, u1, 1).
Next we consider the case where victim(X, u1, 1) = u1; thus, by the
definition of the function raise, we have nonpositive(X) ∩ agents(X, u1) = ∅
and potential(X1, v) = potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in items(X, u1).
Thus, victim(X, u1) = victim(X
′




By Lemma 5.5.1, we have items(X0, u1) = items(X, u1) \ items(X, u0) and
potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in items(X, u0). By
Lemmas 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, we have nonpositive(X0) ∩ agents(X0, u1) = ∅; thus,
we have potential(raise(X0, u1), v) = potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in
items(X0, u1). Since items(X0, u1) = items(X, u1) \ items(X, u0), we have
potential(raise(X1, u1), v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any item v in items(X, u0)∪
items(X, u1).
LetX ′01 = inc(raise
′(X0, u1), u1). If victim(X
′
01, u1, 0) = victim(X
′
1, u1, 0),
then the proof is complete. Suppose that victim(X ′01, u1, 0) 6= victim(X ′1, u1, 0);
then there is an agent u′ in agents(X ′1, u1) such that u
′ = victim(X, u0), and
hence u0 belongs to agents(X
′
01, u1). Since u
′ = victim(X0, u0), u
′ belongs
to agents(X ′1, u1), and u
′ 6= victim(X ′1, u1, 0). The definition of the function
victim implies that victim(X ′01, u1, 0) = victim(X
′
1, u1, 0).
Thus, victim(X0, u1) = victim(X, u1) and potential(raise(X0, u1), v) =
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potential(X1, v) for any item v in items(X) such that potential(X1, v) =
potential(X, v) + 1.
Lemma 5.5.7. For any quiescent ECC X and any agents u0 and u1 in
agents(X), if matched(X)∩{u0, u1} 6= ∅, then potential(X01) = potential(X10)
and matched(X01) = matched(X10), where X01 = raise(raise(X, u0), u1) and
X10 = raise(raise(X, u1), u0).
Proof. Let X0 = raise(X, u0) and let X1 = raise(X, u1).
We first consider the case where |{u0, u1} ∩ matched(X)| = 2; thus,
{u0, u1} ⊆ matched(X). By Fact 5.3.1, we haveX01 = shift(shift(X, u0, 1), u1, 1),
and X10 = shift(shift(X, u1, 1), u0, 1); thus, X01 = X10.
We now focus on the case where |{u0, u1}∩matched(X)| = 1. Without
loss of generality, we assume that {u0, u1} ∩ matched(X) = {u1}; thus, u1
belongs to matched(X). Since u1 belongs to enabled(X) ∩ matched(X) and
X1 = shift(X, u1, 1), either u1 belongs to nonwhite(X) ∩ nonwhite(X1) or u1
belongs to white(X)∩white(X1). If u1 belongs to nonwhite(X)∩nonwhite(X1),
then for every item v in items(X), we have β(v) < potential(X, v)− 2, where
β = bid(bid-graph(X), u1). Thus we have victim(X, u0) = victim(X1, u0) = u1
and raise(X0, u1) = X0. Using these facts, it is straightforward to argue
that potential(X01) = potential(X10) and matched(X01) = matched(X10). It
remains to address the case where u belongs to white(X) ∩ white(X1). We
proceed via the following case analysis.
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• Case 1: victim(X, u0) 6= u1.
– Case 1.1: victim(X, u0, 1) 6= u0.
We have victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u0, 1). In this case, u0 belongs
to matched(raise ′(X, u0)); thus, by the definition of the function
raise, we have matched(X0) = matched(X) + u0 − victim(X, u0)
and potential(X0) = potential(X). By Fact 5.3.1, we have X01 =
shift(X0, u1, 1); thus we have potential(X01) = potential(X) and
matched(X01) = matched(X) + u0 − victim(X, u0).
Since victim(X, u0) 6= u1, there exists an agent u′ in nonwhite(X)∩
agents(X, u0) such that victim(X, u1, 1) = u
′. By Fact 5.3.1, we
have X1 = shift(X, u1, 1) and thus, nonwhite(X)∩ agents(X, u0)−
u1 = nonwhite(X1)∩agents(X1, u0)−u1; it follows that victim(X1, u0)
is equal to victim(X, u0). Thus, matched(X10) = matched(X) +
u0 − victim(X, u0). Since X1 = shift(X, u, 1) and u0 belongs to
matched(raise ′(X, u0)), we have potential(X10) = potential(X).
Thus, we have matched(X01) = matched(X10) ∧ potential(X01) =
potential(X10).
– Case 1.2: victim(X, u0, 1) = u0.
In this case, victim(X, u0) = victim(X
′
0, u0, 0) where X
′
0 is equal
to inc(raise ′(X, u0), u0). Since victim(X, u0, 1) = u0, it follows
that nonwhite(X) ∩ agents(X, u0) = ∅; thus, potential(X0, v) =
potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in items(X, u0). By Fact 5.3.1,
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we have X01 = shift(X0, u1, 1); thus potential(X01) = potential(X0)
and matched(X01) = matched(X) + u0 − victim(X, u0).
We established above that X1 = shift(X, u1, 1); thus potential(X1)
is equal to potential(X) and matched(X1) = matched(X). Fur-
ther, since agents(X, u0)∩nonpositive(X) = ∅ and potential(X1) =
potential(X0), by Lemmas 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 can be used to argue
that we have items(X1, u0) = items(X, u0) and agents(X1, u0) ∩
nonpositive(X1) = ∅; thus potential(X10, v) = potential(X, v) + 1
for any item v in items(X, u0).
Let X ′1 = inc(raise
′(X1, u0), u0); it is easy to see that X
′
1 is equal to
shift(X ′0, u1, 1). Since u1 6= victim(X ′0, u0) andX ′1 = shift(X ′0, u1, 1),
we have u1 6= victim(X ′1, u0); thus, victim(X ′1, u0) = victim(X ′0, u0) =
victim(X, u0), and matched(X10) = matched(X)+u0−victim(X, u0).
It follows that matched(X01) = matched(X10) and potential(X01) =
potential(X10).
• Case 2: victim(X, u0) = u1.
– Case 2.1: victim(X, u0, 1) 6= u0.
In this case, victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u0, 1) = u1; thus, we have
potential(X0) = potential(X) and matched(X0) = matched(X) +
u0−u1. By the definition of the function raise, we have gap(X, u1) =
0 and gap(X0, u0) = 1. We consider two sub-cases.
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First we consider the case where agents(X0, u1)∩nonpositive(X0) 6=
∅. In this case, we have potential(X01) = potential(X0) and by
Lemma 5.5.2, agents(X0, u1)∩nonpositive(X0) = nonpositive(X)∩
(agents(X, u1) ∪ agents(X, u0)). Since gap(X, u1) = 0 and X1 =
shift(X, u1, 1), we have gap(X1, u1) = 1; by the definition of the
function raise ′, we find that u1 does not belong to nonpositive(X0)
and victim(X0, u1) 6= u1. Thus, potential(X01) = potential(X) and
matched(X01) = matched(X) + u0 + u1 − victim(X0, u1).
Since u1 belongs to agents(X1, u0) and X1 = shift(X, u1, 1), it
follows that potential(X1) = potential(X0) and nonpositive(X1) ∩
agents(X1, u0) = nonpositive(X)∩(agents(X, u0)∪agents(X, u1))−
u1; thus we have victim(X1, u0) = victim(X0, u1). It follows that
potential(X10) = potential(X) and matched(X10) = matched(X)−
victim(X0, u1) + u0 + u1.
Next we consider the case where agents(X0, u1)∩nonpositive(X0) =
∅, In this case, we have potential(X01, v) = potential(X, v) + 1 for
any item v in items(X0, u1) and victim(X0, u1) = victim(X
′
0, u1, 0)
whereX ′0 = inc(raise
′(X, u1), u1). Since u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1)
and gap(X0, u0) = 1, we have u0 belongs to nonpositive(X
′
0) ∩
agents(X ′0, u1); thus u1 belongs to matched(X01). Thus, we have
matched(X01) = matched(X) + u0 + u1 − victim(X ′0, u1, 0) and
potential(X01, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any item in items(X, u1).
Since potential(X0) = potential(X) and victim(X, u0, 1) = u1, and
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since agents(X0, u1)∩nonpositive(X0) = ∅, we have agents(X, u0)∩
nonpositive(X0) = {u1}. Since X1 = shift(X, u, 1), it follows that
agents(X1, u0) ∩ nonpositive(X1) = ∅; thus potential(X10, v) =
potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in items(X1, u0) = items(X0, u1).
Let X ′1 = inc(raise





agents(X ′1, u0)∩nonpositive(X ′1) = agents(X ′0, u1)∩nonpositive(X ′0)−
u1, and we have victim(X
′
1, u0, 0) = victim(X
′
0, u1, 0). Therefore,
potential(X10) = potential(X) and matched(X10) = matched(X) +
u0 + u1 − victim(X ′0, u1, 0).
– Case 2.2: victim(X, u0, 1) = u0.
In this case, victim(X, u0) = victim(X
′
0, u0, 0) = u1 where X
′
0 =
inc(raise ′(X, u0), u0). Since victim(X, u0, 1) = u0, it follows that
nonwhite(X) ∩ agents(X, u0) = ∅; as a result, potential(X0, v) =
potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in items(X, u0), and by the defi-
nition of the function raise ′′, we have gap(X0, u0) = 0. Since u0 be-
longs to agents(X0, u1) and gap(X0, u0) = 0, we have u1 belongs to
matched(raise ′(X0, u1)); thus potential(X01) = potential(X0) and
matched(X01) = matched(X) + u0 + u1 − victim(X0, u0, 1).
We established above thatX1 = shift(X, u1, 1); thus potential(X1) =
potential(X) and matched(X1) = matched(X). Since agents(X, u0)∩
nonpositive(X) = ∅ and potential(X1) = potential(X), Lemmas 5.5.1
and 5.5.2 imply that agents(X1, u0) ∩ nonpositive(X1) = ∅ and




potential(X, v) + 1 for any item v in items(X, u0), where X
′
1 =
inc(raise ′(X1, u0), u0).
Since gap(X0, u1) = 0, potential(X
′
1) = potential(X0) and X1 =
shift(X, u1, 1), we have gap(X
′
1, u1) = 1; thus u1 6= victim(X ′1, u0, 0).
By the definition of the function raise, we haveX ′1 = shift(X0, u1, 1);
thus, victim(X ′1, u0) = victim(X0, u0, 0).
It follows that matched(X10) = matched(X)+u0+u1−victim(X, u0, 0)
and potential(X10) = potential(X0).
Lemma 5.5.8. For any quiescent ECC X and any agents u0 and u1 in
unmatched(X), if victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1) = u, then
potential(X01) = potential(X10) ∧ matched(X01) = matched(X10)
where X01 = raise(raise(X, u0), u1) and X10 = raise(raise(X, u1), u0).
Proof. Let X0 = raise(X, u0) and let X1 = raise(X, u1).
Let X ′0 = inc(raise
′(X, u0), u0), let X
′
01 = inc(raise
′(X0, u1), u1), let X
′
1 =
inc(raise ′(X, u1), u1), and let X
′
10 = inc(raise
′(X1, u0), u0). We consider the
following cases.
• Case 1: victim(X, u1, 1) 6= u1
– Case 1.1 victim(X, u0, 1) 6= u0. We begin by establishing the fol-
lowing sequence of claims.
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1. potential(X0) = potential(X). Follows from the definition of
the function raise ′′ and the fact that victim(X, u0, 1) 6= u0.
2. u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1). Follows from Lemma 5.5.4 and
the fact that victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1, 1) = u.
3. potential(X1) = potential(X). Follows from the definition of
the function raise ′′ and the fact that victim(X, u1, 1) 6= u1.
4. u1 belongs to agents(X1, u0). Follows from Lemma 5.5.4 and
the fact that victim(X, u1) = victim(X, u0, 1) = u.
We now consider two sub-cases.
(a) Case 1.1.2 victim(X0, u1, 1) 6= u1.
By claims 1 and 2, we have potential(X0) = potential(X1)
and by claims 2 and 4, we have u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1)
and u1 belongs to agents(X1, u0); thus victim(X1, u0, 1) 6=
u0.
Since victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1) = u, it follows that
matched(X0) \ matched(X1) = {u0} and matched(X1) \
matched(X0) = {u1}. Further, by the definition of the
function raise, we have bid-graph(X0) = bid-graph(X1) and
for any agent u′ in nonwhite(X), there exists an item v′
in items(X) such that match(χ, v) = u′ for any config-
uration χ in X0 ∪ X1. Thus, by Lemma 5.5.3, we have
victim(X0, u1, 1) = victim(X1, u0, 1).
Further, by the definition of the function raise ′′, we have
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potential(X01) = potential(X10). Since victim(X, u0) =
victim(X, u1) and victim(X0, u1, 1) = victim(X1, u0, 1), we
have matched(X01) = matched(X10).
(b) Case 1.1.2 victim(X0, u1, 1) = u1.
By claims 1 and 2, we have potential(X0) = potential(X1)
and by claims 2 and 4, we have u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1)
and u1 belongs to agents(X1, u0); thus agents(X0, u1) =
agents(X1, u0) and by the definition of the function raise
′′,
we have potential(X ′01) = potential(X
′
10).
We know that victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1) = u, thus
matched(X ′01) \matched(X ′10) = {u0} and matched(X ′10) \
matched(X ′01) = {u1}. Further, by the definition of the
function raise, we have bid-graph(X ′01) = bid-graph(X
′
10)
and for any agent u′ in nonwhite(X), there exists an item
v′ in items(X) such that match(χ, v) = u′ for any con-
figuration χ in X ′01 ∪ X ′10. Thus, by Lemma 5.5.3, we
have victim(X ′01, u1, 0) = victim(X
′
10, u0, 0). By the def-
inition of the function raise ′′, we have potential(X01) =
potential(X10).
Since victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1) and victim(X
′
01, u1, 0) =
victim(X10, u0, 0), we have matched(X01) = matched(X10).
– Case 1.2. victim(X, u0, 1) = u0. We begin by establishing the
following sequence of claims.
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1. potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any item v in items(X, u0)
and potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v) for any item v in items(X)\
items(X, u0). Follows from the fact that victim(X, u0, 1) = u0
and the definition of the function raise ′′.
2. gap(X0, u0) = 0. We have victim(X, u0, 1) = u0 and we have
victim(X, u0) = u; thus, u0 is matched by a raise
′′ invocation
and gap(X0, u0) = 0.
3. u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1). Since victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1, 1),
by Lemma 5.5.4, we have u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1).
4. potential(X ′01) = potential(X0). By 2 and 3, we have u0 belongs
to nonpositive(X0) ∩ agents(X0, u1); thus by the definition of
the function raise ′, we have potential(X ′01) = potential(X0).
5. potential(X1) = potential(X). This follows from the fact that
victim(X, u1, 1) = u and the definition of the function raise
′.
6. potential(X ′10) = potential(X0). Since victim(X, u0, 1) = u,
we have nonpositive(X) ∩ agents(X, u0) = ∅, thus by 5 and
Lemma 5.5.1, we have items(X1, u0) = items(X, u0), and by
Lemma 5.5.2, we have nonpositive(X1) ∩ agents(X1, u0) = ∅;
thus by the definition of the function raise ′′ and 1, we have
potential(X ′10) = potential(X0).
7. u1 belongs to agents(X
′
10, u0). Since victim(X, u0, 1) = u0,
we have victim(X, u0) = victim(X
′
0, u0, 0) = u where X
′
0 =
inc(raise ′(X, u0), u0). We have victim(X, u1, 1) = u. Thus, by
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Lemma 5.5.5, we have u1 belongs to agents(X
′
10, u0).
8. victim(X ′10, u0, 0) = victim(X0, u1, 1). By claims 4 and 6, we
have potential(X ′01) = potential(X
′
10), and by claims 3 and 7
we know that u0 belongs to agents(X0, u1) and u1 belongs to
agents(X10′ , u0). It is now easy to see that matched(X0) \
matched(X ′10) = {u0} and matched(X ′10)\matched(X0) = {u1},
and by the definition of the function raise, for any agent in
nonwhite(X ′01), there exists an item in items(X) such that
match(χ, v) = u for any configuration in X0∪X ′10. Thus, it fol-
lows from Lemma 5.5.5 that victim(X ′10, u0, 0) = victim(X0, u1, 1).
By claims 4 and 6, we have potential(X01) = potential(X10). The
statement of the lemma assumes that victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1)
and by claim 8, we have victim(X ′10, u0, 0) = victim(X0, u1, 1); thus
matched(X01) = matched(X10).
• Case 2: victim(X, u1, 1) = u1
– Case 2.1: victim(X, u0, 1) 6= u0
This case is symmetric to case 1.2.
– Case 2.1: victim(X, u0, 1) = u0. We begin by establishing the fol-
lowing sequence of claims.
1. potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any item v in items(X, u0)
and potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v) for any item v in items(X)\
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items(X, u0). Follows from the fact that victim(X, u0, 1) = u0
and the definition of the function raise ′′.
2. potential(X ′01, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any v in items(X, u0)∪
items(X, u1) and potential(X
′
01, v) = potential(X, v) for any v
in items(X)\items(X, u0)∪items(X, u1). Since victim(X, u1, 1) =
u1, we have nonpositive(X) ∩ agents(X, u1) = ∅; by 1 and
Lemma 5.5.1, we have items(X0, u1) = items(X, u1)\items(X, u0),
and by Lemma 5.5.2, we have nonpositive(X0)∩agents(X0, u1) =
∅; thus, claim 2 follows by the definition of the function raise ′′
and claim 1.
3. u0 belongs to agents(X
′
01, u1). By claim 2, potential(X
′
01) >
potential(X0); thus victim(X0, u1, 1) = u1 and victim(X0, u1) =
victim(X ′01, u1, 0); and by Lemma 5.5.5, we find that u0 belongs
to agents(X ′01, u1).
4. potential(X1, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any item v in items(X, u1)
and potential(X0, v) = potential(X, v) for any item v in items(X)\
items(X, u1). Follows from the fact that victim(X, u0, 1) = u0
and the definition of the function raise ′′.
5. potential(X ′10, v) = potential(X, v)+1 for any v in items(X, u1)∪
items(X, u0) and potential(X
′
10, v) = potential(X, v) for any
item v in items(X) \ items(X, u1)∪ items(X, u0). The analysis
is similar to claim 2.
6. u1 belongs to agents(X
′




potential(X1); thus victim(X1, u0, 1) = u0; and victim(X1, u0) =
victim(X ′10, u0, 0); and by Lemma 5.5.5, we find that u1 belongs
to agents(X ′10, u0).
7. victim(X ′10, u0, 0) = victim(X
′
01, u1, 0). By claims 4 and 5, we
have potential(X ′01) = potential(X
′
10) and by claims 3 and 6
we know that u0 belongs to agents(X
′
01, u1) and u1 belongs
to agents(X ′10, u0). Since victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1), we
have matched(X ′01)\matched(X ′10) = {u1} and matched(X ′10)\
matched(X ′10) = {u0}, and by the definition of the function
raise, for any agent in nonwhite(X ′01), there exists an item in
items(X) such that match(χ, v) = u for any configuration in
X ′01∪X ′10. It follows from Lemma 5.5.5 that victim(X ′10, u0, 0) =
victim(X ′01, u1, 0).
By claims 2 and 5, we have potential(X01) = potential(X10). The
statement of the lemma assumes that victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1)
and by claim 7, we have victim(X ′10, u0, 0) = victim(X
′
01, u1, 0);
thus, matched(X01) = matched(X10).
Lemma 5.5.9. For any quiescent ECC X and any agents u0 and u1 in
enabled(X), we have
raise(raise(X, u0), u1) = raise(raise(X, u1), u0).
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Proof. Let X01 = raise(raise(X, u0), u1) and let X10 = raise(raise(X, u1), u0).
We first prove the following claim: potential(X01) = potential(X10)
and matched(X01) = matched(X10). By Lemma 5.5.7, the claim holds when
matched(X) ∩ {u0, u1} 6= ∅. It remains to show that the claim holds when
{u0, u1} ⊆ unmatched(X). By Lemma 5.5.8, the claim holds when {u0, u1} ⊆
unmatched(X) and victim(X, u0) = victim(X, u1). By Lemma 5.5.6, the claim
holds when {u0, u1} ⊆ unmatched(X) and victim(X, u0) 6= victim(X, u1).
It now remains to be shown that if potential(X01) = potential(X10)
and matched(X01) = matched(X10), then X01 = X10. Consider any agent u in
nonwhite(X); there exists an item v in items(X) such that match(χ, v) = u for
every configuration χ in X. Note that if u belongs to unmatched(raise(X, u0)),
then by the definition of the function raise, it follows that u belongs to
unmatched(X01). Using this fact and by repeated application of Lemma 5.4.1,
it follows that either u belongs to unmatched(X01) or match(χ, v) = u for every
configuration χ in X∪X01. By an identical argument, we find that either u be-
longs to unmatched(X10) or match(χ, v) = u for every configuration in X∪X10.
However, since we established above that matched(X01) = matched(X10), it
follows that match(χ, v) = u for every configuration χ in X ∪X01 ∪X10, and




In this chapter, we present the mid-level auction. The mid-level auction
is a sealed-bid unit-demand auction, and corresponds to a determinized, proxy-
based version of the bottom-level auction.
Recall from Chapter 5 that the bottom-level auction is dynamic. In
the mid-level auction, we associate with each agent u, a proxy agent u′ who
bids on behalf of u in the bottom-level auction. The bid of agent u in the
mid-level auction restricts the number of raise invocations of agent u′ in the
bottom-level auction.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we ana-
lyze the bottom-level auction when each agent is associated with a restricted
bidding strategy — the unit-demand bid of an agent in the mid-level auction
restricts the number of raise invocations of the agent’s proxy in the underly-
ing bottom-level auction. In Section 6.2, we describe a particular tie-breaking
scheme that determinizes the raise operation described in Section 5.3 to yield
a unique allocation and pricing. In Section 6.3, we describe the mid-level
auction and establish some basic properties.
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6.1 A Restricted Class of Bidding Strategies
In this section, we analyze the bottom-level auction when each agent
in the auction has a restricted “target” number of raise invocations.
We define a target as a function from the set of all agents to the set of
nonnegative integers. For any target s, any agent u, and any integer z such
that α(u)+z ≥ 0, we define shift(s, u, z) as the target s′ where s′(u) = α(u)+z
and s′(u′) = α(u′) for any agent u′ different from u. For any configuration χ =
(G,M,Φ) where G = (U, V, w), and any target s, we define shift(χ, s) as the
configuration (G′,M,Φ) where G′ = (U, V, w′) and w′(u, v) = w(u, v) + α(u)
for any agent u in U and any item v in V . For any ECC X and any target s,
we define shift(X, s) as ∪χ∈X [shift(χ, s)].
We view the bottom-level auction as taking a pair (X, s) as input, where
X is a quiescent ECC and s is a target, and updating this pair over a sequence
of rounds. For any agent u in X, the nonnegative integer α(u) represents
the number of additional raise invocations desired by agent u. In a general
round of the auction with input (X0, s0), a single agent u in enabled(X0)
having s0(u) > 0 invokes raise, and the output of the round, denoted by
raise(X0, u, s0) is given by (raise(X0, u), shift(s0, u,−1)). The auction termi-
nates when no enabled agent has pending raise invocations.
We define bottom(X, s) as the output of the bottom-level auction when
given the pair (X, s) as input. By Lemma 5.4.3 and Lemma 5.5.9, it follows
that bottom(X, s) is uniquely defined.
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In Section 6.1.1, we establish various properties of bottom(X, s). These
properties are crucial for describing and analyzing the auctions of Chapters 7
and 8.
The facts below follow from the definition of the function raise and the
commutativity of raise invocations established in Lemma 5.5.9.
Fact 6.1.1. For any quiescent ECC X, any target s, and any agent u in
enabled(X), we have
bottom(raise(X, u), s) = bottom(X, shift(s, u, 1)).
Fact 6.1.2. For any quiescent ECC X0 of the form add(X, u, β) and any
target s, we have bottom(X0, s) = bottom(add(X
′, u, β), s′) where (X ′, s′) =
bottom(X, s).
Fact 6.1.3. For any quiescent ECC X, any agent u in white(X), and any
target s, if (X0, s0) = bottom(X, s), then
bottom(X, shift(s, u, 1)) = bottom(X0, shift(s0, u, 1)).
6.1.1 Properties
The goal of this section is to establish Lemma 6.1.10. Lemma 6.1.10
is useful in establishing truthfulness of first phase of the top-level auction of
Chapter 7.
[Definitions] For any quiescent ECC X and any target s, we define
matched(X, s) as the set of agents in matched(X ′), where (X ′, s′) = bottom(X, s).
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For any quiescent ECC X, any target s, and any item v in items(X), we define
agents(X, s, v) as agents(X ′, v), where (X ′, s′) = bottom(X, s).
Lemma 6.1.1. For any quiescent ECC X, any quiescent ECC X ′ of the
form subst(X, u, u′), and any target s such that α(u) = α(u′), if u belongs
to matched(X) ∩ white(X), then gap(X0, u) = gap(X1, u′), where (X0, s0) =
bottom(X, s) and (X1, s1) = bottom(X
′, s).
Proof. By Lemma 5.5.9, the raise invocations of the bottom-level auction in-
stances with inputs X and subst(X, u, u′) can be reordered such that at each
round, either the same agent invokes raise in both executions, or agents u and
u′ invoke raise in their corresponding executions. By the definitions of the
functions raise ′ and raise ′′, the executions treat agents u and u′ identically
until both agents attain a utility of zero. By Lemma 5.4.2, we know that u
and u′ remain white in every round of their corresponding executions, and by
Fact 5.3.2, we know that the potentials are nondecreasing over the rounds of
both executions. Thus, agents u and u′ continue to have zero utility for the
remainder of the executions, and we have gap(X0, u) = gap(X1, u
′).
Lemma 6.1.2. Let X be a quiescent ECC and let X ′ be a quiescent ECC of the
form subst(X, u, u′) such that for any agent u′′ in agents(X), we have u′′ < u
if and only if u′′ < u′. Let s and s′ be targets such that α(u) = s′(u′) and
α(u′′) = s′(u′′) for any agent u′′ in agents(X)− u. If (X0, s0) = bottom(X, s)
and (X1, s1) = bottom(X




Proof. By Lemma 5.5.9, the raise invocations of the bottom-level auction in-
stances with inputs X and subst(X, u, u′) can be reordered such that at each
round, either the same agent invokes raise in both executions, or agents u and
u′ invoke raise in their corresponding executions. Since agents u and u′ have
the same relative ordering with respect to the agents in agents(X) − u, it is
easy to see that if X0 and X
′
0 are the output ECCs corresponding to the same
round in both executions, then we have X ′0 = subst(X0, u, u
′).
Lemma 6.1.3. For any quiescent ECC X ′ of the form add(X, u, v, z) and any
target s, there exists a unique integer z∗ and a unique agent u∗ in agents(X)+ε
such that u belongs to matched(X ′, s) if and only if (z + s(u), u) > (z∗, u∗).
Moreover, if u belongs to matched(X ′, s), then potential(X ′′, v) = z∗ where
(X ′′, s′′) = bottom(X ′, s).
Proof. Let S be the ordered sequence of all pairs of the form (z′, u′) where
z′ is an integer and u′ is an agent that does not belong to agents(X) ∪ ε.
Consider any pair (z0, u0) in S such that z0 + s0(u) < potential(X0, v), where
s0 = subst(s, u0, α(u)) and (X0, s
′
0) = bottom(add(X, u0, v, z0), s0). By re-
peated application of Fact 5.3.2, we know that potential(X0) ≥ potential(X)
and by repeated application of Lemma 5.4.2, we have u0 belongs to white(X0).
Thus, u0 does not belong to matched(X0). Further, since u0 belongs to
white(X0), it follows that potential(X0, v) ≥ z0. Since prices cannot grow in-
definitely, there must be a first pair (z1, u1) > (z0, u0) in S such that u1 belongs
to matched(X1, s1) where X1 = add(X, u1, v, z1) and s1 = subst(s, u1, α(u)).
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Consider the pair (z1, u2) where u2 is the maximum agent such that u2 < u1.
By Lemma 6.1.2, if u2 does not belong to agents(X) ∪ ε, then u2 and u1
have the same relative ordering with respect to the remaining agents in X
and thus, u2 belongs to matched(subst(X1, u1, u2), subst(s, u2, α(u))). How-
ever, we know that (z1, u1) is the first pair in S such that u1 belongs to
matched(X1, s1). Thus, it follows that u2 belongs to agents(X) ∪ ε. Consider
any pair (z3, u3) > (z1, u1) in S; by the definition of the bottom-level auction,
we find that u3 belongs to matched(subst(X1, u1, u3), subst(s, u3, α(u))). Thus
u∗ = u2 and z
∗ = z1.
We now show that if u belongs to matched(X ′, s), then potential(X ′′, v) =
z∗ where (X ′′, s′′) = bottom(X ′, s). Suppose that potential(X ′′, v) < z∗. Then
consider the case where u < u∗ and z+α(u) = z∗. Since (z+α(u), u) < (z∗, u∗),
we have u belongs to unmatched(X ′′) and since z+α(u) > potential(X ′′, v), we
have u belongs to matched(X ′′); a contradiction. Suppose that potential(X ′′, v) >
z∗. Then consider the case where u > u∗ and z+α(u) = z∗. Since (z+α(u) +
z, u) > (z∗, u∗), we have u belongs to matched(X ′′) and since z + α(u) <
potential(X ′′, v), we have u belongs to unmatched(X ′′); a contradiction. It
follows that potential(X ′′, v) = z∗.
[Definitions] For any quiescent ECC X, any target s, and any item
v in items(X), we define threshold∗(X, s, v) as the unique pair (z∗, u∗) of
Lemma 6.1.3, and we define threshold∗(X, s) as the function that maps each
item v in items(X) to threshold∗(X, s, v). In addition, we define threshold(X, s, v)
as the integer z∗ and we define threshold(X, s) as the function that maps each
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item v in items(X) to threshold(X, s, v).
Lemma 6.1.4. For any quiescent ECC X, any target s, and any agent u in
enabled(X), we have
threshold∗(X, s) ≤ threshold∗(raise(X, u), s).
Proof. Assume threshold∗(raise(X, u), s, v0) < threshold
∗(X, s, v0) for some
item v0 in items(X). Let X0 be an ECC of the form add(X, u0, v0,min(v0))
and let s0 be a target such that
1. s0(u
′) = α(u′) for any agent u′ in agents(X), and
2. threshold∗(raise(X, u), s, v0) < s0(u0) + min(v0) < threshold
∗(X, s, v0)
Note that X0 is quiescent. We have threshold
∗(X, s) = threshold∗(X, s0), and
threshold∗(raise(X, u), s) = threshold∗(raise(X, u), s0); thus,
threshold∗(raise(X, u), s0, v0) < s0(u0) + min(v0) < threshold
∗(X, s0, v0)
Let (X1, s1) = bottom(X0, s0). Since s0(u0) + min(v0) is less than
threshold∗(X, s0, v0), by Lemma 6.1.3 we find that u0 belongs to unmatched(X1).
Since X0 is quiescent and u belongs to unmatched(X0), we have u belongs to
white(X0), and by repeated application of Lemma 5.4.2, we find that u0 be-
longs to white(X1). We conclude that s1(u0) = 0.
By Fact 6.1.1, bottom(raise(X0, u), s0) = bottom(X0, shift(s0, u, 1)),
and by Fact 6.1.3, bottom(X0, shift(s0, u, 1)) = bottom(X1, shift(s1, u, 1)). Since
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threshold∗(raise(X, u), s0, v0) < s0(u0)+min(v0), by Lemma 6.1.3, we find that
u0 belongs to matched(raise(X0, u), s0), and since we established above that
s1(u0) = 0, we have u0 does not belong to matched(X1, shift(s1, u, 1)). Since
bottom(raise(X0, u), s0) = bottom(X1, shift(s1, u, 1)), this yields a contradic-
tion. Thus, we have threshold∗(X, shift(s, u, 1)) ≤ threshold∗(raise(X, u), s).
Lemma 6.1.5. For any quiescent ECC X0 of the form add(X, u, β) and any
target s, if u does not belong to matched(X0, s), then threshold
∗(X0, s) =
threshold∗(X, s).
Proof. Let (X ′, s′) = bottom(X, s) and let (X ′0, s
′
0) = bottom(X0, s). By
Fact 6.1.2, we have bottom(X0, s) = bottom(add(X
′, u, β), s′). By repeated ap-
plication of Lemma 6.1.4, it follows that threshold∗(X ′0, s
′
0) ≥ threshold∗(X ′, s′).
Suppose threshold∗(X ′, s′, v1) < threshold
∗(X ′0, s
′
0, v1) for some v1 in items(X).
Let X1 = add(X0, u1, v1,min(v1)) for some agent u1, and let s1 be a target
such that






′) = α(u′) for any u′ in agents(X0). Note that threshold
∗(X0, s0) =
threshold∗(X0, s1)
Similarly, threshold∗(X1, s0) = threshold
∗(X1, s1).
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Let X2 = add(X, u1, v1,min(v1)); then it follows from above that




2) = bottom(X2, s1); by Fact 6.1.2, we find that
bottom(X1, s1) = bottom(add(X
′
2, u, β), s
′
2). By Lemma 6.1.3, since min(v0) +
s1(u1) > threshold
∗(X ′, s′, v1) and threshold
∗(X ′0, s
′
0) ≥ threshold∗(X ′, s′), u0
is in matched(X ′2, s
′
2). By Lemma 6.1.4, threshold
∗(X ′2, s
′
2) ≥ threshold∗(X, s1),
and since u is not in matched(X0, s1), agent u does not belong to matched(X1, s1);
thus u1 belongs to matched(X1, s1).
Since u belongs to enabled(X1), by Fact 6.1.2, it follows that
bottom(add(X ′0, u1, v1,min(v1)), s
′
1) = bottom(X1, s1)
By Lemma 6.1.3, since min(v0)+s0(u0) < threshold
∗(X ′0, s
′
0, v1), agent u0 does
not belong to matched(X ′0, s
′
1); thus u and u1 do not belong to matched(X1, s1),
a contradiction.
[Definitions] For any quiescent ECC X, any target s, and any item
v in items(X), we define price(X, s, v) as potential(X ′, v) where (X ′, s′) =
bottom(X, s), and we define price(X, s) as the function that maps every item
v in items(X) to price(X, s, v).
[Definitions] For any quiescent ECC X, any target s, and any item v
in items(X), we define price∗(X, s, v) as (price(X, s, v), u0), where u0 is the
maximum agent in agents(X, s, v). In addition, we define price∗(X, s) as the
function that maps each item v in items(X) to price∗(X, s, v).
Lemma 6.1.6. For any quiescent ECC X and any target s, we have
price∗(X, s) ≤ threshold∗(X, s)
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Proof. Assume that there exists an item v in items(X) such that price∗(X, s, v) >
threshold∗(X, s, v). Let (X ′, s′) = bottom(X, s). LetX0 = add(X
′, u, v,min(v))
for some agent u, and let s0 be a target such that
1. threshold∗(X, s, v) < s0(u) + min(v) < price
∗(X, s, v), and
2. s0(u
′) = s′(u′) for any agent u′ in agents(X).
Note thatX0 is quiescent. It is easy to see that threshold
∗(X, s) = threshold∗(X ′, s′) =
threshold∗(X ′, s0); thus threshold
∗(X ′, s0, v) < s0(u) + min(v).
We have bottom(X0, s0) = bottom(add(X
′, u, v,min(v)), subst(s′, u, s0(u))).
Thus, by repeated application of Fact 5.3.2, we have
price∗(X0, s0) ≥ price∗(X ′, s′) ≥ price∗(X, s)
Thus, threshold∗(X ′, s0, v) < s0(u) + min(v) < price
∗(X0, s0, v).
Let (X ′0, s
′
0) = bottom(X0, s0). By Lemma 6.1.3, since s0(u)+min(v) >
threshold∗(X ′, s0, v) we find that u belongs to matched(X
′
0). Since u belongs
to unmatched(X0), we find that u belongs to white(X0); thus, by repeated
application of Lemma 5.4.2, we have u belongs to white(X ′0). However, since
s0(u) + min(v) < price
∗(X, s, v), it follows that u belongs to nonwhite(X ′0),
thus yielding a contradiction. Thus, price∗(X, s) ≤ threshold∗(X, s).
Lemma 6.1.7. Let X0 be a quiescent ECC. Let u0 be an agent in unmatched(X0)
and let X1 be a quiescent ECC of the form subst(X0, u0, u1), where u1 <
u0. Then for any target s such that α(u0) = α(u1), we have gap(X
′
0, u0) =








1) = bottom(X1, s).
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Proof. Let β = bid(bid-graph(X0), u) and let X be the ECC such that X0 =
add(X, u, β). Observe thatX andX1 are quiescent. Let (X
′, s′) = bottom(X, s).
By Fact 6.1.2, we have bottom(X0, s) = bottom(add(X
′, u0, β), s
′) and we have
bottom(X1, s) = bottom(subst(X0, u0, u1), s
′). We refer to the instance of the
bottom-level auction with inputs X0 and s as execution A and we refer to the
instance of the bottom-level auction with inputs X1 and s as execution B. By
Lemma 5.5.9, raise invocations of executions A and B can be reordered such
that agents u0 and u1 exhaust their raise invocations before any other agent
invokes the function raise. If u0 and u1 are unmatched when they exhaust
their raise invocations, then by the description of the bottom-level auction,
agents u0 and u1 have zero utility in executions A and B respectively, and
they continue to have zero utility for the rest of the corresponding executions;
thus gap(X ′0, u0) = gap(X
′
1, u1) = 0.
For the remainder of this proof, we may assume that consider the fol-
lowing cases at least one of agents u0 and u1 is matched by a raise invo-
cation in either execution A or execution B. Let k be the first round in
which either u0 or u1 is matched and let Xk and X
′
k be the output ECCs of
round k of executions A and B. By repeated application of Lemma 5.4.5, we
have gap(Xk, u0) = gap(X
′
k, u1) = 0, and either Xk = subst(X
′
k, u1, u0), or
raise(Xk, u0) = raise(X
′
k, u1).
First we consider the case where Xk = subst(X
′
k, u1, u0). In this case,
u0 belongs to matched(Xk) ∩ white(Xk) and u1 belongs to matched(X ′k) ∩
white(X ′k); thus, by Lemma 6.1.1 we have gap(X
′




Next we consider the case where Xk 6= subst(X ′k, u1, u0). If agents
u0 and u1 have exhausted their raise invocations, then by the description
of the bottom-level auction, they continue to have zero utility for the rest
of the auction; if u0 and u1 have one or more pending raise invocations,
then by Lemma 5.4.5, raise(Xk, u0) = subst(raise(X
′
k, u0), u1, u0), and by
Lemma 6.1.1, we have gap(X ′0, u0) = gap(X
′
1, u1).
Lemma 6.1.8. Let X be a quiescent ECC of the form add(X0, u, β) and for
each item v in items(X), let Xv = add(X0, u, v, z) where z = β(v). Then
for any target s, agent u belongs to matched(X, s) if and only if u belongs to
matched(Xv, s) for some item v in items(X).
Proof. We refer to the bottom-level auction instance with inputs (X, s) as
execution A, and for each item v, we refer to the bottom-level auction instance
with input (Xv, s) as execution Av. We represent the output of round i of
execution A by (Xi, si), and for any v in V , we represent the output of round
i of execution Av by (Xv,i, sv,i). Note that agent u is unmatched and therefore
enabled in all rounds of all executions under consideration. By Lemma 5.5.9,
we choose to defer the raise invocations of agent u in each execution to a round
j in which u is the only enabled agent. Further, we choose to allow the same
agent to invoke raise in each round of every execution.
We now allow agent u to exhaust its raise invocations in rounds j to k
of all executions, where k = j + α(u). We consider the following two cases.
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• Case (1) : (β(v) + α(u), u) < threshold∗(X,α(u), v) for every item v in
items(X).
By Lemma 6.1.3, since (β(v)+α(u), u) < threshold∗(X,α(u), v) for every
item v in items(X), we find that u does not belong to matched(Xv, s) and
thus u belongs to unmatched(Xv,k) for every item v in items(X). Assume
that u belongs to matched(X, s); thus, u belongs to matched(Xk). Let s
′
be a target such that s′(u′) = sk(u
′) for any u′ in agents(Xk) and for any
agent of the form uv where v is an item in items(X), we have (β(v) +
α(u), u) < (s′(uv) + min(v), uv) < threshold
∗(X, s, v). By Lemma 6.1.4,
we have threshold∗(X, s) ≤ threshold∗(Xk, s′); thus, we have (β(v) +
α(u), u) < (s′(uv) + min(v), uv) < threshold
∗(Xk, s
′, v) for any item v in
items(X).
Let X ′ be an ECC that is constructed from Xk as follows: initialize X
′ =
Xk, and for each item v in items(X), set X
′ = add(X ′, uv, v,min(v)).
Consider the execution A′ of the bottom-level auction with input (X ′, s′),
and for any round i of execution A′, let (X ′i, s
′
i) represent the output of
round i of execution A′. We now use Lemma 5.5.9, to allow all agents in
∪v∈items(X)uv to exhaust their raise invocations. If m is the last round of
the raise invocations by agents in ∪v∈items(X)uv, then by Lemmas 6.1.3,
since (s′(uv)+min(v), uv) < threshold
∗(Xk, s
′, v) for every item v, we find
that agent uv belongs to unmatched(X
′
m) for every v in items(X), and








m is quiescent, we have
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potential(X ′m, v) ≥ (s′(uv) + min(v), uv) for every item v in items(X);
thus by Fact 5.3.2, we have price∗(X ′, s′, v) ≥ (s′(uv) + min(v), uv) for
every item v. Since (β(v) + α(u), u) < (s′(uv) + min(v), uv) for every
item v, we have price∗(X ′, s′, v) ≥ (β(v) + α(u), u) for every item v.
However, by repeated use of Lemma 5.4.2, agent u is white at the end of
execution A′, and by our assumption that u belongs to matched(X, s),
we have price∗(X ′, s′, v) < (β(v) + α(u), u) for some item v; this yields
a contradiction. Thus, we have u does not belong to matched(X, s).
• Case (2) : (β(v) + α(u), u) > threshold∗(X, s, v) for some item v in
items(X).
By Lemma 6.1.3, since (β(v) + α(u), u) > threshold∗(X, s, v) for some
item v in items(X), we find that u belongs to matched(Xv, s) for some
item v in items(X). Assume that u does not belong to matched(X, s).
Consider the execution A′ defined as in Case 1 above. By Lemma 6.1.5,
we have threshold∗(Xk, sk) = threshold
∗(X ′m, s
′
m). By Lemma 6.1.6,
we have price∗(X ′m, s
′
m) ≤ threshold∗(Xk, sk). Thus, there exists some
item v in items(X) such that u belongs to unmatched(X ′m) and (β(v) +
α(u), u) > price∗(X ′m, s
′
m, v); this violates the quiescent property of X
′
m.
Thus, u belongs to matched(X, s).
We conclude that agent u belongs to matched(X, s) if and only if u
belongs to matched(Xv, s) for some item v in items(X), as required.
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Lemma 6.1.9. Let X be a quiescent ECC of the form add(X0, u, β), let s be a
target, and for each item v in items(X), let Xv = add(X0, u, v, z), where z =
β(v). Then, we have gap(X ′, u)+s′(u) = maxv∈items(X){gap(X ′v, u)+sv′(u)},
where (X ′, s′) = bottom(X, s) and (X ′v, s
′
v) = bottom(Xv, s) for each item v
in items(X).
Proof. By Lemma 6.1.7, if (X∗, s∗) = bottom(add(X0, u
′, β), s) for any agent
u′, then gap(X ′, u) = gap(X∗, u′). Thus, without loss of generality, we can as-
sume that u > u′ for any agent u′ in agents(X). By Lemma 6.1.8, u belongs to
matched(X ′) if and only if u belongs to matched(X ′v) for some v in items(X0).
Thus, if u belongs to unmatched(X ′), we have gap(X ′, u) = gap(X ′v, u) = 0
for all v in items(X).
We now focus on the case where u belongs to matched(X ′). Let z be the
largest integer such that u belongs to matched(shift(X ′, u,−z)). By Fact 6.1.3,
we have (X ′, s′) = (X ′′, shift(s′′, u, z)) where (X ′′, s′′) = bottom(shift(X, u,−z), s);
thus gap(X ′, u) + s′(u) = gap(X ′′, u) + s′′(u) + z. By Lemma 6.1.8, agent












v, u, z)); thus we




v , u) + s
′′
v(u) + z. Since u belongs to white(X)∩
white(Xv), we have s
′′(u) = s′′v(u) = 0. To complete the proof, it remains to
be shown that gap(X ′′v , u) = gap(X
′′
v , u).
Let the bottom-level auction instance with input (shift(X, u,−z), s) as
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execution A, and for each item v, let the bottom-level auction instance with
input (shift(Xv, u,−z), s) as execution Av. We represent the output of round
i of execution A by (Xi, si), and for any v in V , we represent the output of
round i of execution Av by (Xv,i, sv,i). Since u belongs to unmatched(X), it
follows that u belongs to enabled(X) ∩ enabled(Xv). By Lemma 5.5.9, we
choose to allow agent u to first exhaust its raise invocations in all executions.
Since u > u′ for any agent u′ in agents(X), it follows that for each round j in
which u invokes raise, either u belongs to unmatched(Xj)∩unmatched(Xv,j) or
there exists a first round j such that u belongs to matched(X ′j) and u belongs
to matched(X ′v,j) for some item v in items(X). Since z was chosen to be
the largest integer such that u belongs to matched(shift(X ′, u,−z)), we have
gap(Xj, u) = gap(Xv,j, u) = 0, and thus gap(X
′′, u) = gap(X ′′v , u) = 0.
Lemma 6.1.10. Let X ′ be a quiescent ECC of the form add(X, u, β) and let
(X ′′, s′′) = bottom(X ′, s) for some target s. Let ∆ denote the maximum, over
all items v in items(X), of β(v)+α(u)−threshold(X, s, v), and let V denote the
set of all items v in items(X) such that β(v) + α(u)− threshold(X, s, v) = ∆.
Let u0 denote the minimum, over all items v in V of the second component of
the pair given by threshold∗(X, s, v). Then the following conditions hold:
• If the pair (∆, u) < (0, u0), then agent u belongs to unmatched(X ′′), and
threshold∗(X ′, s) = threshold∗(X, s).
• If the pair (∆, u) > (0, u0), then agent u belongs to matched(X ′′) and,
(1) for every configuration χ in X ′′, there exists an item v in V such
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that match(χ, v) = u, and (2) potential(X ′′, v) = threshold(X, s, v) for
any item v in V .
Proof. First, we show that u belongs to matched(X ′′) if and only if (∆, u) >
(0, u0).
Let v0 be any item in items(X); thus, we find that β(v0) + α(u) −
threshold(X, s, v0) = ∆. If (∆, u) < (0, u0), then by adding threshold(X, s, v0)
to the first component of both pairs, we find that
(β(v0) + α(u), u) < (threshold(X, s, v0), u0)
Similarly, if (∆, u) > (0, u0), we have (β(v0)+α(u), u) > (threshold(X, s, v0), u0).
By Lemma 6.1.3, it follows that agent u belongs to matched(add(X, u, v0, β(v0)), s)
if and only if (β(v0) + α(u), u) > (threshold(X, s, v0), u0). Additionally, by
Lemma 6.1.8, we find that agent u belongs to matched(X ′′) = matched(X ′, s)
if and only if there exists some item v′ in items(X) such that agent u be-
longs to matched(add(X, u, v′, β(v′)), s); thus, we find that agent u belongs to
matched(X ′′) if and only if (∆, u) > (0, u0).
Next we show that if agent u does not belongs to matched(X ′′), then
threshold∗(X ′, s) = threshold∗(X, s). The result follows directly from Lemma 6.1.5.
Finally, we show that if agent u belongs to matched(X ′′), then (1) and
(2) stated above hold. By Lemma 6.1.9, if agent u belongs to matched(X ′′),
then we have gap(X ′′, u) = max v∈items(X){gap(X ′v, u)}, where X ′v is equal
to bottom(add(X, u, v, β(v)), s), and by Lemma 6.1.3, it follows that ∆ =
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max v∈items(X){gap(X ′v, u)}; thus gap(X ′′, u) = ∆. Let v0 be any item in
V . By Lemma 6.1.6, we have potential(X ′′, v0) ≤ threshold(X, s, v0), and
since gap(X ′′, u) = ∆, we have potential(X ′′, v0) ≥ threshold(X, s, v0); thus
potential(X ′′, v0) = threshold(X, s, v0) and condition (1) holds. Now consider
any item v not in V . By definition, we have
β(v) + α(u)− threshold∗(X, s, v) < ∆. (3)
By Lemma 6.1.6, we have
potential(X ′′, v) ≤ threshold∗(X, s, v). (4)
By subtracting (4) from (3), we have β(v)+α(u)−potential(X ′′, v) < ∆; since
u belongs to white(X ′′), agent u attains its highest utility by being matched
to some item in V in every configuration of X ′′ and condition (2) holds.
6.2 A Determinized Raise Operation
We have been dealing with ECCs in the discussion of the bottom-
level auction in the current and previous chapters. The inputs and outputs
of our top-level auction are configurations; accordingly, we define a suitable
determinization of the bottom-level auction.
For any quiescent configuration χ and any agent u in enabled(χ), we
would like to define raise(χ, u) as a specific configuration in raise([χ], u) such
that for any agent u0 in enabled(χ), if u does not belong to matched(χ) ∩
unmatched(raise(χ, u0)), then raise(raise(χ, u0), u) = raise(raise(χ, u), u0).
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In order to do so, we determinize the choice of the augmenting path in function
augment defined in Section 5.2. Specifically, we pick a lexicographically first
(with respect to item identifiers) shortest path.
6.3 Description
The input to the mid-level auction is a pair (χ, s), where χ is a quiescent
configuration and s is a target.
We view the bottom-level auction instance as taking the pair (χ, s) as
input, and updating this pair over a sequence of rounds. A general round of the
bottom-level auction with input (χ0, s0) is defined as follows: if enabled(χ0) =
∅, then the auction terminates; if the minimum agent in matched(χ0)∩enabled(χ0) =
ε then the minimum agent in enabled(χ0) invokes raise; otherwise, the mini-
mum agent in matched(χ0) ∩ enabled(χ0) invokes raise.
The output of the mid-level auction is defined to be bottom(χ, s), the
output of the bottom-level auction when given the pair (χ, s) as input.
Below we establish some key lemmas relating to the mid-level auction.
Lemma 6.3.1. For any configuration χ′ of the form raise(χ, u′), and any
agent u in nonwhite(χ), either (1) u belongs to unmatched(χ′), or (2) u
belongs to nonwhite(χ′), and there exists an item v in items(χ) such that
potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v) and match(χ, v) = match(χ′, v) = u.
Proof. Let X ′ = raise([χ], u′). By definition, χ′ belongs to X ′. The result
follows from Lemma 5.4.1.
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Lemma 6.3.2. For any quiescent configuration χ and any agent u in enabled(χ),
if χ′ = raise(χ, u), then
gray(χ) ⊆ nonblack(χ′) ∧ white(χ) ⊆ white(χ′).
Proof. Let X ′ = raise([χ], u). By definition, χ′ belongs to X ′. The result
follows from Lemma 5.4.2.
Lemma 6.3.3. For any quiescent configuration χ and any agent u in enabled(χ),
we have enabled(χ)− u ⊆ enabled(raise(χ, u)).
Proof. Let X ′ = raise([χ], u). By definition, raise(χ, u) belongs to X ′. The
result follows from Lemma 5.4.3.
Lemma 6.3.4. For any quiescent configuration χ, any quiescent configura-
tion χ′ of the form subst(χ, u, u′), and any target s such that α(u) = α(u′),
if u belongs to matched(χ) ∩ white(χ), then gap(χ0, u) = gap(χ1, u′), where
(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ, s) and (χ1, s1) = bottom(χ
′, s).
Proof. Let X = [χ] and let X ′ = [χ′]. Let (X0, s0) = bottom(X, s) and let
(X1, s1) = bottom(X
′, s). By definition, χ0 belongs to X0 and χ1 belongs to
X1. The result follows from Lemma 6.1.1.
Lemma 6.3.5. Let χ be a quiescent configuration and let χ′ be a quiescent con-
figuration of the form subst(χ, u, u′) such that for any agent u′′ in agents(χ),
we have u′′ < u if and only if u′′ < u′. Let s and s′ be targets such that
α(u) = s′(u′) and α(u′′) = s′(u′′) for any agent u′′ in agents(χ) − u. If
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(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ, s) and (χ1, s1) = bottom(χ




Proof. Let X = [χ] and let X ′ = [χ′]. Let (X0, s0) = bottom(X, s) and let
(X1, s1) = bottom(X
′, s′). By definition, χ0 belongs to X0 and χ1 belongs to
X1. The result follows from Lemma 6.1.2.
Lemma 6.3.6. Let χ′ be a quiescent configuration of the form add(χ, u, β) and
let (χ′′, s′′) = bottom(χ′, s) for some target s. Let ∆ denote the maximum, over
all items v in items(χ), of β(v)+α(u)−threshold(χ, s, v), and let V denote the
set of all items v in items(χ) such that β(v) + α(u) − threshold(χ, s, v) = ∆.
Let u0 denote the minimum, over all items v in V of the second component of
the pair given by threshold∗(χ, s, v). Then the following conditions hold:
• If the pair (∆, u) < (0, u0), then agent u belongs to unmatched(χ′′), and
threshold∗(χ′, s) = threshold∗(χ, s).
• If the pair (∆, u) > (0, u0), then agent u belongs to matched(χ′′) and,
(1) for every configuration χ in χ′′, there exists an item v in V such that
match(χ, v) = u, and (2) potential(χ′′, v) = threshold(χ, s, v) for any
item v in V .
Proof. Let X = [χ] and let X ′ = [χ′]. Let (X ′′, s′′) = bottom(X ′, s). By
definition, χ′′ belongs to X ′′. The result follows from Lemma 6.1.10.
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Lemma 6.3.7. For any quiescent configuration χ and any agents u0 and u1
in enabled(χ), we have
raise(raise(χ, u0), u1) = raise(raise(χ, u1), u0).
Proof. By the definition of the function raise that takes an ECC as an ar-
gument, either u0 does not belong to matched(χ)∩ unmatched(raise([χ], u1)),
or u1 does not belong to matched(χ) ∩ unmatched(raise([χ], u0)). The result





The top-level auction is a sealed-bid unit-demand auction consisting of
two phases. The first phase corresponds to running an instance of the mid-
level auction and the second phase corresponds to solving an instance of the
house allocation problem [37]. The sealed-bid unit-demand auction proposed
in this dissertation is a variant of the top-level auction that admits a fast
implementation.
We provide a formal description of the first and second phases of the
top-level auction in the following sections. Here we briefly mention some of
the high-level ideas underlying the design of the first phase. To ensure that
the price of an item v does not decrease, at the outset of the first phase, we
tentatively impose the following obligation on the agent u who is the target
of item v’s put: Agent u will remain allocated to v at the strike price of v.
Next, we drop the bids of all agents sufficiently until equilibrium properties
1, 2, and 3 of Section 4.3 are satisfied. The first phase then proceeds to
update the tentative allocation and pricing in an iterative manner by invoking
the mid-level auction. In Section 8.7, we discuss a fast implementation of
this iterative procedure. In our fast implementation, each iteration either
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permanently releases an initially tentatively allocated agent from its obligation,
or eliminates an unallocated agent whose unit-demand bid is too low to ever
be allocated. The latter property ensures termination of the first phase.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 7.1 and 7.2,
we describe the first and second phases respectively of the top-level auction.
In Section 7.3, we establish some basic properties of the top-level auction. In
Section 7.4, we show that the top-level auction is truthful.
7.1 First Phase
For any configuration χ, we define top ′0(χ) as follows. Let χ0 be a
quiescent configuration and let s0 be a target such that χ = shift(χ0, s0),
white(χ0) ∩ matched(χ0) = ∅, and for any agent u in unmatched(χ), we
have items(χ0, u) = ∅. We define top ′0(χ) as the configuration shift(χ′, s′),
where (χ′, s′) = bottom(χ0, s0). The uniqueness of top
′
0(χ) is established by
Lemma 7.3.1.
7.2 Second Phase
The second phase of the top-level auction affects only the allocation
and uses a single application of either the TTC algorithm [37] or the TC≺
algorithm of Jaramillo and Manjunath [19] to exchange items within a certain
subset of the allocated agents.
For any configuration χ = (G,M,Φ), we define an instance of the
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house allocation problem on χ as follows. Each agent in black(χ) represents
a house owner and the item matched to u in M represents the house owned
by u. Each agent u in black(χ) is associated with a preference ordering over
the items as follows, where β = bid(χ, u): for any pair of items v and v′, if
β(v)− Φ(v) > β(v′)− Φ(v′), then agent u prefers item v over item v′; ties, if
any, are broken using item identifiers.
For any configuration χ, we define top ′′(χ) as the configuration obtained
by using the TTC algorithm to resolve the house allocation problem defined on
χ. Alternatively, the second phase of the top-level auction can be implemented
using the polynomial time TC≺ algorithm. The TC≺ algorithm has a slower
running time than the TTC algorithm but yields an outcome with stronger
efficiency-related properties than the TTC algorithm. (see Section 8.5 for
details.)
For any instance of the top-level auction with configuration χ as input,
the second phase of the top-level auction takes the configuration χ′ = top ′0(χ)
as input and produces the configuration top ′′(χ′) as output. For any instance of
the top-level auction with configuration χ as input, the output of the top-level
auction is given by top ′′(top ′0(χ)).
Recall that equilibrium properties 1, 2, and 3 of Section 4.3 are satisfied
by the first phase of the top-level auction. In the second phase, item prices and
the allocation of non-black agents remain unchanged. Thus, it is easy to see
that equilibrium properties 1, 2, and 3 are retained in the second phase. The
second phase involves resolving an instance of the house allocation problem on
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the subset of black agents; thus, by definition, equilibrium properties 4(a) and
4(b) are satisfied. Finally, it follows from known results on the TC≺ (TTC)
algorithm that the solution computed in the second phase is in the (weak)
core. This establishes equilibrium property 5 of Section 4.3.
Fact 7.2.1. For any configuration χ′ of the form top′′(χ) where χ = (G,M,Φ)
and χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ′), we have Φ′ = Φ, unmatched(χ′) = unmatched(χ), and
white(χ) ⊆ white(χ′).
Fact 7.2.2. For any configuration χ = (G,M,Φ), if top(χ) = (G,M ′,Φ′),
then Φ′ ≥ Φ.
7.3 Properties
The following lemmas establish basic properties of the top-level auction.
Lemma 7.3.1. Let χ0 and χ1 be configurations and let s0 and s1 be targets
such that (1) configurations χ0 and χ1 are quiescent, and χ = shift(χ0, s0) =
shift(χ1, s1), (2) white(χ0)∩matched(χ0) = white(χ1)∩matched(χ1) = ∅, and
(3) for any agent u in unmatched(χ), we have items(χ0, u) = items(χ1, u) = ∅.
Then, we have bottom(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ1, s1).
Proof. Let s∗ be the target such that for any agent u in agents(χ), we have
s∗(u) = min(s0(u), s1(u)), and let χ = shift(χ
∗, s∗); thus s0(u) ≥ s∗(u). Let S
be the set of agents u in agents(χ) such that s0(u) > s
∗(u). By the definitions
of s0 and s
∗, for any agent u in S, we find that u belongs to enabled(χ0) and
raise(χ0, u) = shift(χ0, u0, 1); by repeated use of this fact and Lemma 6.3.7,
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agents in S can commute their raise invocations forward until each agent u
in S has s∗(u) pending raise invocations and the resulting configuration is
χ∗; thus, bottom(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ
∗, s∗). By a similar argument, we have
bottom(χ1, s1) = bottom(χ
∗, s∗). Thus, bottom(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ1, s1).
Lemma 7.3.2. The second phase of the top-level auction is truthful.
Proof. Consider any configuration χ′ of the form top ′′(χ). The second phase of
the top-level auction, which is implemented using an application of the TTC
algorithm or the TC≺, updates only the matching of black agents. By known
results on the truthfulness of the TTC and TC≺ algorithms, the second phase
of the top-level auction is truthful for agents in black(χ). By Fact 7.2.1, we
have potential(top ′′(χ)) = potential(χ); thus no agent u in nonblack(χ) can
achieve a utility higher than gap(χ, u) by submitting a false bid. Thus, the
second phase of the top-level auction is truthful.
Lemma 7.3.3. For any configuration χ0 of the form subst(χ, u, β), if β 6=
bid(bid-graph(χ), u), then either top′0(χ0) = subst(top
′
0(χ), u, β) or u belongs
to white(top′0(χ)) ∩ white(top′0(χ0)).
Proof. It follows from the description of the bottom-level auction, that ei-
ther u is unmatched in the same round of both bottom-level auction in-
stances and hence u belongs to white(top ′0(χ)) ∩ white(top ′0(χ0)), or u re-
mains matched throughout to the same item in both auction instances and





A sealed-bid auction is said to be truthful if it is a weakly dominant
strategy for every agent in the auction to bid truthfully. Formally, we say
the first phase of the top-level auction is truthful if it satisfies the following
condition: for any configuration χ and any agent u in agents(χ), if χ′ =
subst(χ, u, β) for some bid β in bids(bid-graph(χ)), then
gap(top ′0(χ), u) ≥ gap(χ′′, u)
where χ′′ = subst(top ′0(χ
′), u, bid(χ, u)).
In what follows, we establish Lemma 7.4.3 on the truthfulness of the
top-level auction. We establish Lemma 7.4.1 based on the claim of Lemma 6.3.6
of Section 6.1.1. Lemma 7.4.2 follows from Lemma 7.4.1. The proof of
Lemma 7.4.3 follows from Lemma 7.4.2 and known results on the truthful-
ness of the TTC and TC≺ algorithms.
We use the claims of this section to establish Lemma 8.4.10 on the
truthfulness of our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction in Section 8.4.
Lemma 7.4.1. For any configuration χ, any agent u in agents(χ) where
bid(bid-graph(χ), u) = β′, and any configuration χ′ of the form subst(χ, u, β)
where β is a bid in bids(bid-graph(χ)), we have
gap(top′0(χ), u) ≥ gap(subst(top′0(χ′), u, β′), u).
Proof. Let χ = shift(χ0, s0), where χ0 is a quiescent configuration and s0
is a target such that white(χ0) ∩ matched(χ0) = ∅, and for any agent u in
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unmatched(χ), we have items(χ0, u) = ∅. By definition, top ′0(χ) = shift(χ′0, s′0),
where (χ′0, s
′
0) = bottom(χ0, s0). Note that threshold
∗(χ, s0) = threshold
∗(χ, s0).
Similarly, let χ′ = shift(χ1, s1), where χ1 is a quiescent configuration and s1
is a target such that white(χ1) ∩ matched(χ1) = ∅, and items(χ1, u) = ∅ for
any agent u in unmatched(χ). By definition, top ′0(χ





1) = bottom(χ1, s1).
Let βT = bid(bid-graph(χ), u) and let χ
′′ = subst(χ′1, u, βT ). Assume
that gap(top ′0(χ), u) < gap(subst(top
′
0(χ





gap(χ′′, u) + s′1(u).
We first consider the case where u belongs to unmatched(χ). By re-





1(u) = 0; thus, by our assumption, gap(χ
′
0, u) <
gap(χ′′, u). Since gap(χ′0, u) < gap(χ
′′, u) and u belongs to white(χ′0), we have
gap(χ′′, u) ≥ 1; thus u belongs to matched(χ′1). By Lemma 6.3.7, we choose
to defer the raise invocations of u until a round in which u is the only remain-
ing enabled agent with pending raise invocations. Let (χa, sa) be the input
of the first round in which u invokes the function raise in the bottom-level
auction instance with input (χ0, s0), and let χ
′
a be the configuration such that
χa = add(χ
′
a, u, βT ). Let (χb, sb) be the input of the first round in which
u invokes the function raise in the bottom-level auction instance with input
(χ1, s1), and let χb
′ be the configuration such that χb = add(χ
′
b, u, β). Let S
′ be
the set of items v in items(χ) for which β(v)−threshold∗(χ′b, sb, v) is maximized.
By Lemma 6.3.6, we have potential(χ′1, v) = threshold
∗(χ′b, sb, v); thus, we have
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gap(χ′1, u) = β(v) − threshold∗(χ′b, sb, v) and we have gap(χ′′1, u) = βT (v) −
threshold∗(χ′b, sb, v). By Lemma 6.3.6, gap(χ
′
0, u) = max v∈items(χ)(βT (v) −
threshold∗(χ′a, sa, v)); since threshold
∗(χ′b, sb) = threshold
∗(χ′a, sa), we have
gap(χ′0, u) ≥ gap(χ′′, u); a contradiction. Thus, it follows that
gap(subst(top ′0(χ
′), u, βT ), u) ≤ gap(top ′0(χ), u)
Next we consider the case where agent u belongs to matched(χ). Since
matched(χ0) ∩ white(χ0) = matched(χ1) ∩ white(χ1) = ∅, the definition of
the function shift implies that there exists an item v in items(χ) such that
match(χ0, v) = match(χ1, v) = u. Since agent u belongs to nonwhite(χ0) ∩
nonwhite(χ1), by the description of the bottom-level auction, either we have
match(χ′0, v) = match(χ
′
1, v) = u, or u is unmatched in some round of the
bottom-level auction instances with inputs (χ0, s0) and (χ1, s1). In the case
where match(χ′0, v) = match(χ
′




′), u, βT ), u). In the case where u is unmatched in some round
of the bottom-level auction instances with inputs (χ0, s0) and (χ1, s1), the
analysis is similar to the previous case in which u belongs to unmatched(χ).
Thus, we have
gap(top ′0(χ), u) ≥ gap(subst(top ′0(χ′), u, bid(bid-graph(χ), u)), u)
Lemma 7.4.2. The first phase of the top-level auction is truthful.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 7.4.1 and the definition of truthfulness.
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Lemma 7.4.3. The top-level auction is truthful.
Proof. For any configuration χ0, let f(χ0) denote top
′′(top ′0(χ0)). Consider
any instance of the top-level auction with configuration χ as input and let u
be an agent in agents(χ). Let β = bid(bid-graph(χ), u) and let βT 6= β be
the truthful bid of u. Let χT = subst(χ, u, βT ). We are required to show
that gap(subst(f(χ), u, βT ), u) ≤ gap(f(χT ), u). By Lemma 7.3.3, it follows
that either agent u belongs to white(top ′0(χ))∩white(top ′0(χT )) or top ′0(χT ) =
subst(top ′0(χ), u, βT ).
First, we consider the case where agent u belongs to white(top ′0(χ)) ∩
white(top ′0(χT )). By Fact 7.2.1, we have potential(f(χ)) = potential(top
′
0(χ))
and u belongs to white(f(χ)); thus we have gap(f(χ), u) = gap(top ′0(χ), u)
and gap(f(χT ), u) = gap(top
′
0(χT ), u). By Lemma 7.4.1, we have
gap(subst(top ′0(χ), u, βT ), u) ≤ gap(top ′0(χT ), u)
Thus, we have gap(subst(f(χ), u, βT ), u) ≤ gap(χT , u).
Next, we consider the case where top ′0(χT ) = subst(top
′
0(χ), u, βT ). By
Lemma 7.3.2, the second phase of the top-level auction is truthful; thus,
we have gap(subst(f(χ), u, βT ), u) ≤ gap(f(χT ), u). Thus, any auction that
takes an configuration χ as input and produces the configuration f(χ) =
top ′′(top ′0(χ)) as output is truthful.
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Chapter 8
A Sealed-Bid Unit-Demand Auction with Put
Options
In this chapter, we describe our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auc-
tion with put options.
The top-level auction described in Chapter 7 does not immediately
incorporate bid revision requests of tentatively allocated agents at the be-
ginning of the auction. Instead, the bid of each tentatively allocated agent
is incorporated by a suitable number of raise invocations in the underlying
mid-level auction. Our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction described in
this chapter is a variant of the top-level auction that immediately incorpo-
rates bid revision requests of tentatively allocated agents whenever possible;
consequently our proposed sealed-bid auction admits a fast implementation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.1, we in-
troduce some preliminary definitions. In Section 8.2, we describe our proposed
sealed-bid unit-demand auction. We establish truthfulness of this auction in
Section 8.4 by using results on the truthfulness of the top-level auction from
Section 7.4. In Section 8.5, we establish efficiency-related properties of our
sealed-bid auction. In Section 8.6, we show that our sealed-bid auction main-
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tains bid privacy for tentatively allocated agents. Finally, in Section 8.7, we
describe a polynomial-time implementation in which our sealed-bid auction is
resolved by performing a number of single-source shortest paths computations,
with the number of such computations bounded by the number of agents in
the auction.
8.1 Preliminaries
For any configuration χ, we define targets(χ) as the set of all targets
s such that there exists a quiescent configuration χ0 satisfying the following
conditions:
1. shift(χ0, s) = χ
2. white(χ0) ∩matched(χ0) = white(χ) ∩matched(χ)
3. for any agent u in unmatched(χ) we have items(χ0, u) = ∅
For any configuration χ, we define target(χ) as the unique pointwise
minimum target in targets(χ).
8.2 Description
Consider any instance of our sealed-bid auction with a configuration
χ as input and let χ = shift(χ0, target(χ)). The output of the first phase
of our sealed-bid auction, denoted top ′(χ), is given by shift(χ′, s′), where
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(χ′, s′) = bottom(χ0, target(χ)). The output of the second phase of our sealed-
bid auction is given by top ′′(top ′(χ)). The output of our sealed-bid auction,
denoted top(χ), is the output of its second phase.
8.3 Properties
The following lemmas establish some basic properties of our proposed
sealed-bid auction.
Lemma 8.3.1. For any configuration χ and any targets s0 and s1 in targets(χ)
such that χ = shift(χ0, s0) = shift(χ1, s1), we have
bottom(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ1, s1)
Proof. Let χ = shift(χ∗, s∗), where s∗ = target(χ). Since s∗ is the point-
wise minimum target in targets(χ), we have s0(u) ≥ s∗(u) for any agent u in
agents(χ). Let S be the set of agents u in agents(χ) such that s0(u) > s
∗(u).
By the definitions of targets(χ) and s∗, for any agent u in S, we find that u
belongs to enabled(χ0) and raise(χ0, u) = shift(χ0, u0, 1); by repeated use of
this fact and Lemma 6.3.7, agents in S can commute their raise invocations
forward until each agent u in S has s∗(u) pending raise invocations and the re-
sulting configuration is χ∗; thus, bottom(χ0, s0) = bottom(χ
∗, s∗). By a similar
argument, we have bottom(χ1, s1) = bottom(χ
∗, s∗). Thus, bottom(χ0, s0) =
bottom(χ1, s1).
Lemma 8.3.2. Let χ be any configuration and let χ∗ be the configuration
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such that χ = shift(χ∗, target(χ)). If (χ0, s0) = bottom(χ
∗, target(χ)), then
unmatched(top′(χ)) ⊆ white(top′(χ)) and nonwhite(top′(χ)) ⊆ nonwhite(χ0).
Proof. Let s∗ = target(χ). By definition, we have top ′(χ) = shift(χ0, s0).
Since χ0 is quiescent, we have unmatched(χ0) ⊆ white(χ0) and for any agent
u in unmatched(χ0), we find that agents(χ0, u) ∩ nonwhite(χ0) = ∅. More-
over, these facts imply that by definition of the bottom-level auction, we
have s0(u) = 0 for any agent u in white(χ1); we conclude that u belongs
to white(shift(χ0, s0)), where top
′(χ) = shift(χ0, s0).
It remains to show that nonwhite(top ′(χ)) ⊆ nonwhite(χ0). Consider
any agent u in nonwhite(top ′(χ)); since s0(u) ≥ 0, we conclude that u belongs
to nonwhite(χ0).
Lemma 8.3.3. For any configuration χ and any agent u in nonwhite(top′(χ)),
the following conditions hold: (1) u belongs to nonwhite(χ), (2) there exists an
item v in items(χ) such that potential(χ, v) = potential(top′(χ), v), and (3)
match(χ, v) = match(top′(χ), v) = u.
Proof. Let χ = shift(χ∗, s∗), where s∗ = target(χ). Let (χ0, s0) = bottom(χ
∗, s∗).
By definition, we have top ′(χ) = shift(χ0, s0). By Lemma 8.3.2, u belongs to
nonwhite(χ0); since χ0 is quiescent, we find that u belongs to matched(χ0); fur-
ther, since top ′(χ) = shift(χ0, s0), there exists an item v in items(χ) such that
potential(top ′(χ), v) = potential(χ0, v) and match(χ, v) = match(top
′(χ), v).
By repeated application of Lemma 6.3.1, we find that u belongs to nonwhite(χ∗),
potential(χ∗, v) = potential(χ0, v) and match(χ
∗, v) = match(χ0, v) = u.
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By the description of our sealed-bid auction it follows that u belongs to
nonwhite(χ), potential(χ, v) = potential(χ∗, v), and match(χ, v) = u. These
facts imply that u belongs to nonwhite(χ) and there exists an item v in
items(χ) such that potential(χ, v) = potential(top ′(χ), v), and match(χ, v) =
match(top ′(χ), v) = u.
Lemma 8.3.4. For any configuration χ, we have
nonwhite(top(χ)) ⊆ nonwhite(χ)∧ (unmatched(χ)∪white(χ)) ⊆ white(top(χ))
Proof. Let χ = shift(χ∗, s∗) where s∗ = target(χ). Let (χ0, s0) = bottom(χ
∗, s∗).
We have unmatched(χ) = unmatched(χ∗)∩white(χ∗) and we have white(χ)∩
matched(χ) = white(χ∗) ∩ matched(χ∗); thus unmatched(χ) ∪ white(χ) ⊆
white(χ∗). By repeated application of Lemma 6.3.2, we have white(χ∗) ⊆
white(χ0), and since top
′(χ) = shift(χ0, s0), we have white(χ
∗) ⊆ white(top ′(χ)).
Finally, by Fact 7.2.1, we have white(top ′(χ)) ⊆ white(top(χ)). Thus, we
have unmatched(χ) ∪ white(χ) ⊆ white(top(χ)). By Fact 7.2.1, we have
white(top ′(χ)) ⊆ white(top(χ)); thus nonwhite(top(χ)) ⊆ nonwhite(top ′(χ)).
Lemma 8.3.5. For any configuration χ0 of the form subst(χ, u, β), if β 6=
bid(bid-graph(χ), u), then either top′(χ0) = subst(top
′(χ), u, β) or u belongs
to white(top′(χ)) ∩ white(top′(χ0)).
Proof. Let χ = shift(χ∗, target(χ)) and let χ0 = shift(χ0
∗, target(χ0)). By
definition, we have top ′(χ) = shift(χ′, s′) where (χ′, s′) = bottom(χ∗, target(χ))
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We consider the following cases. First we consider the case where u belongs
to white(χ∗) ∩ white(χ0∗). By repeated application of Lemma 6.3.2, we find
that u belongs to white(χ′), and since s′(u) ≥ 0, we find that u belongs to
white(top ′(χ)) ∩ white(top ′(χ0)).
Next we consider the case where agent u belongs to nonwhite(χ∗) ∩
nonwhite(χ0
∗). It follows from the description of the bottom-level auction,
that either u is unmatched in the same round of both bottom-level auction
instances and hence u belongs to white(top ′(χ))∩white(top ′(χ0)), or u remains
matched throughout to the same item in both auction instances and top ′(χ0) =
subst(top ′(χ), u, β).
Finally we look at the case where u either belongs to nonwhite(χ∗) or
belongs to nonwhite(χ∗0). Without loss of generality, assume that u belongs
to nonwhite(χ∗). It follows from the description of the bottom-level auction,
that either u is unmatched in some round of the auction instance with input
(χ∗, target(χ)) and hence either u belongs to white(top ′(χ))∩white(top ′(χ0)),
or agent u remains matched throughout in the auction instance with in-
put (χ∗, target(χ)) and hence gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(χ, u). It follows that
top ′(χ0) = subst(top
′(χ), u, β).
8.4 Truthfulness
The goal of this section is to establish Lemma 8.4.10 on the truthfulness
of our sealed-bid auction described in Section 8.2. We first establish that for
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any configuration χ and any white agent u in top ′(χ), agent u has the same
utility in top ′(χ) as it does in top ′0(χ) (see Lemma 8.4.7). Lemmas 8.4.8
and 8.4.9 follow easily from Lemma 8.4.7. We use Lemmas 8.4.9 and known
results on the truthfulness of the TTC algorithm and the TC≺ algorithm to
establish Lemma 8.4.10.
Lemma 8.4.1. For any configuration χ′ of the form subst(χ, u, u′), if u is an
agent in matched(χ) ∩ white(χ), then gap(top′(χ), u) = gap(top′(χ′), u′).
Proof. Let target(χ) = s and let target(χ′) = s′. We first show that s = s′.
Since u belongs to matched(χ)∩white(χ), we have α(u) = 0, and since s is the
pointwise minimum target in targets(χ) and u′ does not belong to agents(χ),
we have α(u′) = 0. Similarly, we have s′(u′) = s′(u) = 0. Since s and s′ are
the pointwise minimum targets in targets(χ) and targets(χ′) respectively, we
have α(u′′) = s′(u′′) for any agent u′′ in agents(χ)− u. It follows that s = s′.














1) = bottom(χ1, s). By Lemma 6.3.4, gap(χ0, u) =
gap(χ1, u




Thus, gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(top ′(χ′), u′).
Lemma 8.4.2. Let χ be a configuration and let χA be the quiescent configu-
ration such that χ = shift(χA, target(χ)). Let u be an agent in matched(χ) ∩
white(χ), and let z be an integer such that u belongs to gray(shift(χA, u,−z)).
If u is the minimum agent in agents(χ), then gap(top′(χ), u) = gap(χB, u) +
sB(u), where (χB, sB) = bottom(shift(χ
′
A, u,−z), shift(target(χ), u, z)).
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Proof. Let (χ′B, s
′
B) = bottom(χA, target(χ)). We refer to the executions of the
bottom-level auction with inputs (shift(χ′A, u,−z), shift(target(χ), u, z)) and
(χA, target(χ)) as executions R and R





the outputs of round i of executions R and R′ respectively. By Lemma 6.3.7,
the raise invocations of enabled agents commute. Thus, by repeated applica-
tion of Lemma 6.3.7, executions R and R′ can be reordered such that for any
round i, if S is a nonempty set of agents in enabled(χi)∩enabled(χ′i) such that
si(u
′) = s′i(u
′) > 0, then some agent u′ in S invokes raise in round i + 1 of
executions R and R′. For any round i, we define the predicate P (i) to hold if
(χ′i, s
′
i) = (shift(χi, u,−z), shift(si, u, z)).
First we consider the case where P (i) holds for every round of execu-
tionsR andR′. In this case, we have (χ′B, s
′
B) = (shift(χB, u,−z), shift(sB, u, z)).
Thus, we have gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(χ′B, u) + s
′
B = gap(χB, u)− z+ sB(u) + z.
Since u belongs to white(top(χ)), we have s′B(u) = 0. Thus, gap(top
′(χ), u) =
gap(χ′B, u) + s
′
B.
Next we consider the case where there exists a first round k such that
P (k) does not hold. In this case, it is easy to see that either u belongs to
unmatched(χk) or u belongs to unmatched(χ
′
k); further, since u belongs to
nonwhite(χ′k), we find that u belongs to unmatched(χk). Let u
′ be the agent
in matched(χ′k−1) ∩ unmatched(χ′k). We now allow u to exhaust all its raise
invocations in rounds (k+1)···(k+z) of execution B; thus, we have sB(u) = 0.
Since u belongs to white(top ′(χ)), we have agents(χ′j, u) 6= ∅ for some round
j of execution B where (k + 1) ≤ j ≤ (k + z), and thus, u′ = victim(χ′j, u).
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It is straightforward to see that for any round j > k of execution R, we
have χj = χj+z; thus, χ
′
B = χB. Since α(u) = 0, we have s
′
B(u) = 0, and
we established above that sB(u) = 0. Thus, gap(top
′(χ), u) = gap(χB, u) =
gap(χB, u) + sB(u0).
[Definition] For any configuration χ, any agent u in matched(χ) ∩
white(χ), and any agent u′ such that u < u′ and there exists no agent u′′
in agents(χ) such that u′ < u′′ < u, we define split(χ, u, u′) as the con-
figuration add(shift(χ, u,−z), u′, β) where z is the integer such that β =
bid(bid-graph(χ), u) and max-gap(shift(χ, u,−z), u) = −1.
Lemma 8.4.3. Let χ′ be a configuration of the form split(χ, u, u′) and let χ =
shift(χA, target(χ)). For any integer z such that u belongs to gray(shift(χA, u,−z)),
we have
gap(top′(χ′), u′) = gap(χB, u) + sB(u)
where (χB, sB) = bottom(shift(χA, u,−z), shift(target(χ), u, z)).
Proof. Let χ′′ = shift(χA, u,−z∗), where z∗ is the integer such that max-gap(χ′′, u)
is equal to −1. Let s = target(χ). By the definition of the function split , we
find that u belongs to matched(χ) ∩ white(χ); thus, α(u) = 0. Note that
u belongs to white(shift(χ′′, u, 1)); thus, z∗ ≤ z. By repeated application of
Fact 6.1.1, it follows that (χB, sB) = bottom(χ
′′, shift(target(χ), u, z∗)). Let
χ′A be the quiescent configuration such that χ









We refer to the execution of the bottom-level auction instance with in-
puts (χ′′, shift(target(χ), u, z∗)) as execution A and we refer to the bottom-level
auction instance with inputs (χ′A, target(χ
′)) as execution B. By Lemma 6.3.7,
we can assume that the same agent invokes raise in both executions whenever
possible. From the description of the bottom-level auction, we find that either
u becomes unmatched in the same round of both executions, or u remains
matched in both executions until u′ is the only remaining enabled agent with
pending raise invocations in execution B.
We first consider the case where u is unmatched in the same round of
both executions. In this case, we immediately process the raise invocations
of agent u in execution A and agent u′ in execution B. If χB and χ
′
B are
the resultant configurations of executions A and B after agents u and u′ have
exhausted their raise invocations, then by Lemma 6.3.5, we have gap(χ′B, u
′)+
s′B(u
′) = gap(χB, u) + sB(u), and the proof is complete.
Next we consider the case where u remains matched to some item v in
both executions, all enabled agents have exhausted their raise invocations in
execution A, and u′ is the only remaining enabled agent with pending raise
invocations in execution B. We now allow agent u′ to exhaust its raise invoca-
tions. While u remains allocated for the rest of execution B, the potential of
v remains unchanged; thus u′ attains its highest utility of gap(χB, u) + sB(u).
If u is unmatched by some raise invocation, then the auction terminates with
the potential of item v unchanged, and with u′ attaining its highest utility of
gap(χB, u) + sB(u). Thus, we have gap(top
′(χ′), u′) = gap(χB, u) + sB(u)
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Lemma 8.4.4. Let χ0 be an configuration of the form subst(χ, u, u0) where u
is an agent in white(χ)∩matched(χ), and u0 is an agent such that u0 > u and
there exists exactly one agent u′′ in agents(χ) such that u < u′′ < u0. Then
gap(top′(χ′), u′) = gap(top′(χ′0), u
′
0) where χ
′ is any configuration of the form
split(χ, u, u′) and χ′0 is any configuration of the form split(χ0, u0, u
′
0).
Proof. Let χA be the quiescent configuration such that χ
′ = shift(χA, target(χ
′))
and let χB be the quiescent configuration such that χ
′
0 = shift(χB, target(χ
′
0)).
We refer to the executions of the bottom-level auction instances with inputs
(χA, target(χ
′)) and (χB, target(χ
′
0)) as executions A and B respectively. By
Lemma 6.3.7, the raise invocations by enabled agents commute. Thus, we
choose to defer the raise invocations of agents in the set S = {u′, u′0, u′′} in
executions A and B until S is the only set of enabled agents. Further, we
commute raise invocations in both executions such that whenever possible,
the same agent invokes raise in each round.
For any nonnegative integer i, let χi and χ
′
i be the output configura-
tions of round i of executions A and B respectively. We define the predi-
cate sync(A,B, i) to hold if χ′i = subst(subst(χi, u, u0), u
′, u′0). We define the
predicate coupled(A,B, i) to hold if there exists exactly one maximal set of
items Vi in items(χ) and agents ua in matched(χi)∩ unmatched(χ′i) and ub in
unmatched(χi) ∩matched(χ′i) such that for any agent uc in unmatched(χi) ∩
unmatched(χ′i) such that items(χi, u
∗)∩Vi 6= ∅, we have victim(χi, uc, 1) = ua
and victim(χ′i, uc, 1) = ub.
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Consider the first round j such that coupled(A,B, j) holds; then, by
the definition of the bottom-level auction, it is easy to see that either: (1)
execution A evicts u′ in round j and execution B evicts u′′ in round j, or (2)
execution A evicts u in round j and execution B evicts u′′ in round j. In
case (1), since u′ is evicted by execution A in round j, and sync(A,B, j − 1)
holds, agents u′ and u′0 have zero utility in round j, and by the definition of
the bottom-level auction, u′ and u′0 continue to have zero utility for the rest
of the auction; this completes the proof for case (1).
We now consider case (2). Consider each round i > j of executions A
and B where some agent u1 in agents(χ) − {u′′} invokes the function raise.
If items(χi, u1) ∩ Vi 6= ∅, then it follows that coupled(A,B, i + 1) holds.
Consider the first round k > j in which some agent u1 invokes raise and
victim(χk, u1, 1) = u
′′, thus we have victim(χ′k, u1, 1) = u0. and sync(A,B, k+
1) holds; further, it is easy to see that sync(A,B, i) holds for every round i > k
in which some agent in agents(χ) \ S invokes the function raise.
We now look at executions A and B in a round k when u′′ is the only
enabled agent with pending raise invocations. We consider two cases. We
first consider the case where sync(A,B, k − 1) holds; in this case, u′′ is the
only enabled agent with pending raise invocations in both executions A and
B; thus for any i ≥ k, if coupled(A,B, i) holds, then condition (1) holds where
execution A evicts u′ and execution B evicts u′′ and the proof follows from
the analysis of case (1) discussed above. Next, we consider the case where
coupled(A,B, k − 1) holds; in this case execution A has terminated, and u′′
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is the only enabled agent with pending raise invocations in execution B, and
agents u′′ and u′ are matched in executions A and B respectively. While u′′
and u′ remains allocated for the rest of executions A and B, the potentials
of items on P remain unchanged; thus u′ and u′0 both attain zero utility. If
u′ is unmatched by some raise invocation of execution B, then execution B
terminates and thus, agents u′ and u′0 attain zero utility.
Lemma 8.4.5. Let χ0 be an configuration of the form subst(χ, u, u0) where u is
an agent in white(χ)∩matched(χ). Then gap(top′(χ′), u′) = gap(top′(χ′0), u′0)
where χ′ is any configuration of the form split(χ, u, u′) and χ′0 is any configu-
ration of the form split(χ0, u0, u
′
0).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that u < u0. If there is
no agent u1 in agents(χ) such that u < u1 < u0, then the result follows by
repeated application of Lemma 6.3.5. If there is an agent u1 in agents(χ) such
that u < u1 < u0, then the result follows by induction using Lemma 8.4.4.
Lemma 8.4.6. For any configuration χ and any agent u in matched(χ) ∩
white(χ), if configuration χ′ is of the form subst(χ, u, u′), then gap(top′(χ), u) =
gap(top′(χ′), u′).
Proof. Let χ0 be an configuration of the form split(χ, u, u0) and let χ1 be an
configuration of the form split(χ′, u′, u1). By Lemma 8.4.3, gap(top
′(χ), u) =
gap(top ′(χ0), u0) and gap(top
′(χ′), u′) = gap(top ′(χ1), u1). Further, since χ
′ =
subst(χ, u, u′), by Lemma 8.4.5, we have gap(top ′(χ0), u0) = gap(top
′(χ1), u1).
Thus, we have gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(top ′(χ′), u′).
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Lemma 8.4.7. For any configuration χ such that χ = shift(χ0, target(χ)),
any agent u in matched(χ) ∩ white(χ), and any integer z such that u belongs
to gray(shift(χ0, u,−z)), we have gap(top′(χ), u) = gap(χ1, u) + s1(u) where
(χ1, s1) = bottom(shift(χ0, u,−z), shift(target(χ), u, z)).
Proof. Let u′ be an agent such that u′ < u′′ for every agent u′′ in agents(χ).
Let χ′1 be a configuration and let s
′
1 be a target such that
(χ′1, s
′
1) = bottom(shift(subst(χ0, u, u
′), u′,−z), shift(target(χ), u′, z))
By Lemma 8.4.2, we have gap(χ′1, u
′) + s′1(u
′) = gap(top ′(subst(χ, u, u′)), u′).





Lemma 8.4.1, we have gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(top ′(subst(χ, u, u′)), u′). Thus,
we have gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(χ1, u) + s1(u).
Lemma 8.4.8. For any configuration χ, any agent u in agents(χ), and any
configuration χ′ of the form subst(χ, u, β) where β is a bid in bids(bid-graph(χ)),
we have
gap(top′(χ), u) ≥ gap(subst(top′(χ′), u, bid(bid-graph(χ), u)), u).
Proof. The analysis for agents in unmatched(χ) is identical to the analysis for
unmatched agents in the proof of Lemma 7.4.1, and the analysis for agents in
matched(χ) ∩ nonwhite(χ) is identical to the analysis for matched nonwhite
agents in the proof of Lemma 7.4.1.
We now consider any agent u in matched(χ) ∩ white(χ). Let χ =
shift(χ0, target(χ)) and let z be any integer such that agent u belongs to
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gray(shift(χ0, u,−z)). By Lemma 8.4.7, we have gap(top ′(χ), u) = gap(χ1, u)+
s1(u) where (χ1, s1) = bottom(shift(χ0, u,−z), shift(target(χ), u, z)). Thus,
u obtains the same utility as it would have obtained if its bid had been
shifted down sufficiently to make u gray; it follows that we can restrict at-
tention to bottom-level auction instances that have no white matched agents
in their input configurations. Let χ = shift(χ1, s1), where χ1 is the configura-
tion obtained by shifting down the bid of every white agent in χ0 such that
white(χ1) ∩matched(χ1) = ∅. If (χ′1, s′1) = bottom(χ1, s1), then by definition,




1). The proof now follows from Lemma 7.4.1.
Lemma 8.4.9. The first phase of our proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction
is truthful.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 8.4.8 and the definition of truthfulness.
We use Lemma 8.4.9 and Lemma 7.3.2 on the truthfulness of the second
phase to establish Lemma 8.4.10.
Lemma 8.4.10. The proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction is truthful.
Proof. By Lemma 8.4.9 and Lemma 7.3.2, the first and second phases of our
sealed-bid auction are individually truthful. We now show that the sealed-
bid auction which combines the two phases is truthful. Consider any in-
stance of our sealed-bid auction with configuration χ as input and let u be
an agent in agents(χ). Let β = bid(bid-graph(χ), u) and let βT 6= β be
the truthful bid of u. Let χT = subst(χ, u, βT ). We wish to show that
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gap(subst(top(χ), u, βT ), u) ≤ gap(top(χT ), u). By Lemma 8.3.5, either u be-
longs to white(top ′(χ)) ∩ white(top ′(χT )) or top ′(χT ) = subst(top ′(χ), u, βT ).
First, we consider the case where agent u belongs to white(top ′(χ)) ∩
white(top ′(χT )). By Fact 7.2.1, we have potential(top(χ)) = potential(top
′(χ))
and u belongs to white(top(χ)); thus gap(top(χ), u) = gap(top ′(χ), u) and
gap(top(χT ), u) = gap(top
′(χT ), u). Further, it follows from Lemma 8.4.8
that gap(top ′(χ), u) ≤ gap(subst(top ′(χT ), u, βT ), u). Thus, we conclude that
gap(top(χ), u) ≤ gap(subst(top(χT ), u, βT ), u).
Next, we consider the case where top ′(χT ) = subst(top
′(χ), u, βT ). By
Lemma 7.3.2 on the truthfulness of the second phase of our sealed-bid auction,
we have gap(top(χ), u) ≤ gap(subst(top(χT ), u, βT ), u).
8.5 Efficiency
Recall that put options impose lower bound constraints on item prices.
As a result, we cannot in general achieve efficiency in our auction setting.
Lemmas 8.5.3 and 8.5.4 establish a relaxed form of efficiency for our sealed-
bid auction — the outcome is efficient if the target of every put that is exercised
satisfies voluntary participation and envy-freedom.
[Definitions] For any configuration χ such that unmatched(χ) ⊆ white(χ)
and any agent u in nonwhite(χ), we define admissible(χ, u) as the set of all bids
β in bids(bid-graph(χ)) such that u belongs to white(subst(χ, u, β)). For any
configuration χ such that unmatched(χ) ⊆ white(χ), we define admissible(χ)
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as the set of all possible configurations that can be obtained from χ by replac-
ing the bid of every agent u in black(χ) by a bid in admissible(χ, u).
Lemma 8.5.1. For any configuration χ and any agent u in matched(top(χ))∩
nonwhite(top(χ)), if u belongs to white(subst(χ, u, β)) where β is a bid in
bids(bid-graph(χ)), then u belongs to white(subst(top(χ), u, β)).
Proof. By Lemma 8.3.3, we know that there exists an item v in items(χ) such
that potential(top(χ), v) = potential(χ, v) and match(χ, v) = match(top(χ), v) =
u. Let β be any bid in admissible(χ, u). By definition, β(v)−potential(χ, v) ≥
β(v′)−potential(χ, v′) for any item v′ in items(χ). By Lemma 7.2.2, it follows
that potential(top(χ), v′) ≥ potential(χ, v). Thus, β(v)−potential(top(χ), v) ≥
β(v′) − potential(top(χ), v′) for any item v′ in items(χ). Thus, β belongs to
admissible(top(χ), u).
Lemma 8.5.2. If χ is an configuration such that unmatched(χ) ⊆ white(χ),
then any configuration in admissible(χ) is white.
Proof. Let χ′ be any configuration in admissible(χ). By the definition of
admissible(χ), for every agent u in nonwhite(χ), we have bid(χ′, u) belongs
to admissible(χ, u); thus we have nonwhite(χ) ⊆ white(χ′). Further, for any
agent u in white(χ), we have bid(χ, u) = bid(χ′, u), and thus u belongs to
white(χ′). Thus, configuration χ′ is white.
Lemma 8.5.3. For any configuration χ and any agent u in agents(χ), if u be-
longs to nonwhite(top(χ)), then u belongs to nonwhite(χ) and admissible(χ, u) ⊆
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admissible(top(χ), u).
Proof. By Lemma 8.3.2, we have nonwhite(top(χ)) ⊆ nonwhite(χ). Thus,
u belongs to nonwhite(χ). Let β be any bid in admissible(χ, u); then by
definition, u belongs to white(subst(χ, u, β)). By Lemma 8.5.1, u belongs to
white(subst(top(χ), u, β)). Thus, β belongs to admissible(top(χ), u).
Lemma 8.5.4. For any configuration χ, unmatched(top(χ)) ⊆ white(top(χ)),
and every configuration in admissible(top(χ)) is efficient.
Proof. By definition, top(χ) = top ′′(top ′(χ)). By Fact 7.2.1, we have
unmatched(top ′(χ)) = unmatched(top(χ))∧ potential(top(χ)) = potential(top ′(χ))
and by Lemma 8.3.2, we have unmatched(top ′(χ)) ⊆ white(top ′(χ)); thus
unmatched(top(χ)) ⊆ white(top(χ)).
Let χ′ = (G,M,Φ) be any configuration in admissible(top(χ)). By
Lemma 8.5.2, χ′ is white, and by Lemmas 3.6.1, χ′ is Walrasian; thus, it follows
from Lemma 3.5.2 that M is an MWMCM of G. Thus, χ′ is efficient.
[Definitions] We define a sealed-bid auction to be Pareto-efficient if it
is truthful — so that no agent has an incentive to lie — and it satisfies the
strong version of Condition 5. Lemmas 8.5.5 and 8.5.6 establish the strong
and weak versions of equilibrium condition 5 of Section 4.3.
Lemma 8.5.5. The proposed sealed-bid unit-demand auction is Pareto-efficient
when the second phase of the auction is implemented using the TC≺ algorithm.
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Proof. Consider any configuration χ and let χ′ = top(χ). Suppose by way
of contradiction that there is a nonempty set of agents U0 who can trade
their allocated items amongst themselves such that every agent in U0 ex-
periences an increase in utility. By definition, for any agent u in white(χ′)
and any item v in items(χ), we have gap(χ′, u) ≥ β(v) − potential(χ′, v),
where β = bid(bid-graph(χ), u). Thus, white(χ′) ∩ U0 = ∅. It follows that
U0 ⊆ nonwhite(χ′); this contradicts the Pareto-efficient property of the TC≺
algorithm. Thus, U0 = ∅ and our sealed-bid auction is Pareto-efficient.
Lemma 8.5.6. The proposed sealed-bid auction produces an outcome in the
weak core when the second phase of the auction is implemented using the TTC
algorithm.
Proof. Consider any configuration χ and let χ′ = top(χ). Suppose by way
of contradiction that there is a nonempty set of agents U0 who can trade
their allocated items amongst themselves such that every agent in U0 ex-
periences an increase in utility. By definition, for any agent u in white(χ′)
and any item v in items(χ), we have gap(χ′, u) ≥ β(v) − Φ′(v), where β =
bid(bid-graph(X), u) and χ′ = (G,M ′,Φ′). Thus, white(χ′) ∩ U0 = ∅. It fol-
lows that U0 ⊆ nonwhite(χ′); this is a contradiction to the well established
property that in the absence of strict preferences, the TTC algorithm produces
an outcome in the weak core. Thus, U0 = ∅.
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8.6 Privacy Preservation
A motivating application of the sealed-bid unit-demand auction pro-
posed in this dissertation is the design of a dynamic unit-demand auction in
which each round is implemented using the proposed sealed-bid auction. If the
seller of an item in the dynamic auction has access to the maximum price that
an agent who is tentatively allocated to the item is willing to pay for the item,
then the seller can extract this price by submitting a “shill” offer just below
the agent’s offer. Many dynamic auctions including the popular eBay auction
suffer from shill bidding [38]. Thus, a goal of our proposed dynamic auction
is to ensure bid privacy for tentatively allocated agents. Below we establish
Lemmas 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 which are useful in showing a certain privacy preserv-
ing property of the dynamic auction — no seller can artificially raise the price
of an item by more than one unit without risking forfeiture of sale. Ideally,
we would want to prevent a seller from raising the price of an item even by a
single unit; however, our adoption of tie-breaking to handle degeneracy limits
our auction to giving up one unit in being shill proof.
Consider an agent u with bid β, and let u be white and allocated in an
outcome of our sealed-bid auction. Lemma 8.6.1 establishes that the outcome
of our sealed-bid auction remains unchanged for any bid β′ of u that exceeds β
in all its components. Lemma 8.6.2 establishes that if u has a positive utility,
then the outcome of our sealed-bid auction remains unchanged if u drops all
components of its bid by one unit. It follows from Lemmas 8.6.1 and 8.6.2
that the seller of an item cannot deduce if the offer of an agent who wins the
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item exceeds the price of the item by more than one unit.
Lemma 8.6.1. For any configuration χ and any agent u in matched(top(χ))∩
white(top(χ)), we have top(shift(χ, u, 1)) = shift(top(χ), u, 1).
Proof. Let χ′ = shift(χ, u, 1). Let χ = shift(χA, target(χ)) and let χ
′ =
shift(χ′A, target(χ
′)). We refer to the execution of the bottom-level auction
with inputs χA and target(χ) as execution R and we refer to the execution of
the bottom-level auction with inputs χ′A and target(χ
′) as execution S. Let




i) be the outputs of round i of executions R and S respec-
tively. Let S be the sequence of agents where the ith element of sequence S,
denoted S(i), is the agent that invoked raise in round i of execution R. Simi-
larly, we define S ′ to be the sequence of agents that invoked raise in execution
S. Let j be the round in which u makes its last raise invocation in execution
R.
We first claim that u has the same color in configurations χ and χ′ and
that u is not gray in either configuration. If u belongs to gray(χ), then by
the definition of our sealed-bid auction, u belongs to gray(χ0) and α(u) = 0,
where s = target(χ); thus, u either belongs to gray(top(χ)) or u belongs to
unmatched(top(χ)), which is a contradiction. Thus, u does not belong to
gray(χ). Since χ′ = shift(χ, u, 1), we find that u does not belong to gray(χ′);
it is thus straightforward to argue that u has the same color in configurations
χ and χ′.
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We now show that (1) for all i ≤ j, we have S(i) = S ′(i) and χi = χ′i,
and (2) S ′j+1 = u.
By definition of our sealed-bid auction, χ′0 = shift(χ0, u, 1). Further, we
established above that agent u is non-gray has the same color in configurations
χ0 and χ
′
0. Thus, it follows from the definition of the determinized bottom-
level auction that for all i ≤ j, we have S(i) = S ′(i) and χi = χ′i. Since u
belongs to matched(top(χ)) and u invoked its last raise in round j, we find that
u belongs to matched(χj) ∩ white(χj). Further, since χj = χj′ , we find that
u belongs to matched(χ′j) ∩ white(χ′j) and enabled(χj) = enabled(χ′j). Since
S(j) = u, and by the definition of the function raise, no matched agents were
enabled in round j of both executions, we find that u belongs to enabled(χj+1);
it follows from these facts that S ′(j + 1) = u.
Next we show that S(i) = S ′(i+1) for any i > j. We established above
that u belongs to matched(χ′j) and that u makes its last raise invocation of
execution S in round j+ 1; thus s′j+1(u) = 0. By the definition of the function
raise, we have χ′j+1 = shift(χ
′







j, we have χ
′
j+1 = shift(χj, u, 1) and enabled(χ
′
j+1) = enabled(χj);
further, we established that s′j+1(u) = 0; thus, S(i) = S
′(i+ 1) for i ≥ j.
We now show that if S ′(j + 2) = u′, then raise(raise(χ′j, u), u
′) =
raise(raise(χ′j, u
′), u). From the preceding claim, we have S(j+ 1) = u′. Since
u belongs to matched(top(χ)) ∩ white(top(χ)) and u invoked its last raise in
round j of execution R, it follows that u 6= victim(χj+1, u′). Since χ′j+1 =
shift(χj, u, 1) and S
′(j + 2) = u′, it follows that u 6= victim(χ′j+1, u′); thus, by
150




By repeated application of the preceding argument, the last raise in-
vocation of u in execution S can be commuted to the last round k of ex-
ecution S. Thus, it follows that (χ′k−1, s
′
k−1) = (χB, shift(sB, u, 1)), where
(χB, sB) = bottom(χA, target(χ)).
By the definition of the function raise, we have bottom(χB, target(χ
′)) =
(shift(χB, u, 1), sB). By the description of the second phase of our sealed-bid
auction, it follows that top(χ′) = shift(top(χ), u, 1).
Lemma 8.6.2. For any configuration χ and any agent u in agents(χ), if
gap(top(χ), u) > 1, then we have gap(top(χ0), u) ≥ 1, where χ0 = shift(χ, u,−1).
Proof. Let χ = (G,M,Φ). It follows that χ0 = (G0,M,Φ), where G0 =
shift(G, u,−1). Let β = bid(G0, u). Let top(χ0) = (G0,M ′0,Φ′0) and let
top(χ) = (G,M ′,Φ′). We consider the following cases.
Suppose u belongs to white(top(χ0))∩matched(top(χ0)). By Lemma 8.6.1,
it follows that top(χ) = shift(top(χ0), u, 1). Thus, gap(top(χ0), u) ≥ 1.
Suppose u belongs to white(top(χ0)) ∩ unmatched(top(χ0)). It follows
that gap(top(χ0), u) = 0. Thus, β(v) ≤ Φ′0(v) for every item v in items(χ0).
However, since gap(top(χ), u) > 1, there exists an item v in items(χ0) such
that match(top(χ), v) = u and β(v) − Φ′(v) ≥ 1. Thus, gap(top(χ0), u) <
gap(χ′′, u), where χ′′ = subst(top(χ), u, β). This contradicts Lemma 8.4.8.
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Suppose u belongs to nonwhite(top(χ0)). By Lemma 8.3.4, u belongs
to nonwhite(χ0), and by Lemma 8.3.5, we have top
′(χ0) = subst(top
′(χ), u, β);
thus, it follows from the definition of the second phase of our sealed-bid auction
that top(χ0) = subst(top(χ), u, β). It is now straightforward to see that since
gap(top(χ), u) > 1, we have gap(top(χ0), u) ≥ 1.
8.7 Scalability
In this section we briefly sketch a polynomial-time of our proposed
sealed-bid auction. We say that a bid component is “active” if it is at least
equal to the price (viewing the bid components and prices as pairs, as in the
discussion on white configurations in Section 3.6) of the corresponding item.
We only need to maintain information concerning the active bid components.
We first define an initial tentative pricing and allocation at the start of the
auction: each item is allocated to the seller of its put and has a price equal
to the strike price of its put. The agents that are not tentatively allocated
do not have any active bid components, and so we do not need to maintain
any information concerning such agents. We do not maintain an explicit color
value (black, gray, or white) for each tentatively allocated agent. Instead,
when we need to determine the color of an agent, we do so by examining its
active bid components along with the current prices of the associated items.
We now iteratively process bids of unallocated agents. At the start of
an iteration, our auction state specifies the current pricing and allocation, the
target bid of each tentatively allocated agent, and a set of unallocated agents
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for which the associated bids have yet to be processed. We pick an arbitrary
unallocated agent u from the latter set, and in the style of the well-known
Hungarian algorithm for weighted bipartite matching [24], or the closely re-
lated successive shortest paths algorithm [2, Chapter 9], we proceed to update
the tentative pricing and allocation to account for the bid of u. The high-level
strategy is to grow a Hungarian tree (which involves increasing certain prices,
while maintaining the allocation) rooted at u until one of the following two
conditions occurs: (1) one or more nonwhite tentatively allocated agents enter
the tree; (2) the utility of u or one or more of the white tentatively allocated
agents drops to zero.
If (2) occurs before (1), then we update the allocation via an aug-
mentation that unallocates (and discards) the minimum zero-utility agent,
and allocates u. (If agent u is itself the minimum zero-utility agent, then no
augmentation is performed, and the allocation remains unchanged.) Using a
standard primal-dual approach [25], it is possible to update the pricing and
allocation in time proportional to the time required to solve a single-source
shortest paths (SSSP) problem [8, 11] on the active subgraph of the current
bid-graph. For a directed graph with n vertices and m edges, Thorup presents
an O(m + n log log n) algorithm for the SSSP problem [39]. Thus the time
complexity of the update is close to linear in the number of active bid compo-
nents.
If (1) occurs before (2), then we update the allocation via an augmenta-
tion that unallocates the minimum nonwhite tentatively allocated agent, call
153
it u′, and allocates u. The time complexity for performing this update is the
same as in the case of the preceding paragraph. The difference is that here we
cannot necessarily discard agent u′. In particular, if agent u′ was black before
the update, then it may still have one or more active bid components; if so,
we add agent u′ to the set of unallocated agents for which the associated bids
have yet to be processed. While the size of the latter set does not decrease
(because we removed u and added u′), we are able to prove that the number of
black tentatively allocated agents has decreased by at least one. Consequently,
in any execution of the main auction, the total number of SSSP computations
performed is at most the total number of agents in the auction.
Recall that our proposed sealed-bid auction consists of two phases. The
foregoing discussion has focused on the implementation of the first phase. In
the second phase, any black tentatively allocated agents are given the oppor-
tunity to exchange items with one another. As discussed in Section 7.2, either
the TTC algorithm or the TC≺ algorithm is used to update the allocation, and
the item prices are left unchanged. The second phase of our sealed-bid auction
can be implemented in linear time in the size of the active bid-graph using the
TTC algorithm [37], and in polynomial time using the TC≺ algorithm [19].
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Chapter 9
A Dynamic Unit-Demand Auction Supporting
Arbitrary Bid Revision
In this section, we present our proposed dynamic unit-demand auction
supporting arbitrary bid revision. The dynamic auction proceeds in rounds
and a single application of the sealed-bid unit-demand auction with put options
described in Chapter 8 is used to update the tentative allocation and pricing in
each round. The output of the last round determines the final allocation and
pricing. Below we give an informal description of the input to each application
of the sealed-bud auction.
At the beginning of the first round, the tentative pricing is given by the
starting prices of the items. Each item v is tentatively allocated to a “dummy
agent” for item v whose bid is a single offer on v equal to the reserve price of
v. There may be other (non-dummy) agents present in the first round, each
of whom has an associated unit-demand bid, which may be arbitrary.
At the beginning of any non-first round, the tentative allocation and
pricing is given by the solution to the application of the sealed-bid auction
associated with the previous round. The set of agents appearing in the round
is equal to the union of the following two sets: (1) agents that were tentatively
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allocated at the end of the previous round; (2) (non-dummy) agents that were
not tentatively allocated at the end of the previous round, and are submitting
a new unit-demand bid in the current round. For each agent u in set (1), the
associated unit-demand bid in the current round is determined as follows: if
u submits a revised bid in this round, then this revised bid is taken to be the
bid of u; otherwise, the bid of u is taken to be the same as in the previous
round. We do not allow a dummy agent to revise its bid, since the bid of a
dummy agent is merely intended to model the fixed reserve price of the seller.
The rest of this chapter in organized as follows. In Section 9.1, we pro-
vide a formal description of the dynamic auction. In Section 9.2, we introduce
some auxiliary definitions that are required in Section 9.3. In Section 9.3, we
discuss properties of the dynamic auction related to truthfulness, efficiency,
and shill-resistance. In Section 9.4, we discuss an implementation of the dy-
namic auction with a fast amortized time bound for processing each bidding
operation.
9.1 Description
The input to the first round of the dynamic auction is a configuration χ
satisfying the following conditions: (1) for any item v is items(χ), the integer
min(v) is equal to the seller-specified starting price of item v; (2) there exists
exactly |items(χ)| agents in agents(χ) that are designated as dummy agents,
and for any dummy agent u and any non-dummy agent u′ in the set agents(χ),
we have u < u′; (3) for any item v in items(χ), there is a dummy agent u in
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agents(χ) such that w(u, v) is equal to the seller-specified reserve price of v
(which is required to be at least the starting price of v), match(χ, v) = u, and
w(u, v′) = min(v′)− 1 for any item v′ in items(χ)− v.
Each round of the dynamic auction is resolved using the sealed-bid unit-
demand auction with put options described in Chapter 8. We now describe
the input of a general non-first round of the auction. Let χ = (G,M,Φ) where
G = (U, V, w) be the output of round i− 1 of the auction. The input to round
i is a configuration χ′ of the form (G′,M,Φ) where G′ = (U ′, V, w′) satisfying
the following conditions: (1) U does not include an agent u in unmatched(χ)
if u is either a dummy agent or if u did not submit a bid in round i, (2) For
each item v in V and for each agent u that is either a dummy agent or is in
matched(χ) and did not submit a bid in round i, w′(u, v) = w(u, v).
9.2 Auxiliary Definitions
A dynamic unit-demand auction D is a sequence of sealed-bid unit-
demand auctions where each round of the dynamic auction is resolved using
the corresponding sealed-bid auction in the sequence.
For any execution of a dynamic unit-demand auction, we have an asso-
ciated history of bids that specifies the bids received in each round. We define
a bid-history H as a sequence of sets of bids where each set includes a unit-
demand bid for each agent in the auction. For any bid-history H, we define
length(H) as the length of the sequence H. For any bid-history H and any
nonnegative integer i ≤ length(H), we define prefix (H, i) as the prefix of H of
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length i. For any bid-history H, we define prefix (H) as prefix (H, length(H)−
1). For any bid-history H and any agent u, we define bid(H, u) as the bid
of agent u in the last set of bids of sequence H. For any bid-history H, any
agent u, and any bid β, we define subst(H, u, β) as the history H ′ obtained by
substituting bid(H, u) with β.
For any dynamic unit-demand auction D and any bid-history H, we
define config(D,H) as the output configuration obtained by running auction
D on bid-history H. It follows that for any dynamic unit-demand auction D
and any bid-history H, the input and output configurations of each round of
auction D can be deduced for the sequence of bids in H.
For any configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) where G = (U, V, w), and any
agent u in U , we define envy-free(χ, u) to hold if gap(χ, u) ≥ 0 and gap(χ, u) ≥
w(u, v) for any item v in V . For any configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) and any
agent u such that ¬envy-free(χ, u), we define admissible(χ, u) as the set of all
bids β in bids(G) such that envy-free(subst(χ, u, β), u).
For any bid-history H and any agent u, we say submit(H, u) holds if
bid(H, u) 6= bid(prefix (H), u).
9.3 Properties
Recall that a dynamic auction is essentially a sequence of sealed-bid
auctions. We say a dynamic unit-demand auction satisfies property 1 if each
round of the dynamic auction satisfies property 1 of Section 4.3. We de-
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fine what it means for a dynamic unit-demand auction to satisfy proper-
ties 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 similarly. In this section, we establish properties of
any dynamic unit-demand auction that satisfies certain subsets of properties 1
through 6. Theorems 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 establish efficiency-related properties of
the dynamic auction and are discussed in Section 9.3.2. Theorem 9.3.3 estab-
lishes a certain shill-resistant property of the dynamic auction and is discussed
in Section 9.3.3.
9.3.1 Truthfulness
As we have previously noted in Section 8.4, the sealed-bid unit-demand
auction with put options is truthful. Since each round of the dynamic auction
is resolved using this sealed-bid auction, it follows that each round of the
dynamic auction is truthful.
9.3.2 Efficiency
Each round of the dynamic auction implements the solution concept of
Section 4.3. Thus, it follows from property 6 that each round of the dynamic
auction produces an outcome that is either (strong version) Pareto-efficient,
or (weak version) contained in the weak core.
In Theorems 9.3.1 and 9.3.2, we establish efficiency-related properties
that hold over multiple rounds of the dynamic auction. We now informally
motivate the claims of Theorems 9.3.1 and 9.3.2.
Theorem 9.3.1 establishes that if an agent u is envy-free in a round, then
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agent u remains envy-free in each subsequent round in which u’s preference
does not change and u does not submit a bid.
Consider an agent u who is tentatively allocated to an item v. Assume
that agent u submits a bid revision request in round i of the auction, thereby
expressing a desire to be allocated to some item v′ different from v. After
round i, agent u may not be envy-free; informally, this means that the revised
bid of u is not fully respected by the auction. Theorem 9.3.2 establishes that
in each round subsequent to round i in which u’s preference does not change,
u does not submit a bid revision request, and u remains allocated to the same
item, the dynamic auction makes progress towards respecting the revised bid
submitted by u in round i. Specifically, with each successive round, the revised
bid of u can only find better and better approximations in the growing set of
admissible bids.
Lemma 9.3.1. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies prop-
erties 1 and 3, any agent u in auction D, and any bid-history H, if u belongs
to unmatched(config(D, prefix(H))), then we have envy-free(config(D,H), u).
Proof. Let configuration χ = config(D, prefix (H)) and let configuration χ′ =
config(D,H). By property 1 of auction D, configuration χ′ is semi-Walrasian.
If u belongs to unmatched(χ′), then by the definition of semi-Walrasian config-
urations, we have envy-free(χ′, u). We now consider the case where u belongs
to matched(χ′). Let v be the item such that match(χ′, v) = u. Suppose
¬envy-free(χ′, u); then by the definition of semi-Walrasian configurations and
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the definition of items that are priced above market, item v is priced above
market. By property 4(a) of auction D, if v is priced above market, then agent
u belongs to matched(χ), a contradiction. Thus, envy-free(χ′, u).
Lemma 9.3.2. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies prop-
erties 1, 2, 3, and 4, any bid-history H, and any agent u, if ¬submit(H, u)
and envy-free(config(D, prefix(H)), u), then envy-free(config(D,H), u).
Proof. Let configuration χ = config(D, prefix (H)) and let configuration χ′ =
config(D,H). If agent u belongs to unmatched(χ), then the result follows
from Lemma 9.3.1. We now focus on the case where u belongs to matched(χ).
By property 1 of auction D, configurations χ and χ′ are semi-Walrasian.
Suppose ¬envy-free(χ′, u); then by the definition of semi-Walrasian config-
urations, u belongs to matched(χ′). Let v and v′ be the items in auction
D such that match(χ, v) = u = match(χ′, v′). By the definition of semi-
Walrasian configurations and the definition of items that are priced above
market, item v′ is priced above market. By property 4(a), v is also priced
above market. By property 4(b), gap(χ′, u) ≥ gap(χ, u) and by property 3,
potential(χ, v′) = potential(χ′, v′) and potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v). Since
envy-free(χ, u), it follows that gap(χ′, u) = gap(χ, u). Finally, by properties 2
and 3, potential(χ, v′′) ≥ potential(χ′, v′′) for any item v′′ in items(χ) \ {v, v′}.
It follows that envy-free(χ′, u), a contradiction. Thus, envy-free(χ′, u).
Lemma 9.3.3. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies proper-
ties 1, 2, and 3, any bid-history H, and any agent u, if ¬envy-free(config(D,H), u)
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and if u is matched to the same item v in configurations config(D, prefix(H))
and config(D,H), then
admissible(config(D, prefix(H)), u) ⊆ admissible(config(D,H), u)
Proof. Let configuration χ = config(D, prefix (H)) and let configuration χ′ =
config(D,H). By property 1 of auction D, configurations χ and χ′ are semi-
Walrasian. Let β be any bid in admissible(χ, u). By definition, β(v) −
potential(χ, v) ≥ β(v′) − potential(χ, v′) for any item v′ in items(χ). Since
¬envy-free(χ′, u) and χ′ is semi-Walrasian, by the definition of items that are
priced above market, item v is priced above market. By properties 2 and 3,
potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v) and potential(χ, v′) ≤ potential(χ′, v′) for
any item v′ in items(χ)− v. It follows that, β(v)− potential(χ′, v) ≥ β(v′)−
potential(χ′, v′) for any item v′ in items(χ′). Thus, β is in admissible(χ′, u).
Theorems 9.3.1 and 9.3.2 follow directly by induction on Lemmas 9.3.2
and 9.3.3 respectively.
Theorem 9.3.1. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies prop-
erties 1, 2, 3, and 4, any bid-history H, any prefix H ′ of bid-history H, and
any agent u such that envy-free(config(D,H ′), u), if ¬submit(prefix(H, j), u)
for length(H ′) < j ≤ length(H), then envy-free(config(D,H), u).
Theorem 9.3.2. Let D be a dynamic unit-demand auction that satisfies prop-
erties 1, 2, and 3, let H be a bid-history, and let H ′ be a prefix of H. Let u be an
agent in D such that ¬envy-free(config(D,H), u) and let v be the item such that
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match(config(D,H), v) = u. For each j where length(H ′) < j ≤ length(H), if
match(config(D, prefix(H, j)), v) = u and ¬submit(prefix(H, j), u), then
admissible(config(D,H ′), u) ⊆ admissible(config(D,H), u).
9.3.3 Shill-resistance
If the seller of an item in a dynamic auction has access to the maximum
price that an agent who is tentatively allocated to the item is willing to pay for
the item, then the seller can extract this price by submitting a shill offer just
below the agent’s offer. Thus, a goal of the dynamic auction is to ensure bid
privacy for tentatively allocated agents. Below we formalize what it means
for an agent to be shilled by ∆ units for some nonnegative integer ∆. In
Theorem 9.3.3, we establish that no agent in the proposed dynamic auction
can be shilled by more than one unit. A consequence of this shill-resistant
property is that no seller can artificially raise the price of an item by more than
one unit without risking forfeiture of sale. The running time of our auction is
independent of the monetary units used; thus each unit can be considered to
be as low as one cent, making our auction highly resistant to shilling.
We establish bid privacy of an agent u in the auction with respect to the
grand coalition of all agents in the auction except agent u. For any dynamic
unit-demand auction D and any agent u, we define coalition(D, u) as the set
of all agents in D except agent u. The agents in coalition(D, u) are assumed
to learn the following in each round of auction D:
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1. the bids of all agents except agent u,
2. whether agent u submitted a bid in the round,
3. the shape (relative differences between offers) of agent u’s bid, and
4. the pricing and allocation at the end of the round.
Assumption 1 ensures that our dynamic auction preserves the privacy
of agent u even when all of the other agents conspire against u. Assumptions 2
and 3 ensure that our notion of privacy does not merely exploit the fact that
agent u is allowed to submit a bid revision in every round. Assumption 4 is
natural since the dynamic auction publishes the tentative outcome in every
round.
[Definitions] For any dynamic unit-demand auction D, any bid-history
H, and any agent u in auction D, we define possible(D,H, u) as the set of all
bids β such that config(D, subst(H, u, β)) = subst(config(D,H), u, β). The set
possible(D,H, u) corresponds to the set of possible bids of agent u at the end
of the auction that can be deduced by the agents in coalition(D, u). For any
dynamic unit-demand auction D, any bid-history H, any agent u in D, and
any bid β in possible(D,H, u), we define possible(D,H, u, β) as the set of all
integers z such that shift(β, z) belongs to possible(D,H, u).
[Definitions] For any dynamic unit-demand auction D, any bid-history
H, and any agent u, we define risk(D,H, u) to hold if
1. agent u belongs to matched(config(D, prefix (H))), and
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2. there exists a bid β in possible(D, prefix (H), u) such that agent u belongs
to unmatched(config(D, subst(H, u, β))).
For any dynamic unit-demand auction D, any bid-history H, and any
agent u, we say u is shilled out of ∆ units if ∆ is the maximum integer such
that there exists integers i and j > i that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Agent u belongs to matched(config(D, prefix (H, j)))
2. ¬submit(prefix (H, k), u) for each integer k where i < k ≤ j
3. ¬risk(D, prefix (H, k), u) for each integer k where i < k ≤ j
4. gap(config(D, prefix (H, i)), u) ≥ gap(config(D, prefix (H, j)), u) + ∆.
Lemma 9.3.4. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies prop-
erty 1, 2, 3, and 4, any bid-history H, any agent u in matched(config(D,H)),
and any bid β in possible(D,H, u), either envy-free(config(D,H), u), or shift(β, z)
belongs to possible(D,H, u) for any integer z.
Proof. We use induction on the round number i of the auction. For the base
case, we consider i = 1, the first round of the auction. By definition, u is
unmatched in the input configuration of the first round. By Lemma 9.3.1, it
follows that envy-free(config(D, prefix (H, 1)), u).
For the induction step, we consider the case where i > 1. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, the lemma holds for all 1 ≤ j < i. Let χ = config(D, prefix (H, i−
1)) and let χ′ = config(D, prefix (H, i)). If u belongs to unmatched(χ), then
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by Lemma 9.3.1, we have envy-free(χ′, u). We now consider the case where
u belongs to matched(χ). Let v be the item such that match(χ, v) = u. We
consider the following subcases:
• envy-free(χ, u)
If ¬submit(prefix (H, i−1), u), then by Lemma 9.3.2, we have envy-free(χ′, u).
We now consider the case where submit(prefix (H, i− 1), u).
First, we consider the case where v does not belong to items(χ′, u′) for
any agent u′ in unmatched(χ′), then by using property 1 of auction
D and the definition of items that are priced above market, item v is
priced above market. By property 3 of auction D, potential(χ, v) =
potential(χ′, v). Since potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v) and the bid β
submitted by u could be arbitrary, it follows that for any integer z, the
bid shift(β, z) is contained in the set possible(D, prefix (H, i), u).
Next, we consider the case where item v belongs to items(χ′, u′) for some
agent u′ in unmatched(χ′). In this case, by property 1 of auction D,
configuration χ′ is semi-Walrasian, and by the semi-Walrasian property,
we have envy-free(χ′, u).
• For any integer z, the bid shift(β, z) is an element of possible(D, prefix (H, i−
1), u).
First, we consider the case where v does not belong to items(χ′, u′) for
any agent u′ in unmatched(χ′). In this case, by property 1 of auction
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D, configuration χ′ is semi-Walrasian, and by definition of items that
are priced above market, item v is priced above market. By prop-
erty 3 of auction D, we have potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v). Since
potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v) and for any integer z, shift(β, z) is con-
tained in the set possible(D, prefix (H, i − 1), u), it follows that for any
integer z, shift(β, z) is in possible(D, prefix (H, i), u).
Next, we consider the case where v is in items(χ′, u′) for some agent u′
in unmatched(χ′). In this case, by property 1 of auction D, χ′ is semi-
Walrasian, and by the semi-Walrasian property of configuration χ′, we
have envy-free(χ′, u).
Lemma 9.3.5. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies prop-
erties 1 and 6, any bid-history H, any agent u in matched(config(D,H)),
and any bid β in possible(D,H, u), if envy-free(config(D,H), u), then there
exists a smallest integer z0 such that for any integer z ≥ z0, shift(β, z) be-
longs to possible(D,H, u), and either (a) any nonnegative integer is a possible
value of gap(config(D,H), u), or (b) any positive integer is a possible value of
gap(config(D,H), u).
Proof. Let configuration χ = config(D,H) and let v be the item in auction D
such that match(χ, v) = u. Since envy-free(χ, u), we have gap(χ, u) ≥ 0. It fol-
lows that there exists a maximum integer z′ such that, gap(shift(χ, u, z), u) < 0
for any integer z < z′. By property 1 of auction D, χ is semi-Walrasian; since
envy-free(χ, u), by definition, v is priced at market. By property 6 of auction
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D, for any integer z > z′, the bid shift(β, z) belongs to possible(D,H, u). Let
H ′ = subst(H, u, shift(β, z′)). By definition, we have gap(shift(χ, u, z′), u) = 0;
thus, if envy-free(config(D,H ′), u), then z0 = z
′ and any nonnegative integer
is a possible value of gap(χ, u); otherwise, z0 = z
′+ 1 and any positive integer
is a possible value of gap(χ, u).
Lemma 9.3.6. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies proper-
ties 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, any bid-history H, and any agent u in matched(config(D,H)),
if ¬submit(H, u) and ¬risk(D,H, u), then for any bid β in possible(D,H, u),
possible(D,H, u, β) = possible(D, prefix(H), u, β)
Proof. Let configuration χ = config(D, prefix (H)) and let configuration χ′ =
config(D,H). Let v be the item in auction D such that match(χ′, v) = u. Since
β belongs to possible(D,H, u) and ¬submit(H, u), it follows from properties 2
and 3 of auction D, that β is contained in the set possible(D, prefix (H), u).
By Lemma 9.3.4, we know that either envy-free(config(D, prefix (H)), u), or
shift(β, z) belongs to possible(D, prefix (H), u) for any integer z. We consider
the following cases:
• envy-free(χ, u)
By Lemma 9.3.2, we have envy-free(χ′, u). It follows from Lemma 9.3.5
that the possible values for gap(χ′, u) deduced by coalition(D, u) either
include (a) all nonnegative integers or, (b) all integers greater than 0.
Since envy-free(χ, u), by Lemma 9.3.5, there exists a smallest integer k in
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in possible(D, prefix (H), u, β). Since ¬risk(D,H, u) and ¬submit(H, u),
it follows that k belongs to possible(D,H, u, β). By Lemma 9.3.5, we
know that every integer z > k is in possible(D,H, u, β). Thus, we have
possible(D, prefix (H), u) ⊆ possible(D,H, u). Since ¬submit(H, u), by
properties 2 and 3 of auction D, we have
possible(D,H, u) ⊆ possible(D, prefix (H), u)
Thus, possible(D,H, u) = possible(D, prefix (H), u).
• shift(β, z) belongs to possible(D, prefix (H), u) for any integer z
By property 1 of auction D, configuration χ is semi-Walrasian. Since
¬risk(D,H, u), item v does not belong to items(χ, u′) for any agent u′
in unmatched(χ). By the semi-Walrasian property of configuration χ,
item v is priced above market, and by property 4(a) of auction D, u
belongs to matched(χ). Let v′ be the item such that match(χ, v′) = u.
By properties 2 and 3 of auction D, potential(χ, v) = potential(χ′, v),
potential(χ, v′) = potential(χ′, v′), and potential(χ, v′′) ≥ potential(χ′, v′′)
for any item v′′ in items(χ) \ {v, v′}. Thus, possible(D, prefix (H), u) ⊆
possible(D,H, u). Since ¬submit(H, u), by properties 2 and 3 of auc-
tion D, we have possible(D,H, u) ⊆ possible(D, prefix (H), u). Thus,
possible(D,H, u) = possible(D, prefix (H), u).
Theorem 9.3.3. For any dynamic unit-demand auction D that satisfies prop-
erties 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and any bid-history H, no agent in auction D can be
shilled by more than one unit.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an agent u who is shilled by ∆ > 1 in an execution
of auction D with bid-history H. Then, by definition, there exists integer i
and j, where j > im such that the following conditions hold:
1. u belongs to matched(config(D, prefix (H, j))),
2. ¬submit(prefix (H, k), u) holds for each integer k where i < k ≤ j,
3. ¬risk(D, prefix (H, k), u) holds for each integer k where i < k ≤ j, and
4. gap(config(D, prefix (H, i)), u) ≥ gap(config(D, prefix (H, j)), u) + ∆.
Let χ = config(D, prefix (H, i)). If ¬envy-free(χ, u) then β can be arbitrary,
and any integer is a possible value of gap(χ, u). If envy-free(χ, u), then by
Lemma 9.3.5, the possible values of gap(χ, u) either includes (a) all nonneg-
ative integers, or (b) all integers greater than 0. When zero is a possible
value for gap(χ, u), it is easy to see that u cannot be shilled even by a single
unit without coalition(D, u) risking forfeiture of sale. We now consider the
case where envy-free(χ, u) holds and any positive integer is a possible value
of gap(χ, u). By Lemma 9.3.6, we know that possible(D, prefix (H, k), u, β) =
possible(D, prefix (H, k + 1), u, β) for i ≤ k < j. Thus, if u is shilled by
one unit in a round k where i < k ≤ j, then zero is a possible value of
gap(config(D, prefix (H, l)), u) for k < l ≤ j and u cannot be shilled further, a
contradiction. Thus, u cannot be shilled by more than a unit.
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9.4 Scalability
In this section, we briefly sketch the details of a fast implementation of
the dynamic auction. In each round of the dynamic auction, new bid data (i.e.,
bid revision requests from tentatively allocated agents, and bids from unallo-
cated agents) is received and the tentative allocation and pricing is updated
using an instance of the sealed-bid unit-demand auction with put options. Re-
call from Section 8.7 that in the first round of the sealed-bid auction, the bid
of each unallocated agent can be processed in time proportional to the time
required to solve a single-source shortest paths (SSSP) problem on the active
subgraph of the associated bid-graph.
At the start of a round, one or more tentatively allocated agents are
not envy-free. If a tentatively allocated agent u who is not envy-free becomes
unallocated in the round, then u is added to the set of unallocated agents
whose bids are yet to be processed. For each such agent u, the number of
tentatively allocated agents who are not envy-free decreases by at least one
as the only way a tentatively allocated agent can cease to be envy-free is by
revising its bid. Furthermore, when we use an SSSP computation to process
the bid of the now-unallocated agent u, we can charge the cost of this SSSP
computation to the most recent bid revision of u. Consequently, the total
number of SSSP computations performed across all rounds is at most the
total number of bidding operations (i.e., bid revisions or new bids) over all
rounds.
For our fast implementation, we choose the TTC [37] algorithm to
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implement the second phase of the sealed-bid auction used in each round.
From Section 8.7, the TTC algorithm can be implemented in time linear in
the size of the active subgraph.
In summary, it is possible to implement the dynamic auction in such a
way that the amortized cost of each bidding operation is close to linear in the
size of the active subgraph of the bid-graph, which is at most quadratic in the
number of items. Moreover, in many practical auction settings, the average
number of active bid components of a tentatively allocated agent is likely to
be small, say at most a constant. In such settings, the number of active bid
components is linear in the number of items, and hence the amortized cost of




In this section we describe how to modify our dynamic unit-demand
auction to encourage early bidding, while preserving all of the theoretical prop-
erties established earlier in the preceding chapters. In Section 10.1 we review a
standard technique for incorporating agent-specific adjustments into the sell-
ing prices of the items. In Section 10.2, we generalize this technique to allow
for price adjustments that may increase from one round to the next. Such
dynamic price adjustments are used to discourage “sniping”, i.e., waiting until
close to the end of the auction to submit a bid. Sniping diminishes agents’
ability to focus value discovery efforts on the most relevant items, thereby
increasing participation costs and degrading efficiency.
10.1 Static Price Adjustments
At the conclusion of a typical single-item online auction, the item is
shipped to the winning agent. The winning agent pays the auction price plus
shipping costs. The cost of shipping is agent-specific, in general, because it may
vary depending on the shipping address. The cost of shipping is typically made
available to the agents during the auction (e.g., via a shipping calculator).
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Viewed more abstractly, the seller publishes a static function adjustment(u)
as part of the auction listing, and if agent u wins the auction, then agent u
pays the auction price plus adjustment(u).
Such an abstraction is also useful for selling an item with multiple
“variants”. For example, consider a computer that can be sold with or without
a monitor. The auction listing for the computer might specify an additional
charge for the optional monitor. Such variant-related charges might be agent-
specific (e.g., due to the cost of shipping the monitor), and in general might
be positive or negative. The auction listing of the seller provides the necessary
information (e.g., shipping calculator, fixed price adjustments for different
variants) to allow each agent u to determine the relevant price adjustment
adjustment(u) to be paid in the event that agent u wins the auction. We view
the adjustment as a function of the agent only, as opposed to the agent and
variant, because the agent selects the relevant variant based on the published
cost adjustments. In this sense, the problem of supporting multiple variants
of an item is reduced to the single-variant case.
The framework discussed above generalizes immediately to the unit-
demand setting, where we have a static price adjustment function adjustment(u, v)
that specifies the amount to be added to the auction price to determine the to-
tal price paid by agent u for item v. It is natural to ask whether the theoretical
properties established for our auction continue to hold in the presence of such
an adjustment function. Apart from the price adjustment performed at the
end of the auction, the computations performed by our auction depend only
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on the non-adjusted bids. Consequently, it is straightforward to argue that
all of the theoretical properties established for our auction continue to hold
with respect to the non-adjusted bids/prices. (Regarding our claim that each
individual round of our auction is truthful, we point out that a non-adjusted
bid of agent u is truthful if the corresponding adjusted bid is equal to the
truthful preferences of agent u.)
10.2 Dynamic Price Adjustments
The static price adjustment framework discussed in Section 10.1 reflects
standard practice in single-item auctions, and generalizes straightforwardly to
the unit-demand setting. We now introduce a variation of this framework
in which there is a separate price adjustment function adjustment i for each
round i of the auction. We require that the choice of the function adjustment i
is determined by the public component of the bidding history up to the start
of round i, and that for any agent u, item v, and rounds i and j such that
i < j, we have adjustment i(u, v) ≤ adjustment j(u, v).
When an agent u wins an item v, agent u pays the auction price plus
adjustment i(u, v), where i is the index of the earliest round such that for all
rounds with index at least i, the output configuration χ = (G,M,Φ) satisfies
w(u, v) − Φ(v) ≥ min(0, gap(χ, u)). Roughly speaking, the latter condition
checks whether agent u’s unit-demand bid still has the possibility of winning
item v in a later round, even if it is left unchanged.
Reasoning as in the case of a static price adjustment function discussed
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in Section 10.1, it is straightforward to argue that our dynamic price adjust-
ment scheme continues to enjoy all of the theoretical properties established
in Chapter 9. In this regard, we remark that our requirement that function
adjustment i is determined by the public component of the bidding history
up to the start of round i ensures that the shill-resistance of the auction is
preserved. (In the absence of this requirement, the choice of the function
adjustment i could reveal private information related to the bids of the tenta-
tively allocated agents.) The scalability of our auction is unaffected since it is
easy to compute the price adjustments to be applied at the end of the auction.
Indeed, we can compute tentative price adjustments at the end of each round
without increasing the asymptotic complexity of processing a round.
The requirement that adjustment i(u, v) is nondecreasing in i is moti-
vated by our desire to encourage early bidding in the auction. Suppose agent
u wins item v, and our price adjustment rule prescribes that agent u pays the
auction price plus adjustment i(u, v). We view the nonnegative value obtained
by subtracting adjustment1(u, v) from adjustment i(u, v) as the “sniping fee”
incurred by agent u for not bidding earlier. (Remark: The term “sniping” is
often used narrowly to refer to submitting a bid in the last few seconds of an
auction. Here we use the term more broadly, since our sniping fee structure
can be multi-tiered to discriminate between bids submitted with arbitrarily
varying amounts of time remaining in the auction.)
We now describe a simple but practically important use case of the dy-
namic price adjustment framework introduced above. Consider a unit-demand
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auction in which the listing of each item v specifies — at the outset of the
auction — the value of adjustment i(u, v) for all agents u and rounds i. For
i = 1, these values can be used to model shipping costs and item variants
as discussed in Section 10.1. The sniping fee applicable to bids submitted
in the first round is zero. For any agent u and round i > 1, the quantity
adjustment i(u, v)−adjustment i−1(u, v) models the nonnegative change in snip-
ing fee from round i − 1 to round i. A potential drawback of this scheme is
that the sniping fees for an item v accumulate even while the item remains
tentatively allocated to the dummy agent for item v (because the reserve price
has not been reached). It may be preferable for the seller of item v to specify
how sniping fees are to grow once the reserve price has been met. Such a more
complex sniping fee schedule — which has a nontrivial dependence on the
bidding history — still falls well within the general dynamic price adjustment
framework introduced above.
We now discuss considerations associated with the design of a suitable
sniping fee schedule for a given item in the auction. For the sake of con-
creteness, we pursue this discussion in the context of a specific popular online
auction format: A continuous auction with a fixed one-week duration. (In a
continuous auction, the tentative pricing and allocation is updated immedi-
ately once a bidding operation is received. Equivalently, we can imagine that
each round corresponds to a fixed, infinitesimally small, interval of time.) Sim-
ilar considerations arise in the design of sniping fee schedules for other auction
formats.
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Under one simple sniping fee schedule for a one-week continuous auc-
tion, the sniping fee might increase linearly from zero — at the time when
the reserve is met — to a seller-specified maximum value at the end of the
auction. However, such a schedule is unlikely to be appropriate. Notice, for
example, that the sniping fee would remain virtually constant over the last
hour of the auction. From the perspective of allowing competing agents to
engage in additional value discovery in response to one’s bid, there is a signifi-
cant difference between bidding with ten seconds left in the auction, with one
minute left, with five minutes left, or with an hour left. This observation leads
us to conclude that the sniping fee should increase more rapidly as the time
remaining in the auction diminishes. For example, it might be reasonable to
make the sniping fee proportional to the logarithm of the ratio of the auction
duration to the time remaining. Doing so results in an additive increase in the
sniping fee whenever the time remaining decreases geometrically, and a geo-
metric decrease in the time remaining has a qualitative impact on the ability




The two main contributions of this dissertation are (1) a sealed-bid
unit-demand auction with put options, and (2) a dynamic unit-demand auction
supporting arbitrary bid revision. Our proposed dynamic unit-demand auction
is essentially a generalization of the eBay auction for the unit-demand setting
and has practical potential. In this section, we offer some recommendations
and extensions for our dynamic auction.
In the foregoing presentation of our dynamic auction, we have assumed
that the set of items for sale in the auction is static. It is straightforward
to modify the auction to allow new items to be introduced in each round.
Further, we have assumed that all items in the auction have the same expiry
time. It is possible to relax this assumption. For example, we can specify a
separate expiration time for each item in the auction, and allow unit-demand
bidding across items that expire within the same interval of time (e.g., the
same day).
The binary string identifiers associated with agents and items in our
dynamic auction provide fixed total orders over the sets of agents and items.
The properties of our auction continue to hold even if these total orders are
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changed from one round of the auction to the next. We recommend using
a single total order over the items for all rounds of the dynamic auction;
for example, this total order could be derived by sorting a fixed set of item
identifiers. We recommend a slightly more complex scheme for determining
the total order over the agents to be used in each round. First, we recommend
that all dummy agents be ordered lower than all non-dummy agents in every
round; this ensures that an item can be sold to a non-dummy agent at the
starting price. Within the set of dummy agents, we recommend using the same
(arbitrary) fixed total order in all rounds.
Within the set of non-dummy agents, we recommend using a dynamic
timestamp-based ordering, where the timestamp of an agent is determined as
follows. In the first round, all agents are assigned the same timestamp. In
any non-first round i, recall that the agents may be partitioned into sets (1)
agents that were tentatively allocated at the end of the previous round; and
(2) (non-dummy) agents that were not tentatively allocated at the end of the
previous round, and are submitting a new unit-demand bid in the current
round. Timestamp i is assigned to all of the agents in set (2). Each agent u in
set (1) is assigned the minimum timestamp j less than i such that u is allocated
in the solution associated with all applications of the sealed-bid unit-demand
auction with put options in rounds j through i− 1. Having determined these
timestamps, we recommend ordering any pair of agents u and u′ participating
in round i as follows: if u and u′ have distinct timestamps, then the agent with
the higher timestamp is considered lower; if u and u′ have equal timestamps,
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then the order of the agents is determined by an arbitrary fixed total order.
The motivation for the proposed dynamic timestamp-based scheme is that it
breaks ties in favor of agents who have been allocated longer.
The single-item auction mechanism employed by eBay is essentially a
dynamic second-price auction. We have shown how to generalize this popu-
lar auction format to the unit-demand case, while supporting arbitrary bid
revision by tentatively allocated agents. Our auction maintains strong prop-
erties related to efficiency, truthfulness, privacy preservation, and scalability.
We have implemented our auction in Java and verified that it is capable of
processing large numbers of bidding operations per second. Such speed is im-
portant in practice, since it is desirable for a dynamic auction to compute and
publish updates to the pricing and allocation in real time.
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